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SUMMARY 
The issue of financing development in developing countries is at the heart of this thesis. The 
latter revolves around four chapters on financing development related matters. The chapter 
1 explores how fiscal episodes in the main traditional OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) donors affect their supply of development aid towards 
developing countries. Evidence is shown that fiscal episodes affect significantly aid supply, 
with a behavioural difference between European Union and Non-European countries in terms 
of aid supply. The chapter 2 deals with the consequences of development aid unpredictability 
and migrants' remittances on fiscal consolidation in developing countries. We find evidence 
that while migrants' remittances exert a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
fiscal consolidation in developing countries, development aid unpredictability does not. These 
results particularly suggest that a better management of the revenues derived from these 
private transfers during their booms could help avoid such situations and allow greater room 
of maneuver for governments’ recipients to implement countercyclical measures during bad 
times. The chapter 3 investigates whether the structural vulnerability of developing countries 
matters for their public indebtedness and evidence is obtained that it does. More specifically, 
we observe the existence of U-curve relationship between this structural vulnerability and the 
total public debt of these countries. Focusing on the specific case of CFA Franc Zone 
countries in chapter 4, we examine the relationship between the structural vulnerability and 
the probability of entering into excessive public debt. We also obtain evidence of a nonlinear 
effect of the structural vulnerability indicator with respect to the probability of entering into 
excessive debt: a rise in the structural vulnerability of these countries increases their 
probability to engage into excessive debt; however this probability declines after a certain 
threshold of their structural vulnerability. These results (both for developing countries and 
particularly for CFA Franc Zone countries) suggest that international development institutions 
such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) should take into account 
such vulnerability in their assessment of the adequate development policies and 
recommendations - especially those related to debt issues -, to these countries.  
 
Keywords: Foreign development aid, fiscal episodes, remittances, aid unpredictability, 
structural vulnerability, public debt, OECD, Developing Countries, CFA Franc Zone 
countries. 
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RESUME 
La problématique du financement du développement dans les pays en développement se 
trouve au cœur de cette thèse. Cette dernière s'articule autour de quatre chapitres sur les 
questions liées au financement du développement. Le chapitre 1 explore les effets des 
épisodes budgétaires dans les principaux pays donateurs principaux de l'OCDE (Organisation 
pour la Coopération et le Développement Economique) sur leur offre d'aide au développement 
aux pays en développement. On observe que les épisodes budgétaires affectent 
significativement l'offre d'aide, avec une différence comportementale en termes d'offre d'aide 
du groupe de pays de l'Union européenne versus le groupe de pays de l'OCDE n'appartement 
pas à L'Union européenne. Le chapitre 2 s'intéresse aux conséquences des transferts des 
migrants et de l'imprévisibilité de l'aide au développement sur la probabilité de consolidation 
budgétaire dans les pays en développement. Les résultats montrent que les transferts des 
migrants affectent positivement et significativement cette probabilité alors que l'effet est 
statistiquement nul pour l'imprévisibilité de l'aide. Ces résultats suggèrent en l'occurrence 
qu'une meilleure gestion des recettes issues de ces transferts durant les périodes de boom 
économique pourrait aider à éviter de telles situations et offrir une marge de manœuvre plus 
importante à ces gouvernements pour la mise en œuvre de politiques contra-cycliques pendant 
les périodes de basse conjoncture. Le chapitre 3  analyse l'existence ou non d'effet de la 
vulnérabilité structurelle des pays en développement sur leur dette publique totale. Les 
résultats suggèrent qu'un tel effet existe: en l'occurrence, on montre l'existence d'une relation 
en forme de 'U' entre la vulnérabilité structurelle de ces pays et leur dette publique totale. En 
focalisant dans le chapitre 4 sur les pays de la zone Franc CFA, nous examinons si leur 
vulnérabilité structurelle conduit les gouvernements à un endettement excessif. Les résultats 
suggèrent que plus ces pays sont vulnérables, plus ils sont enclins à un endettement excessif et 
qu'au-delà d'un seuil de vulnérabilité, leur probabilité d'endettement excessif diminue. Ces 
résultats obtenus aussi bien pour l'ensemble des pays en développement que pour les pays de 
la zone Franc CFA suggère que les Institutions Internationales telles que la Banque Mondiale 
et le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) devront prendre en compte cette vulnérabilité dans 
l'évaluation des politiques de développement ainsi que leurs recommandations – en particulier 
sur les questions liées à l'endettement – pour ces pays.     
 
Mots-clés: Aide publique au développement, épisodes budgétaires, transferts des migrants, 
imprévisibilité de l'aide, vulnérabilité structurelle, dette publique, OCDE, Pays en 
Développement, Pays de la zone Franc CFA.   
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The financing development issue remains a major concern for developing countries (DCs), 
especially the poorest among them – least developed countries (LDCs). These countries could 
finance their development needs by resorting to several sources, one of which is overseas 
development aid (ODA), which includes indebtedness vis-à-vis multilateral institutions; 
indebtedness vis-à-vis private banks in the international financial market; migrants’ 
remittances, etc. The exposure of these countries and specifically LDCs to internal and 
external shocks increases proportionately to their financing needs. The issue of financing 
development is at the heart of this thesis: we first explore how fiscal policy in OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and in DCs is related 
to their financing sources, namely ODA and migrants’ remittances. Second, we assess the 
way in which structural economic vulnerability affects developing countries’ public debt.  
In the first part of the thesis, we examine in Chapter I the effects of ‘large’ fiscal austerity 
measures in OECD donor countries (developed countries) on their aid supply and in Chapter 
II the impact of ODA’s unpredictability and migrants’ remittances on the probability of 
developing countries adopting fiscal austerity measures.     
In fact, the strains on developed countries’ public finances, fuelled by the 2008 financial crisis 
and the subsequent debt crisis in European countries, have once again raised the question of 
financing development in developing countries, mainly through ODA. In this respect, this 
thesis questions how fiscal austerity measures in the main OECD donor countries affect their 
aid supply.                 
In addition, as mentioned previously, migrants’ remittances, defined by Ratha (2003) as the 
‘unrequited, non-market personal transfers between households across countries’, are an 
important source for these countries to finance their development. Therefore, we question 
whether these transfers exert an effect on the fiscal adjustment measures adopted by these 
countries.    
The economic literature has largely established that one of the main characteristics of 
developing countries and specifically LDCs is their structural vulnerability. Guillaumont 
(2009) and Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011) define the latter as ‘the risk of a (poor) country 
seeing its development hampered by the natural and external shocks it faces’. Moreover, this 
indicator is used, amongst others, by the United Nations as one of the criteria for 
identification and graduation of least developed countries (LDCs). Many studies have shown 
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the need to use this indicator to examine the aid allocation criteria (see, e.g., Guillaumont, 
2008; Guillaumont, 2013; Guillaumont et al, 2013). However, this literature has not dealt with 
the impact of this vulnerability on the public indebtedness of developing countries. In this 
thesis, we try to fill this gap by examining the impact of the developing countries' structural 
vulnerability on their public debt. We further investigate the effect of the structural 
vulnerability of CFA Franc Zone countries on their probability of engaging in excessive 
public debt.               
 
Fiscal Episodes and Official Development Aid Supply: The majority of developed donor 
countries have engaged in ‘severe’ fiscal austerity further to the deterioration of their public 
finances, the latter being exacerbated by the recession induced by the 2008 financial crisis and 
the medium- to long-run effect of population aging. The economic literature on fiscal policy 
choices and their economic consequences is large (see, e.g., Alesina & Perotti, 1995, 1997a; 
IMF, 1996, 2010; McDermott & Wescott, 1996; OECD, 1997; Perotti, 1997; Alesina & 
Ardagna, 1998; Alesina, Perotti & Tavarez, 1998; Heylen & Everaert, 2000; Ardagna, 2007; 
Alesina & Ardagna, 2010). All these authors, with the exception of Heylen and Everaert 
(2000), convey the same message: ‘fiscal adjustments, which rely primarily on spending cuts, 
that is, cuts on transfers and on the government wage bill have a better chance of being 
successful and are expansionary’. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) also provide evidence that 
fiscal adjustments that rely primarily on tax increases and cuts in public investment tend not 
to last and are contractionary. Heylen and Everaert (2000) empirically contest the result 
according to which current expenditure reductions, especially the government wage bill are 
the best policy to achieve successful fiscal consolidation. According to them, the likelihood of 
successful consolidation rises if consolidation rises if among others, consolidation relies on 
cutting transfers or on raising direct taxes on business, or if it does neither rely on raising 
taxes on households and labour, nor on cutting government investment or more specifically if 
(in contrast with one of Alesina and Perotti’s and McDermott and Wescott’s most popular 
hypotheses) it does not rely on cutting the government wage bill.    
Although the economic literature has focused on the economic consequences of fiscal 
episodes in OECD members, to our knowledge no study has examined the effects of these 
episodes on their official development aid supplies, even though a few studies have explored 
the impact of fiscal policies in OECD countries on aid expenditure. Interestingly, these few 
studies have not led to converging results in terms of ODA’s impact of fiscal policies: for 
12 
 
example, Faini (2006) finds evidence that a higher budget deficit and higher stock of public 
debt reduce aid, whereas Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) 
find no significant relationship between deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these 
studies explore the effects that fiscal episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate how donors behave in terms of supplying aid 
during fiscal episodes. In other words, we explore the long-run average (LRA) effects of 
fiscal consolidation and stimuli episodes on OECD donor countries’ aid supplies, irrespective 
of their effect on per capita income, and other economic, political, institutional and 
international political economy variables. 
       
ODA unpredictability, migrants’ remittances and fiscal adjustment in developing countries: 
The issue of the consequences of fiscal episodes and particularly fiscal austerity measures in 
developing countries has been the subject of the economic literature. The latter encompasses 
two main strands: the impact of fiscal consolidation measures on macroeconomic variables 
such as growth, investment, savings, etc. and the determinants of fiscal consolidation. 
Whereas the first strand of this empirical literature has been largely explored for both 
developed and developing countries, the second strand, apart from certain scarce studies (such 
as Larvigne, 2010), has focused mainly on developed countries.  
Remittances are considered as an increasingly important source of external funding for a 
number of developing countries, exceeding the levels of foreign aid or foreign direct 
investment (see, e.g., IMF, 2005; World Bank, 2006; Chami et al, 2008; Ratha, 2009). 
Moreover, many scholars, including Ratha (2005), argue that these remittances represent a 
stable source of funding for development, whereas ODA flows have been considered as 
unpredictable (see Vargas Hill, 2005; Celasun & Walliser, 2008), in reference to Paris’s 
declaration on aid effectiveness.  
On one hand, researchers such as Chami, Cosimano and Gapen (2006) provide evidence that 
remittances, by increasing consumption, expand the revenue base and thus allow the 
government to carry more debt or incur more expenditure. On the other hand, Gemmell and 
McGillivray (1998) show that development aid flows’ unpredictability is associated with 
reductions in government spending and/or increases in taxes. In this respect, this chapter 
investigates the impact of migrants’ remittances and the unpredictability of ODA on fiscal 
adjustment in developing countries.   
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The second part of the thesis deals with the consequences of the structural vulnerability of 
developing countries for their public indebtedness. In this respect, Chapter III explores the 
impact of structural vulnerability of developing countries on their public debt and Chapter 
IV focuses on the specific case of CFA Franc Zone countries to assess whether or not 
structural economic vulnerability influences their excessive indebtedness.     
 
Structural vulnerability and public indebtedness in developing countries: Is the structural 
economic vulnerability of developing countries a major determinant of their public debt? 
Developing countries have in general been prone to several types of shocks, such as shocks to 
international commodity prices, natural disasters, conflict-related shocks, global financial 
market shocks, shocks to international interest or exchange rates, shortfalls in external aid 
flows, changes in host country policies for migrant labour, etc.   
According to the World Bank classification, the developing countries group – which is 
different from that of high-income countries – is heterogeneous and includes low-income 
countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) (which include lower-middle income 
countries – LMICs – and upper-middle-income countries – UMICs). While high-income 
countries are highly exposed to market development as well as natural disaster shocks, 
UMICs have greater access to market-related financing and LICs and LMICs have limited 
access to private financing. Many LICs and LMICs have, in fact, benefited from substantial 
debt cancellation under international schemes, such as the heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) initiative and the multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI). However, despite these 
initiatives, the debt problem persists (see, e.g., Christensen, 2005; Rocher, 2007; and 
Cabrillac & Rocher, 2009 for the case of sub-Saharan Africa). In addition, Guillaumont 
(2006) and UNDP (2010), for example, highlight that the greater vulnerability to high levels 
of public debt is owed to a range of structural weaknesses of developing countries, 
particularly the poorest ones. Therefore, the first chapter of this second part (Chapter III) 
seeks to examine the influence of the structural economic vulnerability of developing 
countries on their public debt. In the second chapter (Chapter IV) of the second part of this 
thesis, we focus on a specific group of countries: the CFA Franc Zone countries. 
Structural vulnerability and excessive public indebtedness in CFA Franc Zone countries: 
The CFA Franc Zone is composed of countries that are particularly exposed to external and 
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internal shocks (see, e.g., Guillaumont, 2009, 2011). The choice of this group of countries to 
complete the study in Chapter IV is due to its own nature: the CFA Franc Zone, created in 
1945 during the Bretton Wood agreement, currently comprises two separate monetary areas: 
the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) and the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS). Many theoretical and empirical studies (mainly on the 
European Union) have been conducted on the fiscal discipline and fiscal restructuring in a 
monetary area (see, e.g., Bayar, 2001, 2009; Huges-Hallet & Lewis, 2004, 2005; Castro, 
2007; Tiryaki, 2008, which focus on excessive deficits in the euro area). However, to our 
knowledge, such topics have been scarcely explored in the context of African monetary 
unions, such as the CFA1 Franc Zone. This study focuses on one of the fiscal rules of this 
monetary area (specifically related to public debt) to investigate the impact of structural 
economic vulnerability on the probability of excessive debt of these countries.     
In a nutshell, this thesis comprises two main parts, each of them encompassing two chapters:    
- In the first part, we examine in Chapter I the effects of ‘large’ fiscal episodes in 
OECD countries on their aid supply and in Chapter II, the impact of ODA 
unpredictability and migrants’ remittances on fiscal adjustment in developing 
countries. 
- In the second part, we explore in Chapter III the consequences of structural economic 
vulnerability in developing countries for their public debt and in Chapter IV, we 
focus on CFA Franc Zone countries to assess whether or not their structural 
economic vulnerability influences their probability of engaging in excessive debt.         
                                                          
1
 CFA was defined as ‘Communauté Française d’Afrique’, but is now known as ‘Communauté Financière 
d’Afrique’ for the WAEMU area and ‘Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale’ for the ECCAS area.    
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INTRODUCTION GENERALE  
La question du financement du développement demeure une préoccupation majeure pour les 
pays en développement (PED) et plus particulièrement pour les plus pauvres d’entre eux – les 
pays les moins avancés (PMA) -. Ces pays disposent de nombreuses sources de financement 
de leur développement dont notamment : l'endettement à taux concessionnel (Aide Publique 
au Développement – APD-)  incluant l'endettement de l’Etat autant auprès des institutions 
multilatérales et l'endettement a des Etats développés; l'endettement auprès des Banques 
Privées sur le marché financier international ; les transferts des migrants ;….etc. L’exposition 
de ces pays et plus particulièrement des PMA aux chocs internes et externes accroît 
sensiblement leurs besoins de financement. La problématique du financement du 
développement est au cœur de cette thèse : nous explorons dans un premier temps comment la 
politique budgétaire dans les pays de l’OCDE (Organisation pour la Coopération et le 
Développement Economique) ainsi que celle des PED sont liées aux sources de financement 
que sont l’APD et le transfert des migrants. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à la façon dont la 
vulnérabilité de ces pays (PED) affecte leur endettement public.  
Dans une première partie, nous examinons au Chapitre I les effets des « larges » politiques 
d’austérité budgétaire des pays donateurs (pays développés de l’OCDE) sur leur offre d’APD 
et au Chapitre II, l’impact de l’imprévisibilité de l’APD et des transferts des migrants sur les 
politiques de consolidation budgétaire des PED. 
En effet, les tensions sur les finances publiques des pays développés (PD) que la crise 
financière de 2008 et la crise subséquente de la dette des pays européens ont contribué à 
accentuer, ont remis au goût du jour la question du financement du développement, 
notamment par la voie de l’APD. A cet égard, cette thèse s’interroge sur l’impact des mesures 
d’austérité budgétaire dans les principaux pays donateurs de l’OCDE sur leur offre d’aide 
publique au développement.  
De même, les transferts des migrants définis selon Ratha (2003) comme étant les "transferts 
personnels, sans contrepartie et non marchands entre ménages, s'effectuant d'un pays à un 
autre" sont comme nous le soulignions plus haut, également une source importante de 
financement pour les PED. Comment ces transferts en sus de l’APD affectent-ils les mesures 
d’austérité budgétaire dans les PED ? Cette question est également étudiée ici. 
Par ailleurs, la littérature économique a largement établi que l’une des caractéristiques 
majeure des pays en développement et plus particulièrement des plus pauvres, c’est leur 
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vulnérabilité économique structurelle. Guillaumont (2009) et Guillaumont et Cariolle (2011) 
définissent cette dernière comme étant le risque pour un pays (pauvre) de voir son 
développement obéré par les chocs naturels et externes auxquels il fait face ». Cet indicateur 
est par ailleurs l’un des critères majeurs d’inclusion et de graduation des pays dans la liste des 
PMA par les Nations Unies. Plusieurs études ont d'ailleurs montré la nécessité de considérer 
cet indicateur dans l’examen des critères d’allocation de l’APD (voir par exemple, 
Guillaumont, 2008; Guillaumont et al., 2013; Guillaumont, 2013). Cependant, cette littérature 
ne s’est pas intéressée à l’impact de cette vulnérabilité sur l’endettement public des 
PED. Dans cette thèse, nous essayons de combler ce vide en examinant l’impact de la 
vulnérabilité économique structurelle sur la dette publique des PED. Nous nous intéressons 
par la suite au cas spécifique de la Zone Franc CFA en explorant l’effet de cette vulnérabilité 
sur la probabilité de ces pays de s’engager dans un endettement excessif.   
 
Episodes Budgétaires et Aide Publique au Développement : la plupart des pays développés 
donateurs d’APD se sont engagés dans des politiques d’austérité “sévères” suite à la 
détérioration de leurs finances publiques, aggravée par  récession induite par la crise 
financière de 2008 ainsi qu’en raison des conséquences à moyen et long terme du 
vieillissement de leur population. La littérature économique sur les choix de politique 
budgétaire ainsi que de leurs conséquences économiques est importante : on peut citer par 
exemple, Alesina et Perotti (1995, 1997a), Alesina, Perotti et Tavarez (1998), McDermott et 
Wescott (1996), IMF (1996), OECD (1997), Perotti (1997), Alesina et Ardagna (1998), 
Heylen et Everaert (2000), Ardagna (2007), Alesina et Ardagna (2010) et IMF (2010)). Tous 
ces auteurs à l’exception de Heylen et Everaert (2000) aboutissent à la conclusion que « les 
épisodes d’ajustement budgétaires « sévères » qui consistent principalement en des réductions 
des dépenses publiques (baisse des transferts et des salaires des fonctionnaires) ont une plus 
grande chance de conduire à une baisse de la dette publique et d’être expansionnistes. De 
même, Alesina et Ardagna (2010) montrent que les épisodes d’expansion budgétaire 
consistent souvent en des hausses de dépenses publiques et que, les baisses d’impôt en 
période d’expansion budgétaire seraient plus efficaces en termes de stimulation de la 
croissance économique que les hausses de dépenses publiques. Heylen et Everaert (2000) ont 
empiriquement contesté les résultats relatifs à la consolidation budgétaire, arguant que les 
réductions des dépenses publiques ne sont pas la meilleure politique pour assurer un succès de 
la politique de consolidation budgétaire.   
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Si la littérature économique s’est intéressée aux conséquences économiques des épisodes 
budgétaires (consolidation budgétaire et expansion budgétaire) des pays de l’OCDE, elle n’a 
en revanche pas exploré leurs conséquences sur l’Aide Publique au Développement, même si 
quelques études ont examiné l’impact des politiques budgétaires sur l’offre d’APD de ces 
pays donateurs. Ces peu nombreuses études n’ont justement pas pu aboutir à des résultats 
convergents en ce qui concerne l’impact des politiques budgétaires des pays de l’OCDE sur 
l’APD : par exemple, Faini (2006) montre qu’une hausse du déficit budgétaire et de la dette 
publique dans les économies des donateurs réduisent l’APD alors que Round et Odedokun 
(2004) et Boschini et Olofsgard (2007) n’ont pas pu trouver une relation significative entre les 
déficits budgétaires et l’offre d’aide.   
L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’explorer empiriquement le comportement des donateurs des 
pays développés en termes d’offre d’APD durant les épisodes budgétaires. En d’autres termes, 
nous investiguons les effets des épisodes de consolidation budgétaire et de stimulation 
budgétaire sur l’offre d’APD des donateurs de l’OCDE, indépendamment des effets des autres 
variables macroéconomiques, des variables politiques, institutionnelles et d’économie 
politique internationale.  
 
Imprévisibilité de l’APD, Transferts des migrants et Ajustement budgétaire dans les PED : 
La problématique des conséquences des épisodes budgétaires et plus particulièrement celle 
des politiques d’austérité budgétaire sur les économies des PED ont fait l’objet de la 
littérature économique. Cette dernière comprend deux grandes parties : d’un côté l’impact des 
mesures de consolidation budgétaire sur la croissance économique, l’investissement, 
l’épargne….etc (qui couvrent les pays développés comme les pays en développement), et de 
l’autre, les déterminants de ces épisodes de consolidation budgétaire (qui ont concerné plus 
les pays développés et où très peu d’études ont été réalisées sur les PED – par exemple 
Larvigne, 2010). Dans ce chapitre, nous investiguons l’impact des transferts des migrants et 
de l’imprévisibilité dans les flux d’APD sur les mesures d’ajustement budgétaire dans les 
PED.  
Les transferts des migrants sont considérés aujourd’hui comme une source du financement 
externe du développement des PED plus importante que l’APD et les Investissement Direct 
Etrangers (voir par exemple, Ratha 2009, IMF 2005, World Bank, 2006 et Chami et al., 
(2008)). En outre, ces transferts de migrants sont reconnus comme étant une source stable de 
financement du développement (Ratha, 2005) alors que l’APD a été jugée comme étant 
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imprévisible (Voir Vargas Hill (2005), et Celasun et Walliser (2008)), en référence au concept 
de « prévisibilité de l’APD » adopté dans le cadre de la déclaration de Paris sur l’efficacité de 
l’APD.  
Des chercheurs comme Chami, Cosimano and Gapen (2006) montrent que les transferts des 
migrants, en augmentant la consommation, élargissent la base fiscale et ainsi, permettent au 
gouvernement d’accroître leur dette ou leurs dépenses publiques. D’autres auteurs comme 
Gemmell et McGillivray (1998) ont aussi mis en évidence que l’imprévisibilité de l’APD 
conduit à une baisse des dépenses publiques et/ou une hausse des impôts. A cet égard, l’on 
pourrait se demander si « les transferts des migrants et l’imprévisibilité de l’APD 
conditionnent les choix des mesures d’austérité budgétaire dans les PED ».   
 
La deuxième partie de la thèse s’intéresse aux conséquences de la vulnérabilité économique 
structurelle des PED sur leur endettement public. A cet égard, le Chapitre III explore 
l’impact de la vulnérabilité structurelle des PED sur leur dette publique et le Chapitre IV se 
concentre sur le cas spécifique des pays de la Zone CFA2 pour évaluer si leur vulnérabilité 
économique structurelle n’influe pas sur leur capacité d’endettement excessif.   
Vulnérabilité structurelle et endettement public des PED : la vulnérabilité économique 
structurelle des PED est-elle un déterminant majeur de leur endettement public ? Les PED 
sont en général soumis à plusieurs types de chocs comme par exemple, les chocs des prix des 
matières premières, les désastres naturels, les conflits, les chocs inhérents aux marchés 
financiers mondiaux, les chocs sur les taux d’intérêt ou les taux de change, les fluctuations de 
l’APD, les chocs liés aux politiques de migration des pays hôtes…etc. La classification de la 
Banque Mondiale distingue plusieurs catégories  de pays au sein du groupe des PED: les Pays 
à Faible Revenu (PFR) ; les Pays à Revenu Intermédiaire (PRI) (catégorie au sein de laquelle 
on peut distinguer les pays de la tranche supérieure (PRIS) et de ceux de la tranche inférieure 
(PRII)), et les Pays à Revenu Elevé (PRE). Ces derniers sont exposés aux chocs naturels ou 
aux chocs provenant directement de la dynamique des marchés mondiaux, alors qu’au sein 
des PED, on note que les PRIS ont un accès relativement important au financement par le 
marché alors que les PFR et les PRII y ont un faible accès. Ces derniers ont d’ailleurs 
                                                          
2
 Le sigle CFA initialement défini comme ‘Communauté Française d’Afrique’, est actuellement considéré 
comme ‘Franc de la Communauté Financière d’Afrique’ pour l'Union Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest (UEMOA) et ‘Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale’ la Communauté Economique des Etats de 
l'Afrique Centrale.    
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bénéficié d’un allègement substantiel de leur dette à travers les initiatives PPTE (Pays Pauvres 
Très Endettés) et Allègement de la Dette Multilatérales (IADM). Cependant, en dépit de ces 
initiatives, leur problème d’endettement persiste (voir par exemple, Christensen (2005); 
Rocher (2007) et Cabrillac et Rocher (2009) pour le cas de l’Afrique Sub-saharienne). En 
appui à cette thèse, Guillaumont (2006) ainsi que le PNUD3 (2010) par exemple montrent que 
la vulnérabilité croissante à l’endettement public trouve son origine dans les faiblesses 
structurelles des PED et particulièrement des plus pauvres d’entre eux. C’est dans cette 
optique que s’inscrit le premier chapitre de cette deuxième partie (Chapitre III) qui cherche à 
examiner l’influence de la vulnérabilité économique structurelle des PED sur leur endettement 
public. Dans le deuxième Chapitre de cette deuxième partie (Chapitre IV), nous focalisons 
sur un groupe spécifique de pays : la Zone Franc CFA.  
 
Vulnérabilité structurelle et Endettement excessif dans les pays de la Zone Franc CFA : la 
Zone Franc CFA  est composée de pays particulièrement exposés aux chocs internes et 
externes (voir Guillaumont, 2009, 2011). Le choix de cette zone pour compléter notre étude 
précédente est imputable à sa nature même : la Zone CFA, créée en 1945 durant les accords 
de Bretton Woods comprend deux zones monétaires distinctes - l’Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) et la Communauté des Economique des Etats de 
l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)-. De nombreux travaux théoriques et empiriques portant sur les 
pays développés (notamment l’Union Européenne) ont été réalisés sur la problématique de la 
discipline et la restructuration budgétaires dans une zone monétaire. On peut par exemple 
citer les études relatives aux déterminants des déficits excessifs dans la zone euro (voir par 
e.g. Castro, 2007; Tiryaki, 2008; Bayar, 2001, 2009; Huges-Hallet and Lewis, 2004, 2005). 
Cependant, à notre connaissance de telles études portent rarement sur les PED, notamment 
dans le contexte africain, pour des unions monétaires comme la zone CFA. Ainsi, dans notre 
étude ici, nous nous appuyons sur l’une des règles budgétaire adoptée par les pays de cette 
zone (en l’occurrence celle liée à la dette publique) pour investiguer l’impact de la 
vulnérabilité économique structurelle sur la probabilité d’endettement excessif des pays de la 
zone.    
   En résumé, cette thèse comprend deux grandes parties comportant chacune deux chapitres :    
                                                          
3
 Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement. 
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- Dans la première partie, nous examinons en Chapitre I les effets des « larges » 
épisodes budgétaires des pays donateurs (pays développés de l’OCDE) sur leur offre 
d’APD et en Chapitre II, l’impact de l’imprévisibilité de l’APD et des transferts des 
migrants sur les politiques de consolidation budgétaire des PED. 
Dans la deuxième partie, nous explorons les conséquences de la vulnérabilité économique 
structurelle des PED sur leur endettement public dans le Chapitre III. Cette étude se 
concentre dans le Chapitre IV sur le cas spécifique des pays de la Zone CFA pour évaluer si 
leur vulnérabilité économique structurelle n’influe pas sur leur capacité d’endettement 
excessif. 
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PART I: FISCAL EPISODES, OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AID AND MIGRANT 
REMITTANCES 
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CHAPTER I4: The consequences of fiscal episodes in OECD countries for aid 
supplies. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter contributes to the established literature both on the side of fiscal episodes (for 
e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1995; Alesina et al. 2010) and that of aid supplies (for e.g. Mosley 
1985; Faini, 2006) by investigating the effects of fiscal episodes in OECD donor countries on 
their aid effort vis-à-vis developing countries. We use descriptive statistics provided by 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on episodes of fiscal consolidation and stimuli in OECD 
countries and regression models to perform this analysis. The study is performed on a sample 
of 19 OECD DAC countries as well as on sub-samples and over the period 1970-2007. 
Overall, the results suggest that OECD Donor countries curtail their aid effort during their 
large episodes of fiscal consolidation whereas the effects of large fiscal stimuli episodes 
depend on the aid variable considered. However, the European Union and the Non-European 
countries behave differently in terms of their aid supply. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F35, E62, H62, H85 
Keywords: development aid, fiscal consolidation, fiscal stimuli 
 
 
                                                          
4
 This Chapter has been published in the "Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance", Volume 53, Issue 3, 
August 2013, Pages 302–313. 
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1. Introduction 
In response to the largest post-war recession, OECD governments have run up record 
peacetime budget deficits. The recent financial crisis has constrained them to embark on 
major fiscal stimulus in order to rescue their financial institutions and to mitigate the ensuing 
recession. As a result, budget deficits and government debt soared, leading to a substantial 
deterioration of their fiscal situations.  
Actions to design and implement “exits” from fiscal stimulus become imperative and prompt 
countries to adopt fiscal consolidation measures in order to make their public finances 
sustainable. Furthermore, population ageing creates pressures on public finances for the 
medium to long-run, thereby adding to the fiscal consolidation effort.  
While there is an ongoing debate about the best balance between cuts in expenditure and rises 
in tax during episodes of fiscal consolidation, several empirical studies (Alesina and Perotti 
(1995, 1997a), Alesina, Perotti & Tavarez (1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996), IMF 
(1996), OECD (1997), Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna (2007), Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010) and IMF (2010)) tend to convey the same message: “fiscal adjustments, 
which rely primarily on spending cuts, that is, cuts on transfers and on the government wage 
bill have a better chance of being successful and are expansionary”. Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) have also shown evidence that fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on tax increases 
and cuts in public investment tend not to last and are contractionary.  
However, Heylen and Everaert (2000) empirically contest the result according to which 
current expenditures reductions are the best policy to achieve a successful fiscal 
consolidation. 
Broadbent and Daly (2010) review every major fiscal correction in the OECD since 1975 and 
find that decisive budgetary adjustments that have focused on reducing government 
expenditure have been successful in correcting fiscal imbalances and typically boosted 
growth. They also highlight that tax-driven fiscal adjustments, by contrast, fail to correct 
fiscal imbalances and are damaging for growth. However, the authors mention that decisive 
expenditure-driven fiscal adjustments are politically difficult to implement and tend to take 
place only following a change in government and/or once bond markets force the government 
hand. 
Furthermore, Alesina and Perotti (1995a) find evidence that fiscal expansions typically occur 
through increases in expenditures. More recently, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) also find 
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evidence that fiscal stimuli based on tax cuts are more likely to increase growth than those 
based upon spending increases. 
In view of all these different empirical results, one can question whether fiscal episodes in 
donors’ governments do not affect aid supply. Indeed, it is likely that during fiscal 
consolidation episodes when government expenditures are curtailed, development aid 
supplied by the OECD DAC countries - which is a category of government expenditures - 
will also be reduced. Similarly, we can also expect donors’ governments to increase aid 
expenditures during fiscal stimuli years as the other categories of government spending rise. 
At the same time, the OECD DAC countries have committed either individually or 
collectively (through international meetings such as the Gleneagles summit) to achieve a 
target level (the international ODA target of 0.7% of Gross National Income) of aid flows 
granted to developing countries. In 2010, the OECD has estimated that at least USD 10-15 
billion must still be added to the forward spending plans if donors, are to meet their 2010’s 
commitments. Moreover, due to the adjustment measures adopted by the OECD country 
members in response to the recent financial and economic crisis, Africa will not likely receive 
more than the USD 11 billion over the USD 25 billion promised at the Gleneagles summit. 
Recent figures5 regarding the net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements 
confirm its announced decline by the OECD: the overall net ODA of OECD DAC members 
(in per cent of their gross national income –GNI-) dropped in real terms by 2.7% from 2010 to 
2011, reflecting fiscal constraints in several DAC countries which have affected their ODA 
budgets. In addition, bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa also experienced a fall of -0.9% in 
real terms compared to 2010. Nevertheless, aid to the African continent increased by +0.9% 
as donors provided more aid to North Africa following the revolutions in the region. The net 
bilateral ODA flows disbursed towards the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) also 
declined severely by 8.9% in 2011 compared to 2010. 
The figures6 reported in Table 1 provide evidence that over the period 1970-2007, on average, 
only four countries (Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have achieved or even 
exceeded the international ODA target of 0.7% of GNI.  
 
                                                          
5
 See in the OECD Website:  
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm 
6
 Figures are computed by the Author using the OECD Statistics on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Gross National Income (GNI). 
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Table 1: Average Aid Supplies during the period 1970-2007 by OECD DAC Countries 
Country Average ODAGross to GNI Ratio over 1970-2007 
Average ODANet to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007 
Average NAT to GNI 
Ratio over 1970-2007 
Australia 0.37 0.32 0.32 
Austria 0.26 0.22 0.19 
Belgium 0.46 0.45 0.43 
Canada 0.40 0.37 0.36 
Denmark 0.80 0.75 0.73 
Finland 0.34 0.32 0.31 
France 0.60 0.52 0.43 
Germany 0.39 0.33 0.31 
Ireland 0.23 0.17 0.19 
Italy 0.22 0.19 0.18 
Japan 0.31 0.26 0.25 
Netherlands 0.82 0.79 0.76 
New Zealand 0.26 0.25 0.25 
Norway 0.81 0.78 0.78 
Portugal 0.19 0.13 0.16 
Spain 0.20 0.14 0.17 
Sweden 0.76 0.75 0.73 
United Kingdom 0.37 0.35 0.33 
United States 0.21 0.19 0.18 
 
Why do OECD DAC not fulfill their commitments in terms of aid supply? These results 
suggest that several variables affect the decisions of donors to supply aid and may explain 
why many of them do not fulfill their ODA commitments. In this chapter, we explore the role 
of fiscal episodes in explaining this phenomenon. 
As we will see later, the empirical literature has already established that recipient-country 
characteristics such as income level, population, and political system, and the United Nations 
voting patterns (see for e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2006) affect aid 
inflows. However, the empirical literature on the donor-side’s determinants of aid, especially 
the one that focuses on the fiscal variables remains short and inconclusive. For example, Faini 
(2006) finds evidence that higher budget deficit and higher stock of public debt reduce aid, 
whereas Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find no significant 
relationship between deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these studies explore the 
effects that fiscal episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. 
In this chapter, we investigate how donors behave in terms of supplying aid during fiscal 
episodes. In other words, we explore the long-run average (LRA) effects of fiscal 
consolidation and stimuli episodes on OECD donor countries’ aid supplies, irrespective of 
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their effect on per capita income, and other economic, political, institutional and international 
political economy variables. We follow the literature on fiscal episodes and use descriptive 
statistics as well as regression models to perform this analysis.       
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section (II), we provide a literature survey on 
the topic. We then explain how the fiscal episodes in OECD countries are determined (III). In 
section IV, we present our model specification and discuss the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. Section V discusses the data and econometric methodology and section 
VI presents empirical results. The last section (VII) concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Several, though controversial studies have been conducted on the supply of foreign aid, with 
most of them relying on how recipients’ characteristics affect aid delivery. These studies 
examine the potential factors and motivations behind the supply of aid by answering 
questions such as: Who received aid? How much aid is received and for what kinds of 
activities? Many studies find evidence that the donors’ political, economic and strategic 
interests appear to dominate altruistic and development-centered motivations in their foreign 
aid programs. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) use bilateral data on DAC countries 
over 1970-1994 and find evidence that factors such as colonial ties and strategic 
considerations (i.e. proxied by the degree of correlation in the donor and recipient countries’ 
voting records at the UN) are among the factors that could influence the flow of bilateral aid.  
However, limited studies have dealt with the supply side determinants of aid flows from the 
donor’s perspective (that is, the determinants of “aid effort” or “aid generosity”). In particular, 
studies assessing how macroeconomic variables (especially fiscal policy ones) can affect 
theoretically and empirically aid generosity remain scarce: Beenstock (1980); Mosley (1985); 
Faini (2006) and recently Jones (2011) have been the few authors that explore both 
theoretically and empirically the determinants of aid supplies. We present here the theoretical 
and empirical literature on this issue. 
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2.1 The theoretical literature review on the determinants of aid flows 
Beenstock (1980) developed a statistical model that sheds light on the political decision-
making process regarding the allocation of aid. He starts by arguing that in allocating a given 
level of aid, governments face major constraints that are: the GNP (the Gross National 
Product), the population size (POP), the balance-of-payments (BAL) (as a possible constraint 
on affordability), the unemployment rate (U) and the net budget of the Central Government 
(BUGD). Thus, he hypothesizes the objective function of a donor government as: 
G = G [ODA (+), BAL (+), POL (-) ...] (1) where partial derivatives are indicated in 
parenthesis for the respective variables. ODA is the amount of Aid and POL is a measure of 
political rancour that ODA might generate. According to the author, this latter index can vary 
directly with unemployment, the net budget surplus (BUDG) as well as with balance-of-
payments pressures (and so, inversely with BAL) since ODA represents a balance-of-
payments debit. However, the richer the population, the easier it will be for governments to 
grant aid. Henceforth, Beenstock (1980) characterizes the political constraint as:  
POL = POL[U(+), BUDG(+), BAL(-), GNP(-), POP(+), ODA(+)]  (2) 
Thus, for given values of U, BUDG,...etc, the political costs to donor governments in 
providing aid will depend upon the quantity of ODA that they provide. Expressed in other 
words, according to equation (2), for given quantities of ODA, the greater the unemployment 
and the budget surplus are, the higher political rancour will be and, the stronger the balance-
of-payments and the GNP are, the lower is political rancour. 
As the balance-of-payments will be adversely affected by ODA itself, a further constraint will 
be: BAL = B[ODA(-),......]   (3)  
The optimal ODA allocated by the donor government may be determined by maximizing G in 
equation (1) using equations (2) and (3) as constraints. The solutions function for ODA will, 
therefore take the general form: 
ODA* = F[U(-), BUDG(-), BAL(+), GNP(+), POP(-),.......]            (4) 
From this equation, it can be stated that during times of higher unemployment or of tighter 
budget, the political cost of ODA reduces the ODA allocation. The positive relationship 
between ODA* and the balance-of-payments reflects two considerations:  
-First, the stronger the balance-of-payments, the lower will be the political cost to 
provide aid. 
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-Second, assuming G (...) is convex, the more their balance-of-payments objectives are 
attained, the higher the priority the authorities are likely to attach to competing objectives 
including ODA. 
Beenstock (1980) estimates empirically the model of equation (4) by the use of multiple-
regression techniques on a sample of alternatively 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, 
US, the Netherlands and Sweden) and 6 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) 
over the period 1960-1976 (T=17 years). Since the total number of observations is limited, the 
author estimates several versions of the model (4) by adding alternatively the previous 
regressors and country dummies.  
Overall, he finds evidence that aid effort is negatively and significantly affected by the 
unemployment level, the population level, and the net budget surplus, whereas it is positively 
affected by the balance-of-payments, the GNP, and a time trend. 
 Mosley (1985) also develops a theoretical model on aid flows determinants relying on 
Breton (1974)’s approach to market adjustment in the case of goods provided by the public 
sector. He treats aid as a public good for which there is a market, albeit a highly imperfect 
one. Citizens have demand curves for public sector output such as policy or foreign aid just as 
they have for private sector outputs like oranges in the sense that they know how much they 
would like to “buy” at a given price – called “tax price” – or that part of their total tax 
payments which is allocable to that public good. However, they cannot adapt their actual 
consumption to their desired consumption of such public goods by means of market 
behaviour. Hence, if they wish to achieve such adaptation of actual output to the desired level, 
they must try to do so through political action: forming or joining pressure groups, writing to 
politicians or newspapers..etc.... This action, if successful, will bodily shift the (vertical) 
supply curve for the public good in question. 
According to the author, aid determinants rest on a demand and a supply function of aid. The 
demand function depends on the donor countries’ income relative to others countries (the 
poorer the country is relative to the others, the lower the share of aid burden it should bear), 
the quality of the product, (whose dimensions include the proportion of aid going to the 
poorest countries – i.e. the proportion of aid used for purposes such as rural development and 
famine relief, the amount of aid available on grant terms....and so on). Formally, the model is 
stated as: * 0 1 2( )iit t it
w
YA b b b
Y
    ; 1b >0;  2b >0  (5)  where  *itA  is the desired quantity of aid 
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by country i in year t; ( )i t
w
Y
Y
 is the level of per capita income in country i in relation to per 
capita of other OECD countries in year t; and it  is an indicator of aid quality in country i and 
year t. 
Mosley relies on Wildavsky (1964)’s assertion that the principal influence on the budget for 
any spending agency in the current year is the last year’s budget and assumes that this is even 
more true for aid compare to other categories of public expenditures. Since much aid consists 
of money committed several years in advance for the support of particular projects, such aid 
cannot be rescinded without serious offense to foreign governments. 
Summing up, he postulates that the supply of foreign aid expenditures by a government in any 
year is heavily influenced by a constant representing last year’s expenditure and that any 
increase or decrease in the value of this constant will be determined by:  
- the behavior of the Finance Ministry which reflects the state of the domestic 
economy; 
- the aid-giving behavior of the international community; and 
- an adjustment parameter reflecting the adjustment of supply, thus determining  the 
electoral demand for aid. 
Formally,  *3 1 4 5 6 7 1
1
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n
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A b A b U b B b A b A A        (6) 
where itA  = the actual aid disbursement by government of country i in year t. 
*
1itA   = the « desired » quantity of aid in country i in year t; 
itU  = the unemployment in country i in year t. 
itB  = Government Budget deficit in country i in year t; 
1
n
t
i
A = Aid disbursement in period t of all OECD countries other than country i. 
The adjustment of the supply function of aid to the demand function of aid (obtained by 
substituting (5) into (6)) and simplifying gives the following expression: 
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           (7)  
where the constant c = 0 7b b ;  8 7 1b b b ; 9 7 2b b b ; 10 3 7b b b  . 
This equation is estimated for each country separately as well as on pooled regression since 
the author focuses on the differences between response patterns in donor countries as well as 
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on the common factors of the “political economy of aid”. The sample covers 9 OECD 
countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USA and 
U.K) over the period 1961-1979. Using OLS technique country by country, he observed a 
positive and significant effect of the central government budget deficit on aid flows for the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, whereas the effect is mixed (either positive or negative) 
but not statistically significant for the other countries. The unemployment rate exerts a 
negative effect on aid disbursements only for the United Kingdom and path dependence of aid 
disbursements is observed for Canada, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the U.K. In the meantime, respectively positive and negative effects of the level 
of per capita income (in relation to per capita income of other OECD countries in year t) on 
aid disbursements are obtained for the Netherlands and the U.S.A with no effect arising for 
this variable for the other countries. Peer-effects exert a positive influence on foreign aid for 
France, West Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.S.A and the U.K. The pooling of the 
data for the nine countries over the period 1961-1979 leads the author to conclude for the 
existence of positive effects of peer-effects and past commitments on aid disbursements.   
Now, what about Faini (2006)’s model? He explores the relationship between fiscal policy 
and aid effort of donor countries. He starts by making the assumption that the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is a discretionary item of the budget and is to some extent 
subject to the vagaries of the budget process. According to him, to the extent that the 
government must choose among competing allocations of limited resources, there are good 
reasons to believe that, faced with budgetary difficulties, policymakers will first cut 
discretionary spending, with the least priority item taking the biggest toll. He develops a 
simple model where the government faces a standard budget constraint at time t: 
1 (1 )t t t tB r B PS A      (8) where tB  is the stock of public debt at time t; r is the interest 
rate; tPS  is the Primary Surplus (excluding tA ) and tA  is a discretionary spending item (say, 
foreign aid). 
He assumes that policymakers seek to minimize the gap between tA  and its target level 
*A  
and that they also dislike higher future public debt 1tB   to the extent that it may constrain their 
future choice or put an undue burden on future generations. After formally maximizing the 
objective function of the policymaker subject to the budget constraint, he obtains the 
following function: 
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*1 ( (1 ) )
1 1t t t
A PS r B A        (9)   
where  , is the weight of A in the policymaker’s utility function. 
From this model, it can be stated that a strong fiscal position will be associated with higher 
discretionary spending, including on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover, a 
larger value of  , i.e. a larger weight of A in the policymaker’s utility function, should be 
associated with a greater rigidity of A and as a result, a more limited responsiveness to 
changes in budgetary conditions. 
In addition, since the level of foreign aid is a function of its desired level *A , the choice by the 
policymaker may be a function of both income per capita in the donor country and the 
government’s political orientation. Therefore, he estimates the following empirical model: 
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where tPO  is the political orientation of the government at time t; tY  is the output and   
*
*
( )Y Y
Y

  denotes the output gap. He estimates this model where the dependent variable is 
proxied alternatively by the net official ODA; the total official flows and Roodman’s Net Aid 
transfers measure. The sample covers 15 donor countries over the period 1980-2004. Using 
fixed-effects estimation, he finds that aid effort is positively associated with the cyclical 
position of the donor economy and negatively affected by the debt stock. However, the 
significance of the cyclical position of the donor’s economy disappears when using total 
official flows as proxy for aid generosity. The donor’s fiscal surplus exhibits a positive effect 
on aid flows when controlling for the government’s political orientation but has no 
statistically significant effect when using total official flows as proxy for aid generosity. 
Overall, he finds evidence that an increase in the budget deficit or in the stock of debt leads to 
a severe decline of the development assistance.  
The last theoretical model is that of Jones (2011). His objective is to examine the aid 
expenditures’ response to banking crises in donor countries. He assumes that over the long-
run, donors seek to achieve a target ratio of total aid to domestic income, which largely 
depends on various long-run or fixed factors. These factors can vary over time through the 
influence of fiscal policy factors such as government spending trends or long-run fiscal 
balances as well as a time trend. The aid granting decision of policymakers to achieve this 
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target ratio can be affected in the short-run by unexpected macroeconomic shocks and a 
random error term for which we do not know a priori the form. However, when a deviation 
from the aid targets occurs temporarily at time t-1, we expect adjustment towards the target in 
time t, with a high probability of this adjustment to be incomplete and potentially subjected to 
new shocks. 
 Jones (2011) clarifies the heterogeneity and time-varying nature of long-run targets by 
considering a general form of the aid target ratio which is represented by the function 
( , )i tx t where t denotes a unit-specific trend, and tx  a vector of time-varying factors where 
both determine the long-run aid target ratio sets by each donor country. A simple model for 
the actual net aid to income ratio for country i at time t can be written as: 
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       (11) 
where it is assumed that 0i  , and ,i t  represents an error term for country i over time t. 
The transformation of this equation leads to the following error correction form:  
 
, , 1 1 , 1 ,( , ) [ { ( , 1) }]i t it i t i t i t i t i ta y z t a z t y                 (12) 
By assuming that the (log) error term is a linear function of additional variables denoted by 
the vector x  and a random error and, by allowing for a dynamic structure and a unit-specific 
intercept, he obtains: '
,
0
J
it i i t j j it
j
x      . Re-specifying equation (12) to incorporate 
these extensions, yields a more general error correction model:  
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He uses equation (13) to derive long-run trends and short-run dynamics determinants of total 
bilateral aid (net bilateral aid disbursement minus debt relief, which excludes disbursements 
to multilateral organizations but includes support to NGOs and international private 
organizations) over the period 1960-2009. Specifically, he employs the two-step method of 
Engle and Granger with fixed effects. Results show that bilateral aid supplies are positively 
driven in the long-run by government saving and government expenditures (both in percent of 
GDP). In the short-run, the banking crisis exerts negative effects on aid supplies when 
controlling for its possible indirect effects. In addition to the negative effects of the lagged 
peer-effects, the real GDP per capita of the donor’s countries, the trade (Export + Imports) 
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share of GDP and the government spending as a percentage of GDP drive positively aid 
disbursements on the short-run.  
  
 
2.2 The review of the empirical literature on the determinants of aid generosity 
Besides the theoretical models described above, several other empirical studies have been 
conducted on this topic. 
Round and Odedokun (2004) investigating the decline in aid flows over the period 1970-2000 
for a sample of all 22 DAC countries, assessed the determinants of gross disbursements of 
ODA loans and grants, as a proxy of aid generosity. By making a distinction between political 
and non-political factors, they find evidence that aid generosity is driven positively by per 
capita income, peer pressure, the number of checks and balances, polarization and 
fractionalization within the government and negatively by the growth of the donor’s 
population. Whereas mixed results are obtained for the time trend (there is no clear increase in 
aid budgets overtime), they do not find a significant effect of political orientation and fiscal 
balance on aid effort. 
Bertoli et al. (2008) have concentrated their study on the determinants of aid effort (proxied 
by the net aid disbursements, net of debt relief, as share of GDP) for all of the 22 OECD DAC 
countries over the period 1973-2002, with a particular focus on the Italian case for a 
comparison purpose. They employ fixed effects estimation technique, and observe that the 
output gap, the extent of government intervention and redistribution (proxied by government 
receipts on GDP), the trade balance, the political orientation (i.e. conservative government 
raises aid effort) and the fiscal deficit exerts a positive effect on aid generosity. Growing 
income inequality and population are found to be negatively associated with aid effort.  
Mendoza et al. (2009) investigate in the wake of the global financial crisis whether economic 
and financial conditions are negatively associated with official development assistance (both 
bilateral ODA and total ODA) provided by the USA. Focusing on the period 1967-2007, they 
infer that US ODA could fall from 13 to 30 percent depending on the depth of the economic 
recession. Among the control variables, they observe that the party affiliation of the US 
President and tax revenues do not affect significantly both bilateral and total US ODA with 
the latter appearing to increase during the period of post-Monterrey. However, the real GDP 
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per capita and the Gini coefficients exhibit inconsistent significance, rendering inference on 
these variables inconclusive.  
The effects of banking crisis on aid flows have been explored by Dang et al. (2010). They use 
a sample of 24 donor countries over the period 1977-2007 as well as two indicators of aid: 
Net Aid disbursements and Net Aid Transfers. Using of fixed effects estimation, they find 
evidence that banking crises exert severe negative effects on aid supplies, with these effects 
diminishing over time. The lagged budget surplus/deficit (in % of GDP) in the donor’s 
countries adversely influences aid flows, suggesting that the budget surplus is achieved by 
cutting aid along with many other spending categories. Moreover, donor’s per capita income, 
the unemployment rate and the real exchange rate of the donor’s country influence positively 
the net aid disbursements, whilst inflation rates and inequality (Gini coefficient) affect it 
negatively. No effect is obtained for the trade share of GDP, the (log) of population as well as 
political variables such as Corruption index (ICRG, 0‐6 scale), Right‐wing party, and 
Left‐wing party in the donor countries. 
Mold et al. (2010) also explore empirically the determinants of net bilateral ODA in a panel of 
all 22 DAC countries over the period 1960-2007. By employing the System-GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Blond, 1998) and fixed effects, they observe that aid disbursements by donors 
are path dependent. Furthermore, the fiscal balance and military expenditure (both as a 
percentage of GDP) exert a positive effect on the aid disbursed. Despite the significant 
negative effect of GDP growth on aid-to-GDP ratio, the authors conclude that economic 
growth in donor countries did not play a critical role in aid allocation in the past, as this effect 
is low. Overall, Mold et al. (2010) conclude that the scope for allocations to aid are larger 
when fiscal circumstances allow it, and that geopolitical and political purposes are important 
in aid disbursements.  
Chong and Gradstein (2002) examine the determinants of foreign aid with respect to the 
donors. They perform two kinds of analysis: a first one examining individual attitudes 
towards foreign aid on data covering 10,000 individuals surveyed in 1995-1997 and 1999-
2000 in connection with the World Value Survey; and a second one where they develop a 
political economy model analyzing the determinants of total aid disbursements by considering 
a sample of all 22 DAC countries over the period 1973-2002. Applying both fixed-effects 
panel data and Arellano-Bond dynamic estimator techniques, they observe that richer and 
more egalitarian countries tend to provide more aid; the amount of aid raises when in the 
donor countries the chief executive's party belong to the left-wing party or when tax revenues 
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increase. However, aid disbursements are negatively affected by corruption in donor 
countries.   
Other studies have focused more on the political determinants of aid supplies.  
Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) test whether the sizeable reduction in aggregate level of aid 
flows in the 1990’s was due to the end of the Cold War. They use a dynamic econometric 
methodology (both fixed effects and GMM procedure) on a panel of 17 donor countries over 
the period 1970-1997. Their results indicate that total aid disbursements were positively 
correlated with the military expenditures of the former Warsaw Pact countries in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, but not in the 1990’s. The authors conclude that the end of the Cold War led to 
cuts in the aid budgets because one important motivation for aid disbursements altogether 
disappeared. With regard to the control variables, the GDP per capita, aid fatigue, the life 
expectancy and the size of the population of donors’ countries affect positively the aid 
supplies while the unemployment rate affect them negatively. The variables fiscal balance and 
the variable capturing the “aid to Central and Eastern European Countries and new 
independent states from the former Soviet Union” do not exert a significant effect on aid 
supplies by donors. 
Dustin Tingley (2010) has broken down foreign aid by different categories (e.g., low-income 
versus high-income developing countries) and channels (bilateral versus multilateral) to 
examine how the domestic political and economic environment influences the support for 
foreign aid. Using two main political variables (a measure of the government´s ideological 
orientation and a variable capturing the changes in welfare state institutions proxied by the 
time-varying “generosity” indicator calculated by Scruggs (2006)), he finds evidence that real 
GDP growth affects positively only aid to Low Middle Income Countries/Other Middle 
Income Countries (LMIC/OMIC). Moreover, political/economic openness affects negatively 
aid to LMIC/OMIC, whilst cold war is positively associated with total aid, multilateral aid 
and aid to LDC/OLIC (Least Developed Countries/Other Least Income Countries), but not 
with aid to LMIC/OMIC. A critical finding of the author is that as governments become more 
conservative, their aid effort is likely to fall. Moreover, changes in welfare state institutions 
exert positive effects on total and multilateral aid as well as aid to LDC/OLIC, but no 
significant effect on LMIC/OMIC.  
Recently, an extensive analysis of the determinants of aid generosity has been performed by 
Fuchs et al. (2012). In fact, the latter provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature 
on donors’ aid budgets and examine the variables that determine robustly aid effort (measured 
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by the Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a share of gross national income) of the 22 
OECD DAC members. This study is conducted over the period 1976-2008 and tests several 
hypotheses concerning international, domestic politics and macroeconomic determinants of 
aid effort as well as the potential substitute and complements of ODA. The authors observe 
that, among variables capturing the overall budget constraints and macroeconomic conditions, 
only the debt burden appears to be negatively and significantly associated with aid generosity 
of OECD countries.   
Overall, we can infer that the empirical literature does not provide a clear-cut stable 
relationship between aid supplies and its determinants. In particular, the studies that do exist 
on the fiscal determinants of aid supply contradict one another sufficiently so that there is no 
trenchant evidence on the relationship between fiscal policy and aid flows.   
Our purpose in the following sections is to understand how fiscal variables, especially fiscal 
episodes, namely fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli episodes in donor countries affect the 
aid disbursements to developing countries. The next section will consider how these episodes 
fiscal in OECD countries are determined. 
 
3. The determination of Fiscal episodes in OECD Countries 
The choice of the approach to measure the fiscal episodes is a critical point when assessing 
their effects on aid supplies.  
The empirical literature provides several definitions for timing fiscal contractions and stimuli 
(expansions). Tables 2 and 3 provide respectively a summary of the main definitions on fiscal 
episodes as well as of the main findings on fiscal episodes. Most of the definitions rely on the 
structural budget balance concept, which is the balance that results from intentional actions of 
policymakers.  
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Table 2: Summary on the main Definitions of Fiscal Episodes 
Study Definition of Fiscal Episodes7 
IMF (1993, 1995) A period of fiscal adjustment is defined by at least two years period, during which there is a change in the structural budget balance of at least 1,5 percentage points of GDP. 
Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1995) 
Fiscal consolidation is a dummy which equals 1 during episodes of protracted and sizable budget 
cuts, even if not persistent. This dummy tries to capture the points of where the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary deficit is abnormally large as a percentage of potential GDP.  More 
precisely, for a given country at time t this dummy equals 1 if the cumulative change in the structural 
deficit: 
(i) in 4 successive years including t exceeds 5 percent of potential GDP, or 
(ii) in 3 successive years including t exceeds 4 percent of potential GDP, or 
(iii) in 2 successive years including t exceeds 3 percent of potential GDP, or 
(iv) if the change in the structural deficit in year t exceeds 3 percent, and equals 0 otherwise. 
Cour et al (1996) 
Large scale fiscal adjustment episodes are defined three-year period, during which there is a change 
in the primary structural budget balance of at least 3 percent of 
GDP. The Large scale fiscal expansion episodes are defined symmetrically to those of fiscal 
consolidation. 
OECD (1996) Fiscal consolidation (stimuli) episodes are defined as those where there is a change of at least 3 percent of GDP in the structural budget balance, in consecutive years. 
Alesina and Perotti 
(1995a and 1996) 
 
In any given year, the Blanchard fiscal stance(BFI) is: 
- Neutral when BFI is (% of GDP) between -0.5 and 0.5; 
- Loose or a small expansion when BFI is (% of GDP) is between 0.5 and 1.5; 
- Very loose or a strong expansion when BFI is (% of GDP) larger than 1.5. 
- Tight or a small adjustment when BFI is (% of GDP) between -1.5 and -0.5; 
- Very tight or a strong adjustment when BFI is (% of GDP) less than 1.5. 
 
McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) 
An episode of significant fiscal consolidation is defined as one in which the fiscal balance (the ratio 
of the primary structural government balance to potential GDP) improves by at least 1.5 percentage 
points over two years and does not decrease in either of the two years. An episode of significant 
fiscal stimulus is defined as a period in which the primary structural fiscal balance declines by at 
least 1.5 percentage points over two years without increasing in either of the two years. 
 
Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998) 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by 
at least 2% of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5% of GDP per year, in both years. This definition of fiscal 
adjustment is slightly different from the one used in Alesina and Perotti (1995), which treats two 
consecutive years of ‘tight’ policy as a single episode). 
 
Miller and Russek 
(1999) 
A trigger point exists when the key variable (debt-to-GDP ratio, cyclically adjusted primary deficit) 
in a given year, exceeds its mean plus one standard deviation. 
Giavazzi, Jappelli 
and Pagano (2000) 
A large and persistent fiscal impulse is one in which the full employment surplus (as a percent of 
potential output) changes by at least 1.5 percentage points per year over a two-year period. 
 
Heylen and Everaert 
(2000) 
A period of fiscal adjustment is any period starting with an improvement of the budget balance by at 
least 0.25% points in the first year, a minimum duration of 2 years and a total improvement of budget 
balance by at least 2% points. 
Von Hagen et al. 
(2002) 
A fiscal consolidations as Episodes in which either the cyclically adjusted (total) government budget 
balance increased by at least 1.25% of cyclically adjusted GDP in two consecutive years, or the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance increased by at least 1.5% of cyclically adjusted GDP in one year 
and was positive but perhaps less than 1.25% in both the preceding and the subsequent year.’ The 
consolidation episode is said to end when the cyclically adjusted primary deficit deteriorates in a 
given fiscal year. 
 
Ahrend, Catte and 
Price (2006) 
Episodes of Fiscal consolidation are those that starting when the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB)  increases by at least 1 percentage point of GDP (in one year or over two consecutive years 
with at least ½ point in the first year). 
                                                          
7
 It is worth mentioning that where the definitions of « fiscal stimuli episodes” are not explicitly provided by the 
authors and thus reported here by us, we can consider that fiscal stimuli episodes are defined symmetrically as 
that of “fiscal consolidation”, but inversely.   
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Ardagna (2007) 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a period in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves 
by at least 2% of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5% of GDP per year, in both years. 
Guichard, Kennedy, 
Wurzel and Andre 
(2007) 
An episode starts if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least one 
percentage point of potential GDP in one year or in two consecutive years with at least ½ percentage 
point improvement. 
An episode continues as long as the CAPB improves. An interruption is allowed without terminating 
the episode as long at the deterioration of the CAPB does not exceed 0.3 per cent of GDP and is 
more than offset in the following year (by an improvement of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP). 
An episode terminates if the CAPB stops increasing or if the CAPB improves by less than 0.2 per 
cent of GDP in one year and then deteriorates. 
 
Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) 
A period of fiscal adjustment (stimulus) is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
improves (deteriorates) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP. 
European 
Commission (2010) 
A fiscal consolidation occurs when the CAPB improves by at least 1.5% with such an increase taking 
place in one single year (cold shower) or over three years (gradual consolidation) if each and every 
year the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) does not deteriorate by more than 0.5% of 
GDP. 
 
IMF (2010) 
The Episodes are selected using the Action Based Approach that consists of Identifying the policy 
actions motivated by deficit reductions: examination of accounts and records (in OECD Economic 
surveys, IMF Staff Reports, IMF Recent Economic Developments Report, Country Budget 
documents and additional country specific sources) of what countries actually did. 
Source: The Author's compilation 
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Table 3: Summary of findings on Fiscal Episodes   
Study Sample  (Period of 
Study) 
Indicator of Fiscal 
Stance 
Number of Fiscal Episodes 
identified 
IMF (1993, 1995)  IMF primary structural budget balance  
Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1995) 
19 OECD countries 
(1970-1992) 
OECD primary structural 
budget balance 223 Episodes of contractions. 
Cour et al (1996) 17 OECD countries (1970-1995) 
OECD primary structural 
budget balance 
19 Episodes of fiscal contractions and 
18 Episodes of fiscal expansions. 
OECD (1996)  OECD primary structural budget balance  
Alesina and 
Perotti (1995a 
and 1996) 
20 OECD countries 
(1960-1994) – but excluded 
Switzerland for identification of 
fiscal episodes. 
Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 
66 Episodes of very tight policy 
(Strong Adjustments) and 65 Episodes 
of very loose fiscal policy (Strong 
expansion). 
McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) 
20 OECD countries 
(1970-1995) 
OECD primary structural 
budget balance 
74 episodes of large adjustments and 
74 episodes of large stimuli. 
Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998) 
All OECD Countries (1960-
1994) Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 51 Episodes of tight policy 
Miller and 
Russek 
(1999) 
19 OECD countries (1970-1996) OECD primary structural budget balance 22 contractions and 19 expansions. 
Giavazzi, Jappelli 
and Pagano 
(2000) 
18 OECD Countries (1970-
1996); 101 Developing 
countries (1970-1994) 
OECD primary structural 
budget balance (Only 
large and persistent 
episodes). 
For OECD Countries, 65 Episodes of 
contractions and 38 Episodes of fiscal 
expansions. 
For developing countries, 270 fiscal 
contractions and 259 fiscal 
expansions. 
Heylen and 
Everaert (2000) 
19 OECD Countries (1975-
1995) 
Estimation of a cyclically-
adjusted primary balance 
expressed as a percentage 
of potential GDP. 
39 Episodes of fiscal consolidation 
spread over 18 countries. 
Von Hagen et al. 
(2002) 
20 OECD Countries 
(1960 – 1998) 
Estimation of cyclically 
adjusted GDP based on 
country-specific, linear-
quadratic trends. 
OECD cyclically adjusted 
budget balance. 
65 episodes of fiscal consolidation 
Ahrend, Catte 
and Price (2006) 
24 OECD countries from 1980-
2005 
OECD Cyclically adjusted 
primary balance Not available 
 
Ardagna (2007) 
 
A panel of 25 OECD countries 
from 1970 to 2006 
Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 86 episodes of fiscal consolidation 
Guichard, 
Kennedy, Wurzel 
and Andre (2007) 
24 countries from 1978-2005 OECD Cyclically adjusted primary balance 85 fiscales consolidations episodes. 
Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) 
21 OECD countries from 1970 
to 2007 Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 
107 periods of fiscal adjustments, 65 
last only for one period, while the rest 
are multiperiods adjustments. 91 
episodes of fiscal stimuli with 52 
lasting one period, and the rest are 
multiperiods adjustments. 
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European 
Commission 
(2010) 
EU27 countries together with 
selected non-EU OECD 
countries during the period 
1970-2005. Selected non-EU 
OECD countries include 
Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the US. 
European Commission 
cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. 
 
235 consolidation episodes with 160 
consolidations episodes in EU, of 
which 116 in the EU15. 
IMF (2010) 15 Advanced Economies (1980-2009) 
Action Based Approach 
(Identification of policy 
actions motivated by 
deficit reductions). 
136 episodes of Small fiscal 
consolidation (greater than 1.5% of 
GDP) and 37 episodes of Large fiscal 
contraction (greater or equal to 1.5% 
of GDP). 
Source: The Author's compilation 
 
Fiscal episodes (consolidations and stimuli) result from the attempts of the governments to 
change the budgetary position of the government: fiscal consolidations or stabilizations aim at 
adopting discretionary fiscal policies that cut budget deficits whilst fiscal stimuli consist of 
discretionary fiscal policy that increase budget deficits. To identify fiscal episodes, we need to 
compute a measure of fiscal impulse. The fiscal impulse is a discretionary change in the 
budgetary position and can be measured as the difference between the actual budgetary 
position and what would prevail under a benchmark cyclical situation (Alesina and Perotti, 
1995a).  
As mentioned by Alesina and Perotti (1995a), having an interest in discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy means eliminating from the budget balance two components:  
 -the interest payments, which cannot be directly influenced by government policies; 
 -the cyclical component of the budget (that is, excluding changes in economic activity 
such as the effects of automatic stabilisers or the effects of inflation from the budget balance). 
The first adjustment implies the use of the primary surplus (or deficit), whilst the second 
correction is more problematic. This is why there exists several ways in the empirical 
literature to deal with this issue: 
- one possibility is to ignore the existence of the cyclical component in the primary 
budget balance and consider the change in primary deficit as the measure of fiscal impulse. 
According to Alesina and Perotti (1995a), this procedure is not totally unreasonable if the 
focus is on very large (absolute) values of the fiscal impulse, that is, very large reductions or 
increases in deficits. They justify this argument by the fact that considering only “large” 
observations would not be unduly influenced by cyclical effects: for example, when even a 
large change of the fiscal balance is caused by exogenous factors, such as a supply shock, or a 
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shock in “animal spirits”, but most cyclical fluctuations are of relatively moderate magnitude 
(Alesina and Perotti 1995a:P5). 
- the second option is to use the cyclically adjusted budget deficits provided by the 
OECD or the IMF. The first defines the fiscal impulse as the difference between the current 
primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditures of the previous year had grown with 
potential GDP and if previous year’s revenues have grown with actual GDP. The IMF 
measure is similar, but assumes as the benchmark year not the previous year but a reference 
year when the potential output was close to actual output. Although these two measures are 
relatively simple and widely used, they have the drawback to rely upon somewhat arbitrary 
measures of “potential output” and base years.  
- the last option is the one suggested by Blanchard (1993). This approach is more 
attractive to the extent that it does not require a measure of potential output for computing the 
primary surplus (deficit) corrected for cyclical components. This measure consists in 
calculating how the budget balance would be in a certain year, if unemployment had not 
changed from the previous year: this cyclical adjustment is an attempt to eliminate from the 
budget balance changes in taxes and transfers induced by changes in unemployment, when 
tax-transfers laws remained unchanged.  
Formally, one should apply the following procedure to the components of the primary budget 
balance, i.e., transfers and revenues8 that are more sensitive to changes in unemployment: for 
example, transfers are first regressed on a two time trend and the unemployment rate. The 
estimated parameters are used to compute what the transfers would be in period t if 
unemployment were the same as in the previous year. The same procedure applied also to 
each other sensitive components of total revenues. Having then constructed Transfers (Ut-1) 
and Total Revenues (Ut-1), the primary deficit that would have prevailed in period t, had the 
unemployment rate remain equal to its period (t-1) level, is derived.      
Once the fiscal impulse measure is calculated, we need a rule to identify the fiscal episodes. 
The criteria used in the existing literature to identify these episodes differ slightly from paper 
to paper. Table 4 describes these different measures of fiscal impulse available in the 
empirical literature. In this study, we apply the original definitions of Alesina and Perotti 
(1995), which has been re-employed recently in Ardagna and Alesina (2010) and is also 
widely used in practice. According to these definitions,  
                                                          
8
 Though on the spending side, Alesina and Perotti (1995b) have shown evidence that results are virtually 
unchanged if the procedure is applied to total spending, rather than transfers alone. 
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- “A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
- “A period of fiscal stimulus is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance deteriorates by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. 
Thus, we use the episodes of fiscal adjustments and stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010) to examine their effects on aid efforts: the authors focus upon a sample of 21 OECD 
countries with data spanning over 1970-2007. The countries included in their sample are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States. However, in our database, we exclude Greece and 
Switzerland because these countries have significantly short panels, though our results do not 
change if we include them. 
Relying on large changes in fiscal policy stance, especially on the reductions and increases of 
budget deficits, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) use Blanchard (1993)’s indicator of fiscal 
impulse (changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) to identify the fiscal episodes. 
This indicator is simpler and more transparent than other indicators such as the OECD 
measure and corrects various components of the government budget for year to year changes 
in the unemployment rate. More precisely, the change in the cyclically adjusted value of a 
fiscal variable is the difference between a measure of that fiscal variable in period t computed 
as if the unemployment rate were equal to the one in t − 1 and the actual value of the fiscal 
variable in year t-19. Overall, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) identify 107 periods of fiscal 
adjustments and 91 periods of fiscal stimuli. The majority of fiscal episodes lasted only one 
year, i.e. 65 adjustments epsiodes and 52 stimuli episodes, while the remaining episodes were 
multi-year episodes. Table 5 lists the episodes (years) of fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli 
identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010).  
 
                                                          
9
 To calculate the measure of the fiscal variable in period t as if the unemployment rate were equal to the one in t 
− 1, the authors follow the procedure in Alesina and Perotti (1995). Specifically, for each country in the sample, 
they regress the fiscal policy variable as share of GDP, on a time trend and on the unemployment rate. Then, 
using the coefficients and the residuals from the estimated regressions, they predict what the value of the fiscal 
variable as a share of GDP in period t would have been if the unemployment rate were the same as in the 
previous year. 
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Table 4: Summary on the main measures of Fiscal Impulse 
The Fiscal Impulse is the discretionary change in budgetary position and can be measured as the difference between the actual budgetary position and what would prevail under a 
benchmark cyclical situation. There is no universally accepted method which defines what part of the current budgetary position reflects an exogenous action from the government 
and what part is merely a reflection of the cycle. The measures presented here try to take into account two important issues:  1°) What benchmark situation is used to adjust the 
actual measure? 2°) What parts of the budget should be adjusted to this benchmark and how? For instance, should interest payments be adjusted for inflation, and if so, how? 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
Measure of Fiscal Impulse Formula Description Advantages and drawbacks of 
each measure 
Change in Primary deficit 
( Pr imarydeficit ) 1 1
( ) ( )t t t tFI g t g t      
The fiscal impulse is the change in the primary deficit as a share of 
GDP from the previous year (the primary deficit excludes interest 
expenditures). 
 
tg is the total current expenditure 
plus gross capital accumulation 
minus interest payments as share of 
GDP and tt represents the total 
revenues as share of GDP. 
This measure takes the previous year 
as the benchmark year. Although this 
measure is simple, it ignores the 
cyclically induced fluctuations in the 
primary deficit. However, this 
measure can be a good 
approximation as long as 
expenditures and revenues are closed 
to being unit elastic to GDP. Indeed, 
if the endogenous component of  all 
revenues and expenditures were unit 
elastic to actual GDP, this measure 
would identify all and only 
discretionary changes in fiscal 
policy. 
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The Blanchard Fiscal Impulse 
 
1 1 1( ( ) ) ( )t t t t tFI g U t g t       
 
This measure estimates what government outlays and revenues would 
be in any given year if the unemployment rate had remained the same 
as in the previous year. 
 In practice, the Blanchard method consists of extracting cyclical 
movements in the primary balance by using individual regressions for 
each component of the primary balance. In other words, for each 
country, each primary balance component is regressed on a specific 
unemployment rate and a set of deterministic variables that are a 
constant, and a deterministic trend. Predicted values conditional on 
the previous year’s unemployment rate (i.e. by replacing the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate with its lagged value in the 
estimated equations) are then calculated for revenues and transfers. 
This allows us to compute a predicted primary balance based on an 
unchanged unemployment rate. The Blanchard measure of the 
structural fiscal impulse is then calculated by subtracting the predicted 
cyclically adjusted primary balance from its actual value. 
 
tU  is employment rate in year t. 
tg  and tt  are defined as 
previously. 
This measure takes the previous year 
as the benchmark year. It is simple 
does not rely on estimates of 
potential output. It takes into account 
the fact that the deficit can rise 
endogenously during recessions 
(outlays can be negatively related to 
GDP – because of built in stabilizers 
like unemployment compensation- 
and revenue can be positively related 
to GDP – because for instance of the 
progressivity of tax systems. 
The OECD Fiscal Impulse or “Dutch 
measure” 
1 1 1[( ) ( ( ) (1 ))]/t t t t t t tFI G T G I y T y          
 
The fiscal impulse is the difference between the current primary deficit 
and the primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditure in the 
previous year had grown with potential GDP, and revenues in the 
previous year had grown with actual GDP.  
 
tG is the total current expenditure 
plus gross capital accumulation 
minus interest payments ; 
tT represents the total revenues as 
share of GDP; ty  is the rate of 
growth of nominal potential GDP; 
ty  is the rate of growth of nominal 
GDP ; 1t  is the nominal GDP. 
Like the first two measures, the 
OECD Fiscal Impulse takes the 
previous year as the benchmark year.  
It is more complex than the previous 
ones, but is sensitive to inflation in a 
subtle way. 
45 
 
The IMF’s Fiscal Impulse 
0 0 1[( ) ( (1 ) (1 ))]/t t t t tFI G T G y T y         
 
The fiscal impulse is the difference between the current primary deficit 
and the primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditure in a 
reference year where potential output was close to actual output had 
grown with potential GDP, and revenues had grown with actual GDP. 
0G  is the value of G in base year 
and    0T  is revenue in base year. 
The others variables are the same as 
above. 
This measure, in contrast with the 
previous ones does not consider the 
benchmark year as the previous. It 
rather considers a reference year 
where the potential output was close 
to actual output. However, it seems 
to the OECD’s measure aside from 
the difference in benchmark 
treatment. 
The Economic Commission Fiscal 
Impulse 
The cyclical adjustment method used by the Commission services (European Commission, 1995) to calculate the cyclically adjusted balances involves 
two main steps: 
- first, trend output is estimated, applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980; Prescott, 1986). Estimates of the cyclical 
fluctuations are obtained by subtracting these trend output estimates from actual output. 
- secondly, the effects of these output gaps on government budget receipts and expenditure are calculated via the use of revenue and expenditure 
elasticities. These cyclical effects are then deducted from the actual government budget balance to obtain the cyclically adjusted budget balance.  
Bruni and Tujula (1999) compare the Blanchard and HP methods and judge the Blanchard method to be superior in identifying periods of tight fiscal 
stance that accord with the consensus of commentators. 
 
Source: The Author's compilation 
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Table 5: The Episodes of fiscal adjustments and Stimuli identified by Ardagna and 
Alesina (2010)  
Country Episodes of fiscal adjustments Episodes of fiscal Stimuli 
Australia 1987 1988 1990 1991 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 1975 2004 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006 1975 1981 2005 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 1992 
France 1979 1996 1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany 1996 2000 1995 2001 
Greece 1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland 1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy 1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007 1972 1975 1981 2001 
Japan 1984 1999 2001 2006 1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996 1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 1988 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005 1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 1998 
Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006 1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain 1986 1987 1994 1996 1981 1982 1993 
Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 1974 1977 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 
United Kingdom 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000 1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 2001 
United States  2002 
Source: Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
 
The figure 1 below plots the evolution of the three aid variables used in this study : the gross 
aid disbursements in percentage of GDP –ODAGross-, the net aid disbursements in 
percentage of GDP –ODANet-, and the net aid transfers in percentage of GDP of Roodman 
(2008) denoting NAT. The ODAGross measures the total aid disbursements over a given 
accounting period; ODANet represents gross amount of aid disbursements minus the 
repayments of loan principal or recoveries on grants received during the same period; NAT 
subtracts not only the repayments of principal from ODAGross, but also interest payments 
and the cancellation of non-ODA loans (that is, debt relief). The exclusion of debt relief from 
the definition of aid is justified by the fact that debt cancellation does not give rise to an actual 
disbursement of funds and may even imply a double counting of aid if the debt that is 
cancelled was granted on a concessional basis (see also Bertoli et al, 2008). Accordingly, the 
NAT variable appears to approximate more closely the current budgetary outlays associated 
with aid (see also Dang et al, 2010).  
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The evolution of each of these three aid variables is compared with the total number of fiscal 
episodes per each year (both fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli episodes) of OECD DAC. 
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Figure: Aid Variables and the Number of Fiscal Episodes, per year. 
 
Source: The number of fiscal episodes is calculated by the Author based on Alesina and Ardagna (2010)’ data on fiscal episodes. This is the total number of fiscal 
consolidation or fiscal stimuli years for all OECD countries and per each year of our period of study. The Data related to aid variables stem from OECD Economic Outlook 
N° 88 – December 2010 as well as Roodman (2008)’ statistics. 
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Overall, the aid variables tend to decline particularly for high levels of fiscal adjustments, 
though this evolution hides many disparities among countries regarding their aid export 
during fiscal episodes, especially fiscal adjustments. Before presenting the econometric 
specification, we find it useful to perform a simple two-sample t-test on mean difference with 
unequal variances. This test allows us to explore whether aid is higher/lower on average 
during fiscal stimuli/consolidation episodes. In other words, we compare through a t-student 
test the means of aid variables (the three different types of aid variables are considered here) 
during fiscal consolidation episodes/fiscal stimuli episodes to their respective means during 
the episodes of the absence of fiscal consolidation/fiscal stimuli. Whatever aid variable 
considered (ODAGross, ODANet and NAT), we observe that:  
- there is no (statistically significant) difference between the amount of aid disbursed 
during large fiscal consolidation episodes and aid disbursed during the episodes where 
donors do not implement large fiscal consolidation measures. The P-values of the t-
test on mean difference with unequal variance are respectively 0.019, 0.019 and 0.015 
for the variables ODAGross, ODANet and NAT. 
- the amount of aid disbursed during large fiscal stimuli episodes is statistically higher 
than the amount of aid disbursed during the episodes where donors do not implement 
large fiscal stimuli measures. In fact, the P-values of the t-test on mean difference with 
unequal variance are respectively 0.45, 0.27 and 0.23 for the variables ODAGross, 
ODANet and NAT. 
Furthermore, to have a first look at the response of the aid flows to the episodes (“before”, 
“during” and “after”) of fiscal consolidations and stimuli, we regress the aid variables on 
dummy indicators for periods “before”, “during” and “after”. Thus, we estimate the following 
equations: 
1 2 3
4 5 6
it i
it
Aid BeforeConsolidation Consolidation AfterConsolidation
BeforeStimuli Stimuli AfterStimuli
                
where the “aid variable” is alternatively the gross aid disbursements in percentage of GDP 
(ODAGross), the net aid disbursements in percentage of GDP (ODANet), and the net aid 
transfers in percentage of GDP (NAT) (these “aid” variables are described in the Appendix 
1); i denotes the country’s index: i = 1,..,19, and t denotes the time period index: t = 
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1970,...,2007. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 and 6  are parameters to be estimated and i is specific-
country effects. it is an error term. “BeforeConsolidation” and “BeforeStimuli” are dummy 
variables taking the value of “1” the year before the fiscal episode starts in a donor country 
and “0” otherwise, for respectively episodes of fiscal adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli 
(expansions). 
“AfterConsolidation” and “AfterStimuli” are dummy variables that take the value “1” the year 
after the last year of the fiscal episode in a donor country (e.g., if a fiscal episode lasts 4 years, 
we associate the value “1” to the fifth year) and “0” otherwise for respectively episodes of 
fiscal adjustments (consolidations) and stimuli (expansions). 
“Consolidation” and “Stimuli” are the variables indicating respectively the episodes of fiscal 
consolidations and fiscal stimuli.  
We use as estimation technique the panel fixed effects10. The results (in Table 6) of the 
estimations indicate that a one year after the fiscal consolidation induces the decline of 
donors’aid effort, irrespective of the “aid variable” used. For the other variables of the model, 
we do not find a significant effect, except for the “beforeStimuli” variable where the results 
indicate that aid supply is reduced the year following the start of fiscal stimuli episodes. This 
may be because we have not controlled for other explanatory variables and/or we haven’t 
used the appropriate technique to deal with possible serial correlation and contemporaneous 
correlation of errors. However, this does not matter at this stage of the study, since the 
objective here is to have a first idea of the effects of fiscal episodes on aid disbursements. The 
next section is devoted to the specification of the model.  
 
                                                          
10Fixed effects model (FE) appears as the logical econometric specification for having a first look on the effect 
of fiscal consolidation variables on aid disbursements. The reasons are very simple: first, Fixed effects allow us 
to capture unmeasured state-invariant factors influencing aid in percent of GDP. Second, the countries in our 
sample constitute, in principle, the whole population of the donor countries, so it is appropriate to treat the 
individual effects as fixed rather than random. 
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Table 6: Fixed effects panel data estimates of the response of aid flows to fiscal episodes 
 
Model with “ODAGross” Model with “ODANet” Model with “NAT” 
Estimator Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Variable 
   
    
BeforeConsolidation -0.00349 0.00171 0.00245 
 (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0119) 
Consolidation -0.0224** -0.0191* -0.0192* 
 (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
AfterConsolidation -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.0140 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0116) 
BeforeStimuli -0.00480 -0.0148 -0.0288* 
 (0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0162) 
Stimuli 0.000899 -0.00193 -0.00577 
 (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0147) 
AftereStimuli 0.0165 0.00785 -0.00845 
 (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.0148) 
Constant 0.363*** 0.342*** 0.344*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0378) (0.0389) 
    
Countries - Observations 19-645 19-653 19-653 
R-squared 0.837 0.845 0.845 
Year dummy Significance Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors of the coefficients; The “areg” command in Stata is used to 
correct the heteroscedasticity in errors; Time effects are included in the regressions; ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
4. Econometric Specification   
4.1 The Model 
We follow a general approach that consists of estimating a version of the following equation:   
, ,i t i it i it i t i tA X Z            (1) 
where i denotes the countries (i = 1,..., 19) and t denotes years (t = 1970,..., 2007) and the 
dependent variable
, ,
( / )i t i tA Aid GDP  denotes the total aid flows (bilateral and multilateral) 
from country i in year t. As stipulated above, we use as our dependent variables three different 
measures of aid flows disbursed by each donor: the gross aid disbursements as a percentage of 
GDP (denoting ODAGross), the net aid disbursements as a percentage of GDP (ODANet) and 
the net aid transfers (NAT) measure from Roodman (2008)11 also as a percentage of GDP.  
 The vector 
,i tX  represents the fiscal episode variables that include episodes of fiscal 
consolidation and episodes of fiscal stimulus. These variables are included in all our 
regressions. Furthermore, they are replaced by two variables: the number of years since fiscal 
                                                          
11
 See Centre for Global Development and data described in Roodman (2008, 2012). 
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consolidation started in a donor country as well as its square; the number of years since fiscal 
stimulus started in a donor country as well as its square. 
 The vector 
,i tZ  comprises two kinds of time-varying control variables derived from 
the empirical literature:   A set of time-varying control variables is included in all regressions: the fiscal 
balance (percentage of GDP), the gross public debt as a percentage of GDP and the 
output gap. These variables combined with the fiscal episode variables form our 
baseline regression model.   For a first robustness check of our results, we also use a set of time-varying and 
non-varying control variables derived from the empirical literature that are 
included once in the baseline model: the degree of trade openness; a variable 
capturing the ideological orientation of the government; the quality of 
bureaucracy; the independence of the aid agency; the population level; the real 
effective exchange rate; banking crises; the unemployment rate; the inflation rate; 
the Cold War, the welfare institutions and the voting similarity index in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). All these variables are described in the 
Appendix. As shown later, the coefficients of our variables in the baseline model 
are not significantly affected by the inclusion of the vector 
,i tZ of control variables 
(for the robustness check). 
i  are donor fixed effects that are incorporated in the model to capture the heterogeneity 
among countries as well as the likely importance of unobservable effects correlated with the 
error term in determining aid flows. The use of fixed effects i  in our regressions is dictated 
by several considerations: first, since our sample is composed of heterogeneous countries, 
there are likely to be state-invariant and unmeasured factors correlated with the error term in 
determining aid flows. Second, the number of time periods is significantly higher than the 
cross-section dimension of our panel. Furthermore, our macro panel contains, in principle, 
most countries of interest (representing the whole population of the OECD donor countries), 
and thus is not likely be a random sample from a much larger universe of countries. t  are 
year dummies and are included in all specifications to account for common shocks to aid 
volume in any given year.  
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 The disturbance 
,i t  is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.; 
0, 2 ), that is, it is assumed not to be correlated with the explanatory variables of the model 
and its normality is not required (Baltagi, 2002). 
 Should our supply equation of aid flows have a dynamic specification? Wildavsky 
(1964) points out that the current year’s spending in any public agency is predominantly 
influenced by the budget of the previous year. Mosley (1985) reinforces this argument by 
stressing that it is particularly true for aid agencies since aid projects often run over several 
years, with financial flows being committed in year one. 
 To explore this likely dynamic specification statistically, we follow the procedure 
suggested by Maddala (1987) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This procedure, described in 
the Appendix, refers to a Wald test to study if the lagged dependent variables have a direct 
effect on the dependent variable, apart from the indirect influence generated by serial 
correlations of the errors. If this is the case, then the model can be termed ‘state-dependent’ or 
‘system dynamic’ and if not, it can be termed ‘serial correlated’ or ‘error dynamic’.  
 To perform the test, we use two lags of the dependent variable because additional lags 
appear not to be significant. The results are presented in Table 7 and are further interpreted in 
section V. Accordingly, we estimate the model specification described previously with two 
lagged dependent variables. While it is well-known that the fixed-effects estimator generates 
biased results in a dynamic panel, Nickell (1981) proves that this bias decreases over a 
number of time periods and approaches zero as T (the time period) approaches infinity (the 
time dimension of the panel is large). Accordingly, as our time dimension is T=38 and our 
cross-sectional dimension is N= 19, we choose to work with fixed effects. 
 In the next section, we discuss the expected sign of the different regressors included in 
the model. 
 
4.2 Expected signs of the variables 
Before proceeding to the evaluation of the empirical results, we first discuss the expected 
effects of the explanatory variables on the aid effort. 
  
Fiscal consolidation episodes  
During episodes of large fiscal consolidations, governments tighten their budgets and reduce 
high debt levels to make public finances sustainable. Therefore, we can expect governments 
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to reduce several items of expenditure including spending on aid flows despite their firm 
commitment to increase aid exports to recipient countries.   
 However, as Round and Odedokun (2004) point out, since ‘aid can act as an immense 
foreign policy tool for donor governments, it is not a particular discretionary item in the 
budget’ (p.306); thus, it may not be reduced even in the case of the deterioration of public 
finance situations. Although this argument runs counter to the expectation of a procyclical 
pattern of foreign aid (Hallet, 2009), we can also expect aid expenditures to be protected 
during episodes of fiscal consolidation. In other words, large fiscal consolidations can exert a 
positive effect on aid flows.  
 In addition, we also assume that governments will reduce expenditure on several items 
in the face of competing government expenditures, but that they will maintain or increase aid 
exports for strategic, geopolitical or international political economic reasons: aid could be 
protected even when spending is being constrained (Round & Odedokun 2004). 
  
Fiscal stimulus episodes 
During large-scale fiscal stimulus episodes that aim to stimulate domestic activity, aid 
expenditures may decrease (this is considered a discretionary component that is cut in favour 
of social and investment spending), or may increase as do other discretionary components of 
expenditure, or may neither increase nor decrease.    
  
The budget deficit and the public debt 
As in Mosley (1985), Round and Odedokun (2004), Faini (2006) and Bertoli et al (2008), we 
hypothesize that cases of a weaker fiscal position, characterized by larger budget deficits and 
high levels of public debt, will ceteris paribus lead to a reduction in the level of discretionary 
spending, especially that of aid flows, because of strong pressures to reduce deficits and 
public debt and preserve scarce foreign currency. In other words, a healthy fiscal position will 
be associated ceteris paribus with higher spending, including spending on official 
development assistance (ODA).  
 In the same way, Bertoli et al (2008) highlight the fact that regardless of the level of 
public spending, policymakers face competing claims on public resources because of high 
debt servicing, public investment and military expenditures. For example, Boschini and 
Olofsgard (2007) observe a positive relationship between aid flows from Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries and military expenditures and argue that aid 
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was used as a strategic instrument during the Cold War period. Despite the empirical 
difficulties in identifying the true relation (as the intentions of donors are not made explicitly), 
we could argue, following Bertoli et al (2008), that ‘given the small volume of aid relative to 
GDP, it is the overall level of public expenditures rather than its allocation among different 
expenditures chapters that influences the volume of aid’ (see also Faini, 2006).  
 However, in contrast to this hypothesis, in accordance with Bertoli et al (2008), we 
can also assume that weak budgetary positions – or significant debt overhang – may not have 
a detrimental impact on foreign aid provided that governments adopt an accommodating 
attitude towards the fiscal disequilibria over the medium term. 
 
The output gap 
The effect of the output gap (the difference between the maximum output achievable and the 
actual level of output) can be either positive or negative as a positive output shock may not 
necessarily lead to higher aid expenditures. 
  
The number of fiscal consolidation episodes 
We introduce a counter variable (replacing the variable ‘Consolidation’) (see also Dang et al, 
2010, for the same procedure with regard to the ‘banking crisis variable’) in our model to 
capture the effects of fiscal consolidation: the ‘number of years of fiscal consolidation’. This 
variable records for a given country the number of years since the first year in which a fiscal 
consolidation occurred, with the first year taking a value of 1 and all years subsequent to the 
fiscal consolidation end year taking the value of 0. To allow the effect to diminish over time, 
we include this counter variable in both linear and square terms in the model. In other words, 
we expect a negative effect of the counter variable ‘number of years of fiscal consolidation’ 
but a positive effect of its square terms.  
 
The number of fiscal stimulus episodes 
The construction of this variable follows the same procedure as for the variable ‘number of 
years of fiscal consolidation’, the difference here being that this variable records for a given 
country the number of years since the first year of the occurrence of a fiscal stimulus. This 
variable takes the value of 1 for the first year, 2 for the second year, etc. and the value 0 for all 
years subsequent to the fiscal stimulus end year. To allow the effect to diminish over time, we 
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also include this counter variable in both linear and square terms in the model. In other words, 
we expect a positive, neutral or even a negative effect of this counter variable. 
  
The degree of openness 
In the literature on aid allocation and growth, aid depends on the economic characteristics of 
recipient countries: it can be used as a tool to influence the economic policies of recipients, 
especially the openness of the recipient economy to international trade (Alesina & Dollar, 
2000; Heron, 2008; McKinlay & Little, 1978). Thus, countries that rely more on trade may 
see foreign aid as a useful tool to promote trade and hence increase their aid effort.  
 We follow Boschini and Olofsgard (2007), Dang et al (2009), Dustin (2010) and Sam 
(2011) and include in our model a trade integration variable. We use (as do, for instance, 
Dang et al, 2010; Dustin, 2010; Sam, 2011) a measure of how exposed a country is to trade 
openness: (Exports + Imports)/GDP. Other measures are also available in the empirical 
literature and include, for example, export orientation measured by (Exports/(Exports + 
Imports)) or the proportion of years a country is open (the indicator used by Sachs & Warner, 
1995) as a proxy for the degree of economic openness.   
  
The ideological orientation of the government 
The empirical literature on development aid supplies has posited that ceteris paribus, right-
wing regimes in donor countries exhibit lower aid supplies compared to left-wing 
governments. However, the influence of a government’s ideological orientation (social-
democrat versus libertarian-conservative) on aid supplies is not clear-cut on the basis of 
aggregated aid data. Indeed, conservative governments may allocate more aid to promote 
national commercial interests, while progressive governments may provide a similar amount 
for altruistic reasons (Bertoli et al, 2008; Round & Odedokun, 2004). 
 
The real effective exchange rate 
It is expected that depreciation in the real exchange rate will, ceteris paribus, improve the 
balance of payments and thus increase ODA.  
  
Unemployment 
Beenstock (1980) and Mosley (1985) underscore that when explaining aid expenditures, 
unemployment is one of the most important explanatory variables apart from the fiscal 
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balance, as there may be obvious incentives to cut aid expenditures and redirect funds towards 
domestic expenditures in times of fiscal problems. Thus, we expect unemployment to reduce 
the level of aid supplied by the donors. 
 
The quality of governance 
This is another way of measuring the role of political factors in aid supplies. The quality of 
governance is a composite index of corruption in government, bureaucratic quality and the 
rule of law. We expect a better quality of governance in a donor’s country to be associated 
with higher aid supplies. 
 
The independence of aid agencies 
We follow Isernia (1997) and Bertoli et al (2008) in arguing that aid exports may not be 
reduced during fiscal episodes if they are provided by an independent aid agency, rather than 
by the foreign affairs ministry or the prime minister’s office, these latter being institutions that 
are more exposed to conflicting demands for funds (Bertoli et al, 2008). The justification is 
that independent aid agencies may be less exposed to the whims of political electoral cycles 
and may not reduce aid expenditures during fiscal episodes (specifically fiscal consolidation). 
Moreover, they tend to show greater leadership in deciding which developing countries need 
aid and in elaborating meaningful development projects to propose to the recipient countries 
(Isernia, 1997). To test this, we interact this variable with our variables of interest. 
 
Banking crises 
A banking crisis in a donor country is expected to lead to a reduction in aid flows irrespective 
of its effect on other economic variables such as real GDP or the government budget. Indeed, 
according to Dang et al (2010), bank rescues and recapitalizations place massive new fiscal 
demands on the public sector; even if the government is eventually able to recoup many of the 
costs of these rescues through asset sales, the short-term effect is to worsen sharply the 
government’s cash flow.  
 
Inflation 
Greater economic difficulties (for instance, a high level of inflation inducing macroeconomic 
instability effects) will lead to lower support for foreign aid programmes. Thus, we expect a 
negative effect of this variable on aid supplies. 
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Real GDP per capita 
Aid over GDP is assumed to be a ‘superior good’, that is, the ratio of aid over GDP is 
expected to increase as the per capita income rises. 
 
Population 
According to Round and Odedokun (2004), an increase in population size is likely to be 
associated with greater population heterogeneity, loss of social cohesion and ceteris paribus, 
declining willingness to redistribute. There is support for this hypothesis to the extent that 
within the DAC member countries, the small countries – such as the Nordic countries – are 
more homogeneous and cohesive and have long maintained an altruistic and progressive 
attitude towards foreign aid.    
 
The Cold War 
This variable captures certain key miscellaneous qualitative time-related factors that affect aid 
supplies. The empirical literature highlights the fact that aid has plummeted since the early 
1990s due to the end of the Cold War among other factors. Indeed, the emergence of Eastern 
European countries from the early 1990s has created competition for aid with the 
conventional developing countries and provides greater freedom to donors to reduce aid on 
the basis of concerns about governance issues, something to which they had to turn a blind 
eye during the Cold War era (see Hjertholm & White, 2000; Round & Odedokun, 2004).   
 
Welfare state institutions 
Therien and Noel (2000) argue that the influence of partisanship is indirect and operates 
through other policies such as social-democratic welfare state institutions and social spending. 
Hence, the influence of political parties is only cumulative and operates indirectly through 
welfare institutions: strong welfare institutions best explain foreign aid spending patterns. 
However, Therien and Noel (2000) argue that welfare state institutions are relatively fixed, 
but this argument has recently been disputed by scholars who find that the earlier measures 
are deceptively static (Allan & Scruggs, 2004). We follow Tingley (2010) and use Scruggs’ 
(2006) ‘generosity’ measure which is a time-varying measure of welfare state institutions 
(changes in welfare state institutions). This measure relates to comprehensive documentation 
of the welfare state institutions of OECD countries. Thus, a higher score on the ‘generosity’ 
measure indicates more comprehensive welfare state institutions. 
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 While there is support for the positive role of liberal/conservative ideological parties in 
the ‘generosity’ measure, some authors, such as Pierson (1996), argue that this party effect 
has become small or non-existent. Hence, we can suppose that this welfare state measure 
(‘generosity’) provides a harder test for the party ideology variable (see also Tingley, 2010). 
 
The voting similarity index in the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations 
Apart from pursuing economic self-interests (captured through the introduction in our model 
of economic variables related to donors’ economies), donor countries can also pursue political 
self-interests. One might consider, in line with the empirical literature,12 that aid is used as an 
instrument to induce recipients to vote in line with the donor country in the General Assembly 
of United Nations due to bilateral pressure and/or the fact that UN voting is considered relevant 
by the donor in defining bilateral relationships and foreign policy, which is the case of the United 
States (see, for example, Dreher et al., 2008). A proxy of donors’ political self-interests that tends 
to be used in the literature is a recipient country’s voting behaviour in the GA (see the 
Appendix for the details regarding the computation of this variable). We use this indicator in 
our study to see whether it affects the coefficients of our variables of interest. 
 
 
5. The Data and the econometric methodology 
 
5.1 The Data 
We define and describe here the ‘aid’ variable as well as the fiscal episode variables used in 
our model. The other explanatory variables are described in the Appendix. The model is 
estimated on a sample of 19 countries, with data covering the period 1980–2007. Indeed, as 
we will see later, we consider the entire sample of Ardagna and Alesina (2010) but exclude 
Greece and Switzerland.  
 
5.1.1 Dependent Variable: Aid data 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of aid flows, several indicators of aid 
effort have been used: whereas some authors have used ‘aid as a percentage of GDP’ (for 
instance, Bertoli et al, 2008; Faini, 2006), a few studies have used overall aid as the dependent 
                                                          
12
 According to many empirical studies (see, for example, Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Barro & Lee, 2005; Kilby, 
2009a, 2010, 2011; Thacker, 1999), developing countries get more aid and better conditions from donors when 
they have closer political ties with the donor as measured by their GA voting alignment. 
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variable (see, for instance, Boschini & Olofsgard, 2007; Dang et al, 2009) and others have 
employed the (log of) aid per capita (see, for instance, Frot, 2009). 
 For our main test, the dependent variable is net aid flow (as a percentage of GDP), 
which allows us to control for loan repayments. More particularly, we use the net 
disbursements of the ODA share of GDP. This comprises grants and loans with a grant 
element of at least 25%.  
 We then check for the robustness of our main results by considering additional 
variables of aid effort: gross aid disbursements (ODAGross) and net aid transfers (NAT) as 
described by Roodman (2008),13 both as a percentage of GDP. The NAT concept subtracts 
out principal repayments as well as interest payments and the cancellation of non-ODA loans 
(i.e. debt relief). This variable more closely approximates the current budgetary outlays 
associated with ODA.  
 
5.1.2 Fiscal Episodes Variables 
Episodes of fiscal consolidation (and stimulus) 
We use the variables constructed by Ardagna and Alesina (2010) according to their definition 
of ‘fiscal adjustments and fiscal stimuli’ (for more details, see the Appendix). These authors 
have focused on large changes in fiscal policy to identify episodes of fiscal adjustment and 
stimulus in OECD countries. Their definition results in the selection of 100 episodes of fiscal 
consolidation (13.8% of the observations in our sample) and 85 episodes of fiscal stimulus 
(11.8% of the observations in our sample) for 19 countries over the period 1970–2007.  
 
Number of years since the start of fiscal consolidation (stimulus) in a donor country 
These two variables are constructed following Dang et al’s (2009) methodology related to 
banking crises (see the Appendix for the description of these variables). 
 
 
                                                          
13
 See the Centre for Global Development and data described in Roodman (2008, 2012). 
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5.2 Econometric methodology 
5.2.1 Baseline econometric technique 
In this part, we discuss the econometric technique suitable for estimating the effects of fiscal 
episodes on aid supplies. Consider the model (1) described above. We first impose the 
restrictions that  i   and i  =  , for i = 1,...,19.   
Our baseline model specification is:  
, 1 2 1 2
3 ,
_i t it it it it
it i t i t
A Consolidation Stimuli Fiscal Balance Debt
Outputgap
                                (2) 
where 
,i tA denotes ODAGross, ODANet or NAT variables as previously defined; 
Consolidation = episodes of fiscal consolidation (adjustment); Stimuli = episodes of fiscal 
stimulus (expansion); Fiscal_Balance = general government fiscal balances (total revenues 
minus total expenditures) in percentage of GDP; Debt = gross public debt-to-GDP ratio; 
Outputgap = the output gap; i  and t  are respectively country-specific  effects and temporal 
dummies as previously defined. 
 Pursuant to the discussion in sections 4.1 and 5.1.2 regarding the use of two variables 
as substitutes for the variables ‘consolidation’ and ‘stimuli’, we also estimate the following 
equation: 
, 11 12 21
22 1 2 3 ,
NumberConsolidation NumberConsolidationsq NumberStimuli
NumberStimulisq _
i t it it it
it it it it i t i t
A
Fiscal Balance Debt Outputgap
                        (2’) 
where NumberConsolidation, NumberConsolidationsq, NumberStimuli, and 
NumberStimulisq are, respectively, the variables indicating the number of years since the start 
of fiscal consolidation in a donor country and the square of this number; the number of years 
since the start of fiscal stimulus in a donor country and the square of this number. The other 
variables are those described previously in relation to equation (2). 
 The use of the fixed effects estimator (LSDV estimator) raises several issues, in 
particular:   First, as the time dimension of our panel is large, there is likely to be serial 
correlation of errors (serial correlation for each individual through the time 
period), contemporaneous correlation between individuals and heteroscedasticity 
in the model. These problems are addressed through the use of appropriate 
correction techniques as described below. 
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 Second, as already discussed, even if the fixed effects method is often 
recommended in dynamic panels of our size (because the lagged dependent 
variables bias becomes less serious when T grows larger), there may still be a 
concern with regard to inconsistency due to the presence of fixed effects in a 
dynamic panel.  
For panels with dimensions like ours, the econometric literature proposes the use of either the 
Parks–Kmenta feasible generalized least squares (FGLS)14 estimator or Beck and Katz’s 
(1995) panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) method. However, Beck and Katz (1995, 2001) 
have shown evidence that the PCSE method is not only more accurate than FGLS (when 
T>N), but it also performs well compared to the FGLS estimator (especially for T>15), 
pointing out that when FGLS are considered and tested, the standard errors are too optimistic. 
The PCSE enables us to deal with the problems of panel heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation 
and contemporaneous correlation. More specifically, it allows for the unit-specific AR1 term 
to correct for serial correlation. We primarily use the LSDV estimator with the PCSE 
technique to perform our regressions. Recognizing that the previous assumption of our model 
parameters’ homogeneity ( i   and i  =   and, for i = 1,..., 19) is strong, we relax it by 
examining the variation across different groups of countries and test to what extent the 
average effect varies according to the group of countries observed. Indeed, the average 
(common-mean) effects   obtained for the fiscal episode variables (Consolidation and 
Stimuli) as well as for the parameters   in equation (2) may hide variations among donor 
countries. The supplies of aid budgets reflect motives that go beyond the fiscal situations of 
the country and that can lead the donors not to reduce their aid expenditure during fiscal 
consolidation episodes. This may explain, as we have shown in the literature review, why 
there is no empirical consensus on the effects of fiscal variables on aid supplied by OECD 
DAC countries. Moreover, the aid allocation literature provides evidence of substantial 
variation among donor countries in their motives for allocating a fixed aid budget across 
recipient countries (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000; McGillivray, 1989). 
 This concern about the ability to pool data does not rely solely on a theoretical basis, 
but is also rooted in statistical considerations. Pesaran and Smith (1995) have in fact shown 
                                                          
14
 This procedure was first described by Parks (1967) and popularized later by Kmenta (1986). Thus, it is usually 
known either as the Parks or as the Parks–Kmenta estimator. The FGLS method corrects for the cross-sectional 
problems of spatial correlation and heteroscedasticity and requires that T<N.  
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that incorrectly pooling data may lead to inconsistent estimates if the model is dynamic. 
Therefore, we explore empirically the stability of our parameter estimates in two ways:   First, we exclude each country in our sample one by one and estimate the baseline 
regression in order to test whether or not the results depend on the set of countries 
included.  Second, we choose to split our sample into two major groups (acknowledging that 
any splitting of the sample into subgroups remains somewhat arbitrary) and 
estimate the baseline model over the whole period (1970–2007). This allows us to 
check whether the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are different from 
those obtained in the baseline regression over the full sample. The groups are then:  
European (EU) countries composed of 14 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); and non-European (non-EU) countries, 
composed of 4 countries, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the 
United States.  
 
5.2.2 The econometric technique used for robustness check  
Beside the estimators described above (PCSE versus FGLS), the econometric literature also 
proposes (for panels with dimensions like ours), the fixed effects estimator where standard 
errors are computed using the Driscoll–Kraay (1998) method (henceforth referred to as FE-
DK). The Driscoll–Kraay standard error estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent and robust 
to all general forms of spatial and temporal dependence in the residuals.  
 In addition, one might also think that because the one or two years lagged dependent 
variable(s) can be included in the model, depending on Maddala’s (1987) test, we could also 
use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator or the LSDVC (least square 
dummy variables corrected) as an alternative to the LSDV technique (with the PCSE method 
or the Driscoll–Kraay correction) to establish the robustness of our baseline model’s results. 
However, these two estimators cannot be used here for the following reasons:    On the one hand, the GMM estimator’s properties hold only when the cross-sectional 
dimension (N) is sufficiently high; in other words, these properties hold when the 
time period (T) is lower than the cross-sectional dimension (N), that is, N>T (see 
Arellano & Bond, 1991; Judson & Owen, 1999; Kiviet, 1995), because the estimator 
may be severely biased and imprecise when the cross-sectional dimension (N) is low 
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(this is the case in our study). Attanasio et al (2000) study the links between savings, 
growth and investment on panels with a cross-sectional range of 38 to 123 countries 
and a time dimension range of 24 to 34 years and explore the appropriateness of 
different estimation techniques. They argue that with such data dimensions, one 
should employ estimation techniques that make use of T asymptotics, rather than 
using estimators that have been developed for micro panels exploiting N asymptotics. 
They perform both OLS and GMM regressions for the different data sets and observe 
that GMM estimates are less precise. Consequently, they conclude that when T is 
sufficiently large, the bias that comes with an OLS estimator of a dynamic model is 
preferred to the loss of precision that follows the implementation of an instrumental-
variable procedure (Attanasio et al, 2000: p.200). This conclusion confirms our 
choice to use fixed effects techniques to perform our estimations.   On the other hand, Kiviet (1995, 1999), Judson and Owen (1999) and Bun and Kiviet 
(2003) have shown that the estimation of dynamic models with panel data is possible 
on small samples through the use of the LSDVC (corrected least squares dummy 
variable). Indeed, Judson and Owen (1999),15 following the work of Kiviet (1995), 
find that even with T = 30, the LSDV estimator displays a bias of 3–20%. Relying on 
Monte Carlo simulations, as well as on the root mean square (RMSE) and bias 
criterion, they conclude that LSDVC, also called the bias-corrected LSDV estimator, 
consistently outperforms other techniques such as GMM or LSDV. Moreover, Bun 
and Kiviet (2003) also use Monte Carlo simulations and balanced panels to confirm 
previous findings according to which the bias-corrected LSDV estimator is more 
efficient than the LSDV and the first-differenced GMM in terms of bias and root 
mean square error (RMSE) for small or moderate large samples. Bruno (2005b) relies 
upon previous Monte Carlo studies to introduce a bias-corrected LSDV for 
unbalanced panels. He also concludes that the LSDVC estimator outperforms other 
estimators for samples with a comparatively small cross section. However, the 
                                                          
15
 Note, however, that these authors use Monte Carlo simulations as well as the root mean square (RMSE) and 
bias criterion and they compare different GMM estimators and the LSDVC technique. First, they observe 
evidence that the one-step GMM estimator outperforms the two-step GMM estimator and that a ‘restricted GMM 
procedure’ does not significantly hamper the performance of the GMM estimation (Judson & Owen 1999: p.13). 
Moreover, for unbalanced panel data (as is our case), Bruno (2005b) provides strong evidence that favours the 
use of the LSDVC estimator over the IV/GMM methods for samples constructed as part of his Monte Carlo 
study ( ,N T ) = (20, 20) and ( ,N T ) = (10, 40). 
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drawback of the LSDVC estimator is that it relies on all regressors being exogenous, 
not even weakly exogenous. 
For all the reasons highlighted above, we primarily use the FE-DK16 technique for the 
robustness check of our baseline model’s results. It should be noted that for these two 
econometric techniques (LSDV together with PCSE and FE-DK), if Maddala’s (1987) test 
reveals the presence of ‘state dependence’ in the dynamic specification, that is, the model is 
‘state-dependent’ with the two lagged dependent variables (as we include two lagged 
dependent variables at most in our model) or with only one of the lagged dependent variables, 
then we apply the LSDV together with the PCSE technique (the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable also corrects partially for serial correlation in the model due to the high 
time dimension of our panel by including lagged error terms in the specification). In contrast, 
if the model is ‘serially correlated’ with the two-year lagged values of the dependent variable 
according to Maddala’s (1987) test, then we remove the lagged dependent variables from the 
model, correct the serial correlation using the Prais–Winsten estimator and perform the 
regression using only the LSDV along with the PCSE (to correct only the contemporaneous 
correlation of error). 
 To sum up, we estimate our baseline model parameters using the LSDV estimator and 
we correct the standard errors17 using the PCSE method in order to take into account both the 
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity of the errors. For the robustness check, 
we employ fixed effects with standard errors computed using the Driscoll–Kraay (1998) 
method (FE-DK). Maddala’s (1987) test, as explained above, is important in determining 
whether the model is a ‘genuine’ dynamic specification or if it is an ‘error dynamic’ 
specification. 
 
6. Evaluation of the estimation results  
In this section, we turn to the interpretation of the results stemming from performing our 
regressions (Tables 8 to 12) using the LSDV estimator along with the PCSE procedure 
(and/or the Prais–Winsten estimators) as well as the FE-DK technique.  
 We perform tests for autocorrelation, homoscedasticity and the independence of 
residuals between individuals where the null hypotheses are respectively the absence of 
                                                          
16
 The results are obtained using the Stata module « xtscc » implemented by Hoechle (2007). 
17
 Although the presence of the lagged dependent variables can address the serial correlation of errors, it does not 
take into account the contemporaneous correlation of errors. 
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autocorrelation AR (1) of disturbances, the homoscedasticity of disturbances and the absence 
of contemporaneous correlation of the residuals. The results of the tests18 reject all these null 
hypotheses. It is worth mentioning that the presence of significant residual correlation may be 
caused by specification error. Hence, following our discussions of the appropriate estimator in 
section 4.1, we rely mainly on the use of the LSDV with PCSE to perform our estimations. 
We also present the results stemming from the robustness check of results over the full 
sample by using the FE-DK (1998) method.19 The FE-DK estimates are heteroscedasticity 
consistent and robust to all general forms of spatial and temporal dependence in the residuals. 
In this chapter, we also use the FE-DK technique to test the robustness of our baseline 
model’s results. 
 Before the interpretation of the results, let us say few words about the data generating 
process underlying our different specifications according to Maddala’s (1987) test:  The model for the full sample of 19 countries and that for the sub-sample of EU 
countries display ‘state dependence’ with both one- and two-year lagged values of 
either the ODAGross, ODANet, or NAT dependent variables.   The model for the sub-sample of non-EU countries is ‘state-dependent’ only with 
one-year lagged values of ODAGross and ODANet variables. However, with the 
NAT dependent variable, it is ‘error dynamic’ with both one- and two-year lagged 
values. Since Maddala’s (1987) test reveals that in general aid flows exhibit state 
dependence, we opt to estimate the model for the NAT variable with one-year 
lagged values of NAT. This helps us interpret the results with greater ease. In 
addition, the results obtained do not change when we estimate the model with/or 
without both one- and two-year lagged values of NAT (as suggested by Maddala, 
1987).      
The results are presented in Table 7. 
 Table 8 reports alternative estimates of our model (for the full sample of 19 OECD 
DAC countries over the period 1970–2007) obtained by changing the variables included in 
the vector 
,i tX of regressors and/or by using the other measures of aid flows mentioned above. 
As already discussed, we also check the sensitivity of our coefficients of interest to the 
inclusion of additional regressors. The results of the coefficients of interest remain roughly 
stable and robust to the inclusion of these additional variables. 
                                                          
18
 These results are available upon request. 
19
 The results are obtained by using the Stata module « xtscc » implemented by Hoechle (2007). 
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 Table 9 presents the results of the baseline model in which each of the sample 
countries are excluded once from the sample. Table 10 presents the results obtained from the 
use of FE-DK method. Tables 11 and 12 contain respectively the results for the sub-samples 
of EU and non-EU countries over the period 1970–2007. 
 We do not discuss the results of each model specification one by one, but rather 
provide an overview of the regressors’ parameters by assessing whether they are robust and 
consistent with the expectations presented in sub-section 4.2. We focus particularly on our 
variables of interest (‘episodes of fiscal consolidation’, ‘episodes of fiscal expansion’, 
‘number of fiscal consolidation episodes’, and ‘number of fiscal stimulus episodes’).  
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Table 7: Maddala (1987) test for “Aid” variables on the baseline equation. 
 
 Test for 1tODAGross   Test for 2tODAGross   Test for 1tODANet   Test for 2tODANet   Test for 1tNAT   Test for 2tNAT   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the coefficient of 
1tODAGross   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the coefficient of 
2tODAGross   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient of 
1tODANet   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the coefficient 
of 
2tODANet   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient 
of 
1tNAT   
On the 
restriction 
of 
Coefficients 
On the 
coefficient 
of 
2tNAT   
Full Sample 6.25 (0.0001) 
212.14  
(0.0000) 
4.46 
(0.0005) 
19.75  
(0.0000) 
5.99 
(0.0000) 
208.76 
(0.0000) 
2.87 
(0.0143) 
27.50  
(0.0000) 
6.92 
(0.0000) 
180.70 
(0.0000) 
2.18 
(0.0546) 
52.58 
(0.0000) 
EU Sub-
Sample 
5.81 
(0.0000) 
159.97  
(0.0000) 
3.94 
(0.0017) 
13.79  
(0.0002) 
5.50 
(0.0001) 
156.80 
(0.0000) 
2.56 
(0.0269) 
20.65  
(0.0000) 
6.67 
(0.0000) 
137.11 
(0.0000) 
2.04 
(0.0725) 
40.56 
(0.0000) 
Non EU 
Sub-
Sample 
2.76 
(0.0210) 
45.85  
(0.0000) 
0.74 
(0.5959) 
9.94  
(0.0020) 
2.43 
(0.0382) 
44.19  
(0.0000) 
0.54 
(0.7477) 
9.98  
(0.0020) 
1.23 
(0.3008) 
30.74 
(0.0000) 
0.18 
(0.9692) 
12.64 
(0.0005) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
        : the table contains F-Statistics and the P-Value associated.  
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Table 8: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in OECD DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007 
 
 1a 2a 3a 9a 10a 11a 
 
ODAGross ODANet NAT ODAGross ODANet NAT 
Estimator LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs LSDV with PCSEs 
Regressors       
Aidt-1 0.588*** 0.592*** 0.539*** 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.54*** 
 (0.060) (0.065) (0.041) (0.061) (0.065) (0.041) 
Aidt-2 0.209*** 0.228*** 0.287*** 0.21*** 0.227*** 0.287*** 
 (0.058) (0.063) (0.040) (0.058) (0.063) (0.04) 
Consolidation -0.0145** -0.0145** -0.016***    
 (0.0072) (0.007) (0.0048)    
Stimuli -0.0016 0.0035 0.0125**    
 (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.006)    
NumberConsolidation    -0.033*** -0.020* -0.010 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
NumberConsolidationsq    0.0128*** 0.006 -0.0005 
    (0.0044) (0.004) (0.0038) 
NumberStimuli    0.0039 0.015 0.034*** 
    (0.0136) (0.013) (0.011) 
NumberStimulisq    -0.0038 -0.008 -0.016*** 
    (0.0064) (0.006) (0.005) 
Fiscal_Balance 0.0001 0.0001 -2.67e-05 -0.0001 -4.32e-05 -0.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.000698) (0.0009) (0.000924) (0.0007) 
Debt -5.75e-05 -0.0002 -0.00026*** -7.78e-05 -0.0002* -0.00026*** 
 (0.000120) (0.0002) (9.54e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (9.43e-05) 
Outputgap 0.0036** 0.0027* 0.0028*** 0.003** 0.0025* 0.0028*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.0997*** 0.098*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.0192) (0.011) 
Countries - Observations 19-601 19-606 19-606 19-601 19-606 19-606 
Overall R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Time and or Year Dummies Significance YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. 
b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: 
The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). The variable “Aid” denotes either ODAGross, 
ODANet or NAT.  
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Table 8: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in OECD DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-2007 (continued)  
 
 
1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a 8a 9a 10a 11a 12a 13a 
 
ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet ODANet 
Estimator LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
Regressors              
Aidt-1 0.555*** 0.581*** 0.592*** 0.593*** 0.576*** 0.589*** 0.591*** 0.591*** 0.555*** 0.588*** 0.606*** 0.589*** 0.624*** 
 
(0.0836) (0.0643) (0.0645) (0.0642) (0.0647) (0.0645) (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0764) (0.0652) (0.0510) (0.0640) (0.0576) 
Aidt-2 0.174** 0.217*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.222*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 0.204*** 0.232*** 0.201*** 0.231*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.0825) (0.0632) (0.0630) (0.0628) (0.0625) (0.0627) (0.0633) (0.0629) (0.0744) (0.0641) (0.0485) (0.0626) (0.0558) 
Consolidation -0.0119 -0.0141** -0.0145** -0.0144** -0.0132* -0.0141** -0.0146** -0.0148** -0.0126 -0.00930 -0.0162*** -0.0133 -0.0150** 
 
(0.00819) (0.00708) (0.00712) (0.00709) (0.00706) (0.00712) (0.00712) (0.00708) (0.00771) (0.00839) (0.00593) (0.00935) (0.00618) 
Stimuli 0.00922 0.00451 0.00345 0.00341 0.000902 0.00386 0.00353 0.00369 0.00230 0.00347 0.00618 -0.000172 -0.000160 
 
(0.00948) (0.00750) (0.00756) (0.00745) (0.00745) (0.00753) (0.00757) (0.00754) (0.00853) (0.00745) (0.00733) (0.0102) (0.00729) 
Fiscal_Balance -0.00149 -0.000105 0.000107 -0.000246 -0.000309 5.43e-05 2.90e-05 0.000144 -0.00130 6.17e-05 0.000211 0.000176 -0.000357 
 
(0.00123) (0.000919) (0.000911) (0.000902) (0.000918) (0.000917) (0.000940) (0.000912) (0.00108) (0.000909) (0.000920) (0.000942) (0.000885) 
Debt -0.000391** -0.000280** -0.000189 -0.000194 -0.000245** -0.000194 -0.000181 -0.000186 -0.000356** -0.000189 -0.000246** -0.000199* -0.000160 
 
(0.000161) (0.000125) (0.000118) (0.000120) (0.000122) (0.000119) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000148) (0.000119) (0.000108) (0.000119) (0.000123) 
Outputgap 0.00377** 0.00294** 0.00266* 0.00229 0.00268* 0.00278* 0.00271* 0.00263* 0.00153 0.00260* 0.00140 0.00259* 0.00213 
 
(0.00178) (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00138) (0.00148) (0.00144) (0.00142) (0.00184) (0.00141) (0.00130) (0.00145) (0.00141) 
icrg_qog 0.116             
 (0.0735) 
 
           
Lpop 
 
-0.147** 
       
 
 
  
 
 
(0.0593) 
       
 
 
  
Cold 
  
-0.0365** 
        
  
 
  
(0.0153) 
        
  
bankingcrises 
   
-0.0185* 
       
  
 
   
(0.0112) 
       
  
Reer 
    
0.000792*** 
      
  
 
    
(0.000205) 
      
  
Inflation 
     
-0.000965 
     
  
 
     
(0.00129) 
     
  
Trade 
      
0.000144 
    
  
 
      
(0.000297) 
    
  
Political Orientation 
       
-0.00240 
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(0.00285) 
   
  
Unemployment 
        
-0.00261** 
  
  
 
        
(0.00130) 
  
  
Yearbeforeelec 
         
0.00211 
 
  
 
         
(0.00524) 
 
  
YbelecConsolidation 
         
-0.0177 
 
  
 
         
(0.0147) 
 
  
Welfareinst 
          
0.00346***   
 
          
(0.00132)   
Devagency            0.00501  
 
           
(0.00882)  
Devagency- 
Consolidation            
-0.00384  
 
           
(0.0143)  
Devagency- 
Stimuli            
0.00768  
 
           
(0.0150)  
AgreeUN             -0.00806 
 
           
 (0.0430) 
 
            
 
Constant -0.0143 2.452** 0.0513*** 0.0143 -0.0579** 0.117*** 0.0123 0.108*** 0.0571*** 0.0129 0.0466* 0.0110 0.112*** 
 (0.0714) (0.984) (0.0120) (0.0190) (0.0280) (0.0258) (0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0246) (0.0199) (0.0366) 
              
Countries-Observations 19-445 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-606 19-497 19-606 17-464 19-606 19-606 
Overall R2 0.964 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.963 0.960 0.967 0.960 0.964 
Country/ Year 
Dummies Significance YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YES 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.  
c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the 
dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation).  
The variable “Aid” denotes either ODAGross, ODANet or NAT.  
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Table 9: Effects of fiscal episodes variables on Aid Supplies if countries are excluded (Using LSDV and PCSE)  
 
Country Excluded Effect of Fiscal Episodes on ODAGross Effect of Fiscal Episodes on ODANet Effect of Fiscal Episodes on NAT 
 
Fiscal consolidation Fiscal Expansion Fiscal consolidation Fiscal Expansion Fiscal consolidation Fiscal Expansion 
 
      
Australia -0.0141* 0.000510 -0.0143** 0.00536 -0.0157*** 0.0149** 
 (0.00733) (0.00807) (0.00723) (0.00792) (0.00488) (0.00622) 
Austria -0.0194*** -0.000954 -0.0197*** 0.00398 -0.0179*** 0.0123** 
 (0.00701) (0.00785) (0.00691) (0.00767) (0.00497) (0.00605) 
Belgium -0.0167** -0.00367 -0.0164** 0.00185 -0.0179*** 0.0117* 
 (0.00746) (0.00813) (0.00734) (0.00795) (0.00503) (0.00621) 
Canada -0.0150** 0.000811 -0.0148** 0.00499 -0.0162*** 0.0132** 
 (0.00756) (0.00797) (0.00751) (0.00788) (0.00500) (0.00621) 
Denmark -0.0146* 0.00107 -0.0123* 0.00518 -0.0121** 0.0142** 
 (0.00748) (0.00778) (0.00735) (0.00764) (0.00483) (0.00583) 
Finland -0.0144* -0.00429 -0.0153** 0.000820 -0.0172*** 0.0103 
 (0.00746) (0.00817) (0.00741) (0.00809) (0.00492) (0.00640) 
France -0.0158** -0.00620 -0.0151** 0.000498 -0.0169*** 0.0122* 
 (0.00734) (0.00803) (0.00725) (0.00788) (0.00488) (0.00627) 
Germany -0.0151** -0.00150 -0.0150** 0.00370 -0.0163*** 0.0127* 
 (0.00694) (0.00767) (0.00681) (0.00748) (0.00545) (0.00653) 
Ireland -0.0140* -0.00409 -0.0134* 0.00157 -0.0145*** 0.0113* 
 (0.00752) (0.00801) (0.00743) (0.00787) (0.00490) (0.00611) 
Italy -0.0133* 0.00237 -0.0138* 0.00693 -0.0164*** 0.0159** 
 (0.00793) (0.00790) (0.00782) (0.00775) (0.00517) (0.00622) 
Japan -0.0160** -0.00289 -0.0161** 0.00332 -0.0178*** 0.0142** 
 (0.00750) (0.00819) (0.00739) (0.00813) (0.00485) (0.00598) 
Netherlands -0.0108 -0.00338 -0.0104 0.00268 -0.0112** 0.0131** 
 (0.00772) (0.00817) (0.00772) (0.00792) (0.00509) (0.00615) 
New Zealand -0.0148* -0.00116 -0.0148** 0.00405 -0.0163*** 0.0135** 
 (0.00760) (0.00782) (0.00749) (0.00768) (0.00510) (0.00610) 
Norway -0.0141* -0.00638 -0.0141* -0.00115 -0.0168*** 0.00877 
 (0.00756) (0.00812) (0.00752) (0.00799) (0.00505) (0.00621) 
Portugal -0.0114* 0.00259 -0.0132** 0.00875 -0.0170*** 0.0133** 
 (0.00596) (0.00667) (0.00596) (0.00664) (0.00512) (0.00630) 
Spain -0.0151** -0.00101 -0.0151** 0.00395 -0.0165*** 0.0132** 
 (0.00750) (0.00791) (0.00740) (0.00781) (0.00501) (0.00621) 
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Sweden -0.0112 -0.00120 -0.0110 -7.46e-05 -0.0129*** 0.00377 
 (0.00746) (0.00779) (0.00734) (0.00760) (0.00468) (0.00556) 
United Kingdom -0.0160** -0.00127 -0.0162** 0.00419 -0.0181*** 0.0148** 
 (0.00765) (0.00824) (0.00755) (0.00805) (0.00506) (0.00652) 
United States -0.0143** -0.000300 -0.0145** 0.00400 -0.0162*** 0.0128** 
 (0.00726) (0.00788) (0.00716) (0.00774) (0.00482) (0.00609) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. 
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We recall that ODAGross (the gross aid disbursements) measures the total aid disbursements, 
ODANet (the net aid disbursements) represents gross aid disbursements minus the 
repayments of loan principal or recoveries on grants received during the same period, and 
NAT (the net aid transfers) subtracts not only the repayments of principal from ODAGross, 
but also interest payments and the cancellation of non-ODA loans (that is, debt relief). The 
exclusion of debt relief from the definition of aid is justified by the fact that debt cancellation 
does not give rise to an actual disbursement of funds and may even imply a double counting 
of aid if the debt that is cancelled was granted on a concessional basis (see also Bertoli et al, 
2008). Accordingly, the NAT variable appears to approximate more closely the current 
budgetary outlays associated with aid (see also Dang et al, 2010).      
 On the full sample (Table 8), we observe that irrespective of the measure of ‘aid 
variable’ used, aid supplies decline during episodes of fiscal consolidation: over the period 
1970–2007, one more year of fiscal retrenchment (compared to the years of absence of fiscal 
adjustments) decreases aid generosity by 0.0145% of GDP for both the ODAGross and 
ODANet variables and 0.016% of GDP for NAT variable.  
In addition, the use of the counter variables described previously leads us to conclude that one 
more year of fiscal consolidation leads to a fall in ODAGross effort of 0.03% of GDP and an 
average decline in ODANet effort of 0.02% of GDP (although the significance of the 
coefficient is at the 10% level). However, no significant effect for the NAT variable is 
observed. Only the ODAGross exports appear on average to rebound after approximately 1.28 
years. The result found for NAT seems to reinforce the hypothesis of Round and Odedokun 
(2004: p.306) (see sub-section 4.2) according to which aid is not a particular item in the 
budget that should be cut (even) during fiscal consolidation periods because it acts as an 
influential foreign policy tool for donor governments. Therefore, given the aforementioned 
difference in the measurement of the three aid variables, we can conclude here (when we use 
the counter variables) that during episodes of large fiscal consolidations in traditional OECD 
donor countries, the real disbursements of funds are not affected (that is, they neither decline 
nor increase).    
 Large-scale fiscal stimulus episodes do not affect either the ODAGross effort or the 
ODANet effort. One more year of fiscal stimulus affects only the NAT variable and leads to a 
rise in NAT effort of 0.034% of GDP, an effect that seems to decrease after approximately 
1.08 years. Thus, we can also conclude here that during large-scale fiscal expansion episodes, 
donors increase their real disbursements of funds to developing countries.   
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            In agreement with Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007), 
but in contrast to Bertoli et al (2008), Faini (2006) and Mosley (1985), the parameter of the 
fiscal surplus in percentage of GDP is not statistically significant for all specifications. This 
suggests that, all other things being equal, the fiscal balance does not exert a significant long-
run average effect on the level of foreign aid.  
             The coefficient on public debt exhibits alternating significant and non-significant 
negative effects on aid supplies. The output gap appears always to exert a positive significant 
effect on aid supplies.          
 What then about the results of the exclusion of countries (Table 9)? The results 
regarding the ODAGross and the ODANet dependent variables suggest evidence that during 
the years of large-scale fiscal stimulus episodes, the aid expenditure of traditional OECD 
donors neither increases nor decreases. However, the NAT variable appears to be affected 
positively and significantly during large-scale fiscal expansion years: the results are 
suggestive of the fact that when we exclude either Finland, Norway or Sweden from the full 
sample of countries, the effect of the ‘large fiscal expansion variable’ on the NAT variable 
exhibits alternating positive and negative signs, but is never statistically significant. This may 
mean that these three countries play a key role in the rise of aid (NAT) from OECD countries 
during large-scale fiscal stimulus episodes.   
 With respect to the effect of large fiscal consolidation measures on the aid supply of 
OECD countries, we almost always obtain a negative and significant effect. For the 
ODAGross variable, the effect is negative and significant when we exclude each country once 
from the full sample of 19 OECD countries, except for the case of the exclusion of Sweden. 
For the ODANet variable, we observe the same negative and significant effect except for the 
exclusion of Sweden and of the Netherlands. For the NAT variable, the negative effect is 
obtained irrespective of the country that is excluded from the full sample; moreover, this 
effect is always significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results seem to confirm those obtained 
over the whole sample of OECD countries. 
 The robustness check of our baseline model’s results (see Table 10) using the FE-DK 
technique suggests roughly the same results as in Table 8 (although with different standard 
errors), except for the case of the ODANet variable where:   the aid effort declines by 0.02% of GDP for one more year of fiscal retrenchment 
and rebounds after approximately 1.8 years;  
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 an additional year of fiscal stimulus seems to exert on average a permanent 
negative effect on aid effort.  
 
 
Table 10: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in OECD DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 
1970-2007, using Daniel Hoechle’s technique: Fixed-effects regression with Driscoll and 
Kraay standard errors (FEDK).   
 
 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 
 
ODAGross ODANet NAT ODAGross ODANet NAT 
Estimator FEDK FEDK FEDK FEDK FEDK FEDK 
Regressors       
Aidt-1 0.588*** 0.592*** 0.539*** 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.54*** 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.081) (0.060) (0.064) (0.08) 
Aidt-2 0.209*** 0.228*** 0.287*** 0.21*** 0.227*** 0.287*** 
 (0.05) (0.054) (0.088) (0.052) (0.055) (0.088) 
Consolidation -0.0145*** -0.0145*** -0.016**    
 (0.00434) (0.00440) (0.00603)    
Stimuli -0.0016 0.003 0.013    
 (0.01) (0.008) (0.009)    
NumberConsolidation    -0.033*** -0.02*** -0.01 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
NumberConsolidationsq    0.013*** 0.0057** -0.0005 
    (0.003) (0.0022) (0.0047) 
NumberStimuli    0.004 0.0153 0.034** 
    (0.012) (0.0125) (0.013) 
NumberStimulisq    -0.004 -0.008* -0.016*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fiscal_Balance 0.0001 0.0001 -2.67e-05 -0.0001 -4.32e-05 -0.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Debt -5.75e-05 -0.00019 -0.00026** -7.78e-05 -0.0002 -0.00026** 
 (0.0001) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00012) 
Outputgap 0.0036** 0.003** 0.00276** 0.003** 0.0025* 0.0028** 
 (0.0017) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.0442*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.0126) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Countries - Observations 19-601 19-606 19-606 19-601 19-606 19-606 
Within R2 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.72 
Time and Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. a: The model is “state-
dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one 
year lagged values of the dependent variable. c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the 
dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent 
variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
The variable “Aid” denotes either ODAGross, ODANet or NAT.  
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Turning to our sub-samples of countries, we observe that the results of the baseline model 
reported in Table 11 for the EU countries are broadly in line with those found previously for 
the full sample (Table 8), suggesting that EU countries exhibit on average the same behaviour 
in terms of aid supply as those observed for the full sample.  
           
Table 11: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in European Union DAC Countries on aid disbursements, 
1970-2007 
 
 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 
 ODAGross ODANet NAT ODAGross ODANet NAT 
Estimators LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
Variables       
Aidt-1 0.631*** 0.622*** 0.591*** 0.637*** 0.626*** 0.592*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0677) (0.0461) (0.0653) (0.0681) (0.0465) 
Aidt-2 0.137** 0.171** 0.219*** 0.132** 0.168** 0.219*** 
 (0.0635) (0.0665) (0.0446) (0.0634) (0.0669) (0.0448) 
Consolidation 
-0.0176** -0.0177** -0.0193*** 
 
  
 (0.00794) (0.00764) (0.00513) 
 
  
Stimuli 0.00360 0.00668 0.0131** 
 
  
 (0.00869) (0.00867) (0.00647) 
 
  
NumberConsolidation 
   -0.0399*** -0.0246** -0.0112 
 
   (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.00893) 
NumberConsolidationsq 
   0.0153*** 0.00650 -0.00125 
 
   (0.00442) (0.00442) (0.00412) 
NumberStimuli 
   0.00937 0.0194 0.0379*** 
 
   (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0115) 
NumberStimulisq 
   -0.00400 -0.00875 -0.0167*** 
 
   (0.00628) (0.00626) (0.00520) 
Fiscal_Balance 0.000247 0.000318 0.000272 9.68e-05 0.000249 0.000222 
 (0.00102) (0.00109) (0.000780) (0.00103) (0.00108) (0.000783) 
Debt 
-0.000207 -0.000299* -0.000377*** -0.000219 -0.000291* -0.000348*** 
 (0.000173) (0.000173) (0.000129) (0.000174) (0.000174) (0.000130) 
Outputgap 0.00503** 0.00373* 0.00353*** 0.00461** 0.00357* 0.00371*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00197) (0.00109) (0.00204) (0.00200) (0.00112) 
Constant 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.0955*** 0.204*** 0.0816*** 0.0926*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0262) (0.0164) (0.0379) (0.0257) (0.0164) 
Countries-Observations 14-435 14-440 14-440 14-435 14-440 14-440 
Overall R2 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.98 
Time and or Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model 
is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable. c: The model is “state-
dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is 
the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
The variable “Aid” denotes either ODAGross, ODANet or NAT.  
 
In terms of the non-EU donor countries, the results reported in Table 12 show evidence that 
this sub-group of countries behaves differently compared to EU countries in several ways. 
The fiscal retrenchment episodes do not affect the aid efforts of these countries at all (the 
long-run average value of fiscal consolidation episode coefficients are not statistically 
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significant, even at the 10% level), irrespective of the aid variable considered. Hence, the real 
disbursements of funds by these donors are not affected when they experience fiscal 
retrenchment episodes. However, concerning the fiscal stimulus variables, we observe that 
one more year of fiscal stimulus leads to a decline in aid effort (the latter result applies only to 
ODAGross and ODANet variables but not to NAT variable) without any expected rebound 
effect after a certain period. Hence, the results based on ODAGross and ODANet variables 
suggest that during large-scale fiscal expansion periods, donors cut aid expenditure to 
developing countries at the benefit of other expenditure components. Donors' real aid 
expenditure to developing countries does not appear to be affected during the large-scale 
fiscal expansion periods (in donors' economies). When considering the counter variables (the 
number of years since the start of fiscal consolidation in a donor country as well as its squares 
and the number of years since the start of fiscal stimulus in a donor country as well as its 
squares), we observe roughly the same results as those obtained for the variables of fiscal 
consolidation and fiscal stimulus episodes. These results lead us to conclude that despite the 
wealth and the lead of these countries in the renewal of aid commitments, episodes of fiscal 
stimulus could hit their aid supplies severely. Furthermore, in contrast with the EU sub-
sample (and the full sample), we find evidence that an improvement in fiscal balance leads to 
a reduction in aid effort irrespective of the aid variable considered and a higher debt 
accumulation induces a rise in ODAGross effort, the effect on the other aid variables 
appearing statistically insignificant. The output gap does not influence the aid exports of this 
sub-group of countries.   
            Overall, for the full sample, we obtain evidence that during fiscal consolidation 
episodes, the traditional OECD donors reduce their aid expenditure. The effect of large-scale 
fiscal stimulus episodes on the donors’ aid generosity seems to depend on the aid variable 
considered, although given the definition of the NAT variable, we can conclude that the 
donors increase the real disbursements of funds to developing countries during such episodes. 
Whereas the EU countries appear to exhibit on average the same behaviour in terms of their 
aid supply as the full sample, on average the non-EU countries behave differently.  
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Table 12: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in Non EU Countries on aid disbursements, 1970-
2007  
 
 1b 2b 3d 4b 5b 6d 
 ODAGross ODANet NAT ODAGross ODANet NAT 
Estimators LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
LSDV with 
PCSEs 
Regressors       
 
   
 
  
Aidt-1 0.566*** 0.606*** 0.595*** 0.566*** 0.605*** 0.585*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0607) (0.0696) (0.0603) (0.0598) (0.0682) 
Consolidation 0.000591 0.00122 0.000274    
 (0.00836) (0.00726) (0.00782)    
Stimuli -0.0326*** -0.0225** -0.0145    
 (0.0102) (0.00902) (0.0104)    
NumberConsolidation    -0.0135 -0.0130 -0.0172 
    (0.0150) (0.0125) (0.0141) 
NumberConsolidationsq    0.00937 0.00920* 0.0111* 
    (0.00725) (0.00548) (0.00672) 
NumberStimuli    -0.0557** -0.0479** -0.0364 
    (0.0266) (0.0236) (0.0250) 
NumberStimulisq    0.0185 0.0196 0.0155 
    (0.0187) (0.0172) (0.0166) 
Fiscal_Balance -0.00478*** - -0.00471*** -0.00506*** -0.00479*** -0.00528*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00127) (0.00145) (0.00141) (0.00130) (0.00146) 
Debt 0.000388** 7.41e-05 -0.000107 0.000373** 6.38e-05 -0.000126 
 (0.000162) (0.000141) (0.000151) (0.000162) (0.000141) (0.000149) 
Outputgap 0.00303 0.00242 0.00255 0.00310 0.00261 0.00298 
 (0.00203) (0.00188) (0.00206) (0.00204) (0.00189) (0.00205) 
Constant 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.148*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0249) (0.0295) 
Countries-Observations 5-170 5-170 5-170 5-170 5-170 5-170 
Overall R2 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 
Time and/or Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis - *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. a: The model is 
“state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable.   b: The model is “state-
dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.  c: The model is “state-dependent” only 
with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of 
one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
The variable “Aid” denotes either ODAGross, ODANet or NAT.  
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7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we analyze the behavior of OECD donor countries with respect to their aid 
effort during the fiscal episodes (episodes of fiscal consolidation and episodes of fiscal 
stimuli). The focus here is on a panel of 19 OECD DAC countries over the period 1970–2007 
where we employ three different variables to capture aid effort. To perform this analysis, we 
use descriptive statistics provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) on fiscal episodes in OECD 
countries and regression models. In the latter, we control for several other macroeconomic, 
political, institutional and international political economy variables in addition to our core 
variables (fiscal episodes). 
Several results emerge: 
- Considering our full sample of OECD DAC countries, we observe that fiscal 
consolidation episodes reduce aid effort, whatever aid variable considered, with these 
negative effects sometimes diminishing over time. However, fiscal stimuli episodes exert 
significant and positive effects only on aid the Net Aid Transfers variable, the other aid 
variables do not significantly respond to fiscal stimuli periods.   
 - The effects of fiscal episodes on aid supply depend also on the group of countries 
under consideration. In fact, when turning to our sub-samples, we observe that European 
Union countries exhibit the same behaviour in terms of aid effort (with few exceptions) as 
those of the full sample of countries. In contrast, aid exports of Non-European Countries (Non 
EU) do not seem to be affected during episodes of large fiscal retrenchment, whereas the 
effect of their large episodes of loose discretionary fiscal policy on aid expenditure appears to 
depend on the variable considered, with a severe negative effect on Gross aid flows and Net 
Aid flows and a statistically nil effect on Net Aid Transfers (that is here the real aid 
expenditure). In addition these negative effects of loose fiscal policy highlighted do not 
decrease over time.  
The current situation characterized by large public debt overhangs - and strains on 
public finances - in many OECD countries, as well as the ongoing effects the recent (2008) 
financial crisis, makes the findings of our study particularly relevant. Based on these results, 
we can infer that the fiscal adjustment measures being currently adopted by many developed 
countries, especially the European Union ones will negatively affect their aid expenditures, 
with these negative effects being likely higher than expected, given the severity of the crises. 
The figures provided in the Introduction of this Chapter validate our findings. Hence, the 
curtailments observed will severely affect the investment spending of developing countries, 
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especially Africans, with deleterious effects on economic growth and poverty reduction. As a 
result, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is likely to be severely 
jeopardized in these countries. 
These results raise the question of whether developing countries (particularly Low-Income 
countries) should continue in the long-run to be highly dependent on aid flows for financing 
their spending needs. Indeed, acknowledging the current crucial role of aid inflows for many 
aid recipients (especially Low-Income Countries) and regarding the dependence of these 
inflows on the fiscal circumstances in donor countries, we make the following 
recommendations:      
For any country, tax revenues remain unavoidably the main source of financing public 
expenditures in the perspective of sustainable development in the long term. This is why the 
International Community should help developing countries strengthen their mobilization of 
tax revenue by removing the main obstacles to the improvement of such mobilization, 
including the size of the informal sector. 
The International Community decided during the Monterrey Summit in 2002 to find 
innovative financing mechanisms in order to help developing countries achieve their 
development purposes. It becomes more urgent to develop and make such mechanisms more 
operational through for instance the international financial tax transactions and the reduction 
of remittances costs at the international level. 
The International Community should also help developing countries (especially Low-Income 
Countries) develop and deepen their domestic financial markets in order to allow them to 
simultaneously rely less on foreign capital flows (that can be very costly compared to 
domestic financing) and channel the saving towards investments for sustainable development 
purposes. 
Furthermore, we would like to highlight two limits to our study: the first is our focus on only 
traditional OECD donors which are the main ones in terms of aid supply. However, the so-
called “emerging countries” have appeared recently to start playing an important role in terms 
of aid provision to the other developing countries within the framework of South-South 
cooperation. It would thus be interesting to explore in another study whether fiscal policy 
measures in these “emerging countries” matter for their development assistance.  
One may also require us to extend our database to the recent year for which fiscal variables 
are available (2011) (though the fiscal episodes variables come from Alesina and Ardagna, 
2010). This is not really a limit of our study because the fiscal austerity measures currently 
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adopted by many OECD countries especially European Union countries are on-going and will 
last many years (for example, these measures should be implemented until 2017 for France). 
Therefore, such extension seems unsuitable.  
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Appendix and Tables 
Appendix 1: Description of variables and Sources  
ODAGross = Gross Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor in percent of GDP. 
This variable includes ODA to multilateral institutions. Source: Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
ODANet = Net Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor, in percent of GDP. This 
variable includes ODA to multilateral institutions. Source: Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) Databases; OECD (2010). 
 
NAT = Net Aid Transfers disbursed by each donor, as a percentage of GDP. This variable includes 
transfers to multilateral institutions. Source: Centre for Global Development - Roodman (2008 and 
2012). 
 
Consolidation = Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation (Adjustment). This is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 the year of large fiscal consolidation, and the value 0, otherwise. Source:  Alesina, A., and 
Ardagna, S. (2010) “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes vs Spending,” Tax Policy and the 
Economy , Volume 24, Chapter 2, pp 35–68. For the data, see the Appendix Table A.2 of the chapter. 
 
Stimuli = Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli (Expansion). This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 the 
year of large fiscal stimuli, and the value 0, otherwise. Source: Alesina, A., and Ardagna, S. (2010) 
“Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes vs Spending,” Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24, 
Chapter 2, pp 35–68. For the data, see the Appendix Table A.2 of the chapter. 
 
NumberConsolidation = the Number of years since the large fiscal consolidation has started in a 
donor country, with the first year of the fiscal consolidation taking a value of 1. The other years of 
lack of large fiscal consolidation measures take the value 0. Source: Calculated by the author using the 
Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
 
NumberConsolidationsq = the square of the variable “Number of fiscal consolidation’s years”. 
Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified by Ardagna and 
Alesina (2010). 
 
Numberstimuli = the Number of years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country, with the 
first year of the large fiscal stimuli taking a value of 1. The other years of lack of fiscal stimuli 
measures take the value 0. Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli 
identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
 
Numberstimulisq = the square of the variable “Number of fiscal Stimuli’s years”. Source: Calculated 
by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina (2010). 
 
Debt = Gross Public Debt-to-GDP-ratio. Source: The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s New 
comprehensive database on Public debt – (November 2010). 
 
Fiscal_Balance = General government fiscal balances (Total Revenues minus Total Expenditures) in 
percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
 
Output Gap = the difference between the maximum output achievable and the actual level of output. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
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Lrgdp = Log(Real GDP per capita 2005 constant prices in US Dollars). Source: Pen World Tables 
(PWT 6.3), 2009. 
 
Icrg_qog = Quality of Governance: The quality of governance is measured by subjective indices from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-governance index from ICRG used here 
is an 18-point scale, created by summing the following three six-point scales: corruption in 
government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. See the ICRG for the criteria used in coding 
these measures. The rationale for corruption and bureaucratic quality is obvious. The rule-of-law 
definition indicates that this measure reflects the government's administrative capacity in enforcing the 
law, as well as the potential for rent-seeking associated with weak legal systems and insecure property 
rights. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
 
REER = Real effective exchange rates based on consumer price indices - Year 2005 = 100; An 
increase denotes a depreciation. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
 
Unemployment = Unemployment Rate (in % of Total Labor Force). Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
 
Bankingcrises = Banking Crises – It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the years of 
banking crises et 0 otherwise. Data provided by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (June 2010) – 
Website: http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
 
Devagency = Independence of aid Agency = The data are provided by Bertoli et al. (20089 and 
completed by the Author. This variable takes the value “1” if the development aid agency is 
independent from the state and “0”, otherwise. The variable “DevagencyConcolidation” is calculated 
as Devagency*Consolidation. It captures the behavior of independent development agencies during 
fiscal consolidation episodes.  In addition, the variable “DevagencyStimuli” is calculated as 
Devagency*Stimuli. It captures the behavior of independent development agencies during fiscal loose 
episodes. 
 
Inflation = Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %). Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – 
December 2010. 
 
Trade = Openness degree to trade = (Export + Imports)/GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 
88 – December 2010. 
 
Outputgap = Output Gap = the difference between the maximum output achievable and the actual 
level of output. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 2010. 
 
Cold = This is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" for years before or equal to 1990 and "0" 
after 1990. Source: Author Calculation. 
 
Lpop = Natural logarithm of the level of population. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – 
December 2010. 
 
Elec = Election Year - 1970-2008: The variable “Yearbeforeelec” is a dummy that captures one 
yearbefore the election. The variable  
 
YbelecConsolidation = Yearbeforeelec*Consolidation - Source: Armingeon et al. (2010) and 
calculation from the Author - Political Variables  
 See 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.ht
ml 
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PoliticalOrientation = Political Orientation variable =  {0} if there is equality in the combination of 
two of these three parties (for example 50% of Right Party and 50% of Left Party); {1} if the Right 
party dominates the government; = {2} if the Centre party dominates the government and {3} if the 
Left party dominates the government. Source: Constructed by the Author using the Database of 
Political Institutions available online from the World Bank (Beck et al., 2010). 
 
Welfareinst = the “generosity” measure of welfare state institutions. Source: Database of Scruggs 
Lyle (2006), http://sp.uconn.edu/scruggs/wp.htm 
  
AgreeUN = The voting similarity index in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): To 
construct the variable capturing voting alignment of developing countries to the donors in United 
Nations General Assembly, we use the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) voting dataset 
provided by Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009). More particularly, we use the “voting similarity index 
(0-1)”. The latter is computed using 3 category vote data (1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = 
abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue). Abstention is counted as half-agreement with a yes or no 
vote (see the dataset on the website: 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/12379. 
This variable is provided for pair of countries (developed country-developing country) and for each 
year. To obtain our desired data, we average for each developed country and for each year of our 
period of study (1970-2007) the values over all developing countries. This allows us to obtain for each 
developed country and per year, a voting similarity associated to all developing countries (that receive 
aid from that developed country) and for which the data are available. We call the variable thus 
obtained “AgreeUN”.  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics for the full sample of 19 countries   
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Odagrossgdp 698 0.425 0.248 0.012 1.06 
Odanet 722 0.388 0.249 0 1.04 
Nat 722 0.366 0.2445 0 1.03 
Consolidation 653 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Stimuli 653 0.130 0.337 0 1 
NumberConsolidation 653 0.1945 0.52 0 4 
NumberConsolidationsq 653 0.308 1.195 0 16 
NumberStimuli 653 0.165 0.473 0 3 
NumberStimulisq 653 0.251 0.9615 0 9 
Fiscal_Balance 690 -2.193 4.33 -16.008 18.48 
Debt 712 52.328 29.105 0 191.6 
Outputgap 644 -0.134 2.14 -8.72 6.5 
icrg_qog 456 0.901 0.099 0.523 1 
lpop 722 16.7221 1.262 14.855 19.524 
cold 722 0.553 0.498 0 1 
bankingcrises 722 0.036 0.186 0 1 
Reer 718 97.746 13.269 48.339 144.728 
Inflation 700 5.809362 5.103 -9.629 28.783 
Trade 722 62.57673 31.462 11.257 184.742 
Political  Orientation 722 1.889 0.972 0 3 
Unemployment 499 7.642 3.881 1.6 23.9 
Yearbeforeelec 722 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Welfareinst 542 27.281 7.545 11.035 45.378 
Devagency 722 0.363 0.481 0 1 
Agreeun 702 0.698 0.1026 0.243 0.871 
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Appendix 3:  Description of Maddala (1987)’s Test   
 
Consider the following model: 
, , 1 ,i t i t i i ty y u      (1). Maddala (1987) suggests that an important issue that arises in dynamic models is that of 
“serial correlation” versus “state dependence”, that is, whether any direct effects of the dependent variable exist apart from those generate indirectly by 
the serial correlation of the errors. Alternative terminology for the “serial correlation model” versus “state-dependence model” is model with “error 
dynamics” and “system dynamics”, respectively. To clarify this problem, consider a single cross-section unit where we drop the subscript I (this issue is 
not special to panel data and concerns also the usual regression models as well). For example, consider the regression model with no lagged variables, 
but serially correlated errors: 
1
t t t
t t t
y x u
u x e
        
We can write it as  1 1t t t t ty y x x e        (2). The model in (2) is the same as the dynamic regression equation: (3) 
1 0 1t t t t ty y x x e        with the restriction 0 1 0   . The two models thus differ in this restriction. If the restriction 0 1 0    holds, the 
apparent effect of 1ty  on ty is due to serial correlation in the errors. On the other hand, if this restriction does not hold, then 1ty   has an effect on ty  
and we have what is known as « state-dependence ». Thus an estimate of Equation (3) and a test of the restriction 0 1 0    will enable us to 
discrimate between the “serial correlation model” and the “state dependence model”. 
Summing up, the proper procedure is to first estimate Equation (3) and test for the restriction 0 1 0   . If this is not rejected, then we test for serial 
correlation by testing 0  . Thus, the test for the serial correlation should be undertaken after we have determined that what we have is perhaps a 
serial correlation model. The use of the Durbin-Watson statistic at the beginning is not a correct procedure.  
Returning to the case of panel data, the “serial correlation model” and the “state-dependence model” corresponding to Equation (4):  
'
, ,i t i t i ity x u     are: The serial correlation model: ', ,
, , 1
i t i t i it
i t i t it
y x u
u
         ;    The State dependence model: ', , 1 ,i t i t i t i ity y x u      .  
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CHAPTER II20: The effect of migrants’ remittances and unpredictability of 
development aid inflows on fiscal consolidation in developing countries. 
 
 
Abstract 
We use panel data on seventy-four developing countries for the period 1980–2007 to examine 
the effects of aid unpredictability and migrants’ remittances on fiscal consolidation in these 
countries. Using two definitions of fiscal adjustment and a conditional logit model to perform 
our analysis, evidence is shown that except for the case of low-income countries (especially 
gradual fiscal retrenchment), remittances increase the likelihood of fiscal consolidation, be the 
latter gradual or rapid. Surprisingly, we observe that aid unpredictability does not affect the 
adoption of fiscal consolidation measures in all the groups considered. 
 
Keywords: Remittances; Aid Unpredictability; Fiscal consolidation. 
JEL Classification: F35; F24; O23; C5. 
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 This Chapter has been published in the review "World Development", Volume 54, February 2014, Pages 
168-190. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of fiscal consolidation has been largely explored in the literature the empirical 
literature. The latter encompasses two main strands: the impact of fiscal consolidation 
measures on macroeconomic variables such as growth, investment, savings….. etc, and the 
determinants of fiscal consolidation. Whereas the first strand of this empirical literature has 
been largely explored for both developed and developing countries, the second strand, apart 
from certain scarce studies (such as Larvigne, 2010) has focused mainly on developed 
countries. 
In 2000, the international community committed itself to achieving eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 201521. The achievement of these goals requires a substantial 
transfer of resources (for e.g. aid flows and migrants’ remittances) to developing countries. 
According to Ratha (2009), and as documented by IMF (2005), World Bank (2006) and 
Chami et al., (2008), remittances become an increasingly important source of external funding 
for a number of developing countries, going beyond the levels of foreign aid or foreign direct 
investment. Moreover, many scholars of whom Ratha (2005) argue that these remittances 
represent a stable source of funding for development.   
On one side, the substantial literature on workers’ remittances effects has highlighted the 
welfare enhancing benefits of remittances for the recipients’ households, as well as their 
macroeconomic effects. Regarding the latter, remittances are said for example to reduce 
poverty rates (Adams, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009) and minimize the consumption volatility of 
transfer recipients through their compensatory nature (see for example, Chami, Fullenkamp 
and Jahjah, 2003; World Bank, 2006; IMF, 2005, Chami et al., 2009). Moreover, Chami, 
Cosimano and Gapen (2006) examine the Ramsey problem in general equilibrium framework 
and show evidence that remittances affect the setting of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in 
the recipient countries. They conclude that remittances, by increasing consumption, expand 
the revenue base and thus, allow the government to carry more debt or incur more 
expenditure. On the economic growth, the effect of remittances remains unclear: while certain 
researchers such as Chami et al. (2009b) find difficult to conclude for a linear and direct effect 
of them, others such as Catrinescu et al., 2009, Guliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Singh et al., 
2009 find evidence that they exert a positive effect on economic growth conditioned upon 
some factors such as the quality of governance and the financial development. 
                                                          
21
 See complete list of the Millennium Development Goals in the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals website at : http://www.un.org/milleniumgoals/ 
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On the other side, the international community has adopted the concept of “predictability of 
aid” through the Paris’ declaration (2005) of aid effectiveness. Through that declaration, 
donors committed to provide “better aid” for the purpose of MDGs22.   
As highlighted by Celasun and Walliser (2008), “more predictable aid would improve 
recipient countries’ ability to plan for aid flows and allow them to more effectively execute 
the activities financed with such aid. Low predictability, by contrast, is costly by requiring 
adjustments to government consumption and investment plans with potential harmful effects 
on the objective attached to the spending of aid resources”. 
The development aid flows unpredictability is associated with reductions in government 
spending and/or increases in taxes (see for example, Gemmell and McGillivray, 1998). 
According Lensink and Morrissey (2000), aid uncertainty may negatively affect the impact of 
aid on economic growth. Pallage and Robe (2003) underscore that the lack of predictability 
due to aid delivered late compared to original plans, could at the same time be a source of 
procyclicality, with aid flows arriving when the economic downturn is over and reinforcing 
economic cycles rather than dampening them, imposing costs on economic management and 
reducing welfare.  
Thus summing up, both types of transfers serve to feed public revenues in developing 
countries and thus contribute to finance the needed public goods and services of these 
countries to achieve their purpose of sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Meanwhile, evidence has been shown that OECD Donors do not honor their aid’s 
commitments (see for example, Celasun and Walliser, 2008; Bulir and Hamman, 2001; 2003; 
2005). In addition, external and domestic shocks affecting remitters in their host countries 
(usually developed countries) can lead to a sudden and important decline in remittances sent. 
In such circumstances, public finances in developing countries could be severely affected, and 
prompted the interest countries to adopt fiscal consolidation measures.  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of external resources transfers on 
the decision of governments in developing countries to adopt fiscal austerity measures. In 
particular, we explore how migrants’ remittances and the unpredictability of development aid 
affect the inclination of these governments’ recipients to adopt fiscal adjustment measures.    
       The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section (section 2) 
reviews the literature on the fiscal consolidation issue. The following section presents our 
                                                          
22
 Particularly by halving extreme poverty by 2015. 
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definitions of ‘the episodes of fiscal consolidation in developing countries’. Next (section 5), 
we elaborate the model to be estimated as well as the econometric technique and discuss the 
expected effect of explanatory variables. Subsequently, we present the data (section 6), 
evaluate the estimations’ results (section 7) and finally conclude.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
There is a huge literature on the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidation (effects 
on growth, interest rate, real exchange rate, current account, saving, consumption…) in both 
advanced and developing countries. However, among the few studies that have been devoted 
to the determinants of fiscal adjustment, scarce are those that focus on developing countries. 
We summarize here the literature on the determinants of fiscal consolidation with a special 
focus on developing countries. 
Adams and Bevan (2003) study the variations in the persistence of episodes of fiscal stability, 
using a panel of 108 countries (83 developing and 25 OECD countries) over the period 1970-
2000. They define persistence of fiscal stability as the length of time the cyclically adjusted 
conventional fiscal balance exceeds a specific threshold, where the latter is based on plausible 
targets values for the steady-state public debt-to-GDP ratio. The use of hazard functions based 
on a range of alternative deficit thresholds leads them to conclude that: OECD and developing 
countries on one side and, middle-income and low-income countries on the other side, differ 
significantly in terms of fiscal stance and the determinants of fiscal stability; in contrast with 
the conventional structural characteristics of the economies, the level of income plays a major 
role in explaining the persistence of fiscal stability; the ability of countries to maintain a 
sustainable fiscal stance is negatively affected by a history of poor fiscal management, with 
this legacy deteriorating rapidly for middle income and OECD countries and not low-income 
countries; fiscal stability is underpinned by revenue reforms rather than expenditure cuts, 
particularly for low-income countries. 
Gupta et al. (2004) explore the effects of expenditure composition and other variables on the 
duration of fiscal adjustments episodes by the use of survival analysis on a sample of 29 
developing countries over the period 1990-2000. Following the literature on that issue23, fiscal 
                                                          
23
 These studies include for instance Alesina and Perotti (1995); Perotti (1998); Von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch 
(2001, 2002) who define episodes of fiscal consolidation as those periods in which the fiscal impulse (measured 
by the average cyclicality adjusted primary deficit) falls by at least 1.25 percent of GDP over two consecutive 
years, or when it increases by more than 1.5 percent of GDP in one year. 
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adjustments periods are defined as those where the observed change in the fiscal deficit as a 
share of GDP is above 1.5 percentage points of GDP. Moreover, fiscal adjustments are 
considered as continuing if the deficit falls by at least 1.5 % of GDP. They conclude that the 
main drivers of the persistence of fiscal adjustment are: the size of fiscal adjustment, 
economic growth, the composition of expenditure and past performance on fiscal 
consolidation. In addition, the availability of external financing is found to reduce the 
probability of continuing a fiscal consolidation. 
Gupta et al. (2005) examine the factors that influence the persistence of fiscal adjustment in 
25 emerging market countries through the period 1980-2001. They use survival analysis and 
more particularly an approach that defines spells of fiscal consolidation. Periods of fiscal 
adjustments are captured by a binary variable called “failure” and that takes the value of “0” 
when the annual variation of budget deficit is above 1 percentage point of GDP. Conversely, 
it takes the value “1” when annual change of budget deficit is lower than or equal to this 
threshold (lack of adjustment). Their findings24 are of two kinds: their analysis suggests that 
the legacy of previous fiscal failures, the size of the fiscal deficit, the composition of spending 
and the level of total revenue are the main determinants of a probability of a fiscal adjustment 
ending. In addition, the persistence of fiscal adjustments is affected by the initial debt stock, 
the exchange rate developments, inflation, and the unemployment rate. 
Mierau et al. (2007), in exploring the political determinants of fiscal consolidation make a 
distinction between rapid and gradual adjustments. A period of a rapid adjustment (in 
reference to Von Hagen and Strauch, 2001) is defined as that one where an improvement of 
the budget balance by 1.25% points in two consecutive years or an improvement of 1.5% 
points of the budget balance in the budgetary position is observed. A period of a gradual fiscal 
adjustment is captured by the use of Heylen and Everaert (2000)’s definition of fiscal 
consolidation: it is any period starting with an improvement of the budget balance by at least 
0.25% points in the first year, a minimum duration of 2 years and a total improvement of the 
budget balance by at least 2% points. Using a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 
1970-2003, they obtain that both gradual and rapid fiscal adjustments are driven by initial 
budgetary situation (captured by the structural budget deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio) as 
well as broad policy reform. Regarding the economic state, only gradual adjustments are 
affected by inflation. 
                                                          
24
 When for robustness check of their results, the authors use two alternative definition of fiscal consolidation 
based respectively on a change in the fiscal deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP and 1.5 percent of GDP per year, they 
obtained broadly similar results. 
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Thornton and Mati (2008) investigate the influence of exchange rate on the success of fiscal 
consolidation in 23 emerging market economies during the period 1970-2004. To do so, they 
use two definitions of fiscal consolidation: the first one defines fiscal consolidation episodes 
as having occurred when the improvement in the primary balance in any year is greater or 
equal to 0.75% of GDP. The second definition refers to any year where the improvement in 
the primary balance is greater or equal to 1.5% of GDP with no deterioration in the following 
two years. Their empirical results suggest that exchange rate depreciation raises significantly 
the probability of a fiscal consolidation being successful in these countries, when controlling 
for debt, economic growth, the composition of the consolidation and the degree of democracy. 
Larvigne (2010) in contrast with the previous quoted studies explore not only the political and 
institutional determinants of fiscal adjustments (called “adjustment status”), but also those of 
the adjustments need. In other words, his study aims at determining the role of political and 
institutional factors that explain why countries get into fiscal distress, why some are to 
fiscally consolidate when required and why others are unable to adjust despite an evident need 
to do so. A fiscal adjustment or “adjustment status” is then defined as a continuous positive 
change in the primary balance amounting to at least 1.5% of GDP over a period of 5 years. 
For robustness check, the threshold is raised to 2.5% of GDP. An adjustment need is defined 
as a period of severe fiscal distress that signals a clear need for fiscal consolidation. As 
periods of adjustment needs are not readily observable, the author uses two ways for 
identifying such episodes: the screening approach and the Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). 
Whilst the LPA approach focuses on clustering analysis by the use of a categorical latent 
variable, the screening approach remains author’s the principal means of identifying years 
with adjustment needs. This latter approach considers an adjustment need to occur whenever 
the cumulative total of central government deficits over the past years is greater than or equal 
to 20% of GDP. For robustness check, the cumulative deficit threshold is raised to 25% of 
GDP.  
He finds evidence that budgetary institutions play a key role in fiscal adjustment situations in 
developed countries: fiscal rules help avoid situations of fiscal distress whereas fiscal 
performance management systems improve the odds of implementing adjustments.  
Regarding the developing countries, it is mainly the institutional quality that matters for fiscal 
adjustment need and status: whereas strong scores of broad measures of institutional quality 
(e.g. rule of law indices) help avoid fiscal distress situations in certain countries, weaker 
scores in other countries induce the latter to implement large fiscal adjustments. 
 94 
 
The next section explains how in our study, we identify episodes of fiscal consolidation in our 
sample of developing countries. 
 
3. Episodes of the fiscal consolidation in developing countries 
In this study of the role of transfers (aid unpredictability and remittances transfers) on fiscal 
consolidation in developing countries, the fiscal consolidation variable used is a binary 
variable which identifies years in which a fiscal adjustment occurs in a developing country. 
This variable takes the value of “1” if there is a fiscal adjustment in a particular year, and “0”, 
otherwise.  
 
In the empirical literature of budget deficits, there is no consensus upon the criteria to be used 
to identify fiscal adjustments years. Adam and Bevan (2003) distinguishes usefully two 
approaches in the existing work: the level approach that ex ante defines a specific threshold 
and considers all countries that have a deficit smaller than this value consolidating; and the 
gradient approach which evaluates the yearly change in the deficit and considers all countries 
whose deficit decreases by more than a certain threshold to be in a period of fiscal 
consolidation.  
 
Our study remains in the vein of the second approach and we consider here two definitions of 
fiscal adjustment: 
The first is proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and also used for example in Alesina 
and Perotti (1995b, 1997), Alesina and Tavares (1998), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna 
(2007): “A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP”. This definition captures rapid, though 
large adjustments. 
The second definition owes to Heylen and Everaert (2000) and captures gradual fiscal 
adjustment: “A period of fiscal adjustment is any period starting with an improvement in the 
budget balance by at least 0.25% points in the first year, a minimum duration of 2 years and a 
total improvement of the budget balance by at least 2% points”.  
To identify the fiscal consolidation episodes, the common practice in the empirical literature 
is to use a measure of the structural fiscal balances in relation to GDP, i.e. to abstract from the 
fiscal balances, the business cycle influences. However, regarding developing countries, these 
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business cycles influences remain weak because economic stabilizers have a small size. In 
fact, considering the case of sub-Saharan African countries, some authors such as Balassone 
and Kumar (2007) have documented that economic cycles and output gaps are particularly 
difficult to measure in sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons: first, structural breaks and 
supply shocks are frequent and data can be of poor quality; second, revenue-to-GDP ratios are 
generally lower and tax systems and public expenditure structures are not very sensitive to the 
cycle.25 Regarding emerging market economies, Thornton and Mati (2008) have mentioned 
that “the limited and often rapidly changing in the economic structures of these economies 
can complicate the calculation of structural fiscal balances and, their less developed income 
tax system and social insurance systems mean that automatic fiscal stabilizers are much less 
effective”. For that reason, they define fiscal consolidation episodes with respect to changes in 
the unadjusted primary balance and control for business cycle effects in their regression 
analysis.  
In this study, for all these reasons, we follow the approach adopted by Thornton and Mati 
(2008) and construct our fiscal consolidation episodes with respect to changes in the 
unadjusted primary balance, while controlling for the effects of business cycle in the 
regression. 
It is worth mentioning that although the two definitions of fiscal consolidation used here 
partly overlap, they are not identical. These definitions are applied to a sample of seventy-four 
developing countries spanning the period 1980–2007. The panel data thus obtained are 
unbalanced, with the shortest time period being T=7 years and the longest, T=27. 
Appendix 1 displays the set of all the fiscal adjustment years identified. For the first definition 
of fiscal consolidation (that of Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), we identify a total of 457 years of 
fiscal adjustment over 1980–2007 (representing 27.76 per cent of the total number of 
observations), whereas the total is 547 years (representing 33.23 per cent of the total number 
of observations) for the second definition. We also identify 346 episodes for rapid and gradual 
adjustments occurring in exactly the same years. Among all the episodes, 111 occur with the 
                                                          
25
 In particular, the average revenue-to-GDP- ratio in non oil exporting Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries is 
21 percent, compared to an average revenue-to-GDP ratio of over 40% in developed countries. In addition, a 
large fraction of revenue in SSA is generated by indirect taxes which tend to vary proportionally to the output 
gap (i.e. the elasticity with respect to the output gap is close to 1). Regarding the expenditures side, a number of 
studies have highlighted that transfer programs are small in low-income and emerging countries. In particular, 
unemployment welfare and other social protection programs are not very developed (see Fatàs and Rose, 2001; 
Lane, 2003; Suescìon, 2007 and Thornton and Mati, 2008). Moreover, when such programs do exist, their poor 
countercyclical design limits their impact on declining output.  
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first definition without occurring with the second definition and 201 occur with the second 
one without occurring with the first one. 
  
4. Model specification and econometric technique 
In this section, we formulate the model that will be estimated empirically. As there is no 
theoretical model or unified framework that deals with the economic and political 
determinants of fiscal adjustments, we follow the strategy adopted by Mierau et al. (2007), 
who, instead of focusing on a particular theory, explore a wide range of explanatory variables. 
 However, as our principal variables of interest are ‘aid unpredictability’ and ‘migrants’ 
transfers’, we focus mainly on those control variables that may affect either one of our interest 
variables, or both of them. 
 
4.1 Description of the Model and the Econometric Technique 
We probe the following structural model: 
 
* '
it it ity x    ,                                                (1)                                     
 1ity   if *ity >0, and 0ity   if *ity <=0 
where i = 1,…n denotes the country index and t = 1,…, iT  denotes the period (year) index; 
ity represents the adjustment status: 1ity   if in country i in year t the government decides to 
adopt fiscal consolidation measures; 0ity  , otherwise. itx  is the vector of the explanatory 
variables (drawn from the empirical literature) that are included in the model: migrants’ 
transfers (remittances); a measure of aid unpredictability; net aid disbursements; the primary 
budget deficit components (that is, the government revenue components and the primary 
expenditures); inflation; the annual GDP growth; an index of quality of governance; a 
measure of capital flight; the domestic debt stock; the output gap; the real effective exchange 
rate; a variable indicating whether a country is under agreement with the IMF in the previous 
fiscal year. We discuss below the expected sign of each these variables. it  is an error term. 
Several empirical studies (for example Larvigne, 2010) use the pooled logit or probit 
technique to estimate this kind of model. In this chapter, we implement panel data techniques 
to perform our analysis. These techniques allow us to control for the presence of country-
specific effects in order to avoid biased estimates. 
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 That said, we turn now to the assumptions made regarding the error term. According 
to the econometric literature, we have two options: 
- either a random-effects model: in this case, it it i    , where it and i  are 
independent random variables;  2(0, 1)it N     and 2(0, )i N   , 
- or a model of fixed effects where *it it i itd     and itd  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for individual i in period t, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The most decisive factor in the choice of one of these options is the relationship between 
it and i : in the absence of a correlation between it and i , we should opt for the random 
effects. However, if it and i  are correlated, then the better option is the fixed effects model.  
 In this study, we choose to use the fixed-effects model for the following reasons: 
- although all of the developing countries could not be selected in our sample for data 
unavailability reasons, each country in the sample has its own economic, political and 
institutional characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables of 
the model. Therefore, there is a high probability of i  being correlated with the covariates.    
- Since we opt for the model with fixed effects, the other issue is to choose between the 
unconditional fixed-effects estimator and the conditional fixed-effects estimator. Using the 
traditional unconditional fixed-effects estimator can pose certain statistical problems. In fact, 
applying the least squares dummy variable estimator (as in a linear panel) to this model with a 
binary dependent variable leads to inconsistent estimation of   in the logit model, unless 
T  . As iT  is fixed in our model, the estimators of   are not consistent: this is known as 
the ‘incidental parameters problem’, which is more severe in the cases in which iT  is small. 
Chamberlain (1980) provides evidence that it is not impossible to estimate the parameters of 
this discrete-choice model consistently and proposes conditional logit estimation. The idea of 
this approach consists of conditioning the likelihood function on a minimum sufficient 
statistic for i  (the fixed effects). This helps avoid the incidental parameter problem. More 
particularly, Chamberlain (1980) argues that 
1
iT
i it
t
S y  is the suggested minimal sufficient 
statistic for a fixed-effects model, which in our case is the number of years of fiscal 
adjustments per country. Like the modelization of standard fixed effects, the conditional 
fixed-effects logit model focuses on the variation in the data observed within countries 
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(Baltagi, 2005). It is worth noting that whereas sufficient statistics are available for the logit 
model, they are not available for the probit model; this is the main reason for our choice of the 
conditional logit model.  
The econometric technique of consistent estimate, which eliminates the i  from the 
estimation equation, is the conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The latter is 
based on a log density for the ith individual who conditions on 
1
iT
i it
t
S y , the total number of 
outcomes ity  equal to 1 for a given individual over time. Hence, the conditional likelihood 
function can be written as follows: 
'
1
'
11
Ti
it it
t
Ti
it iti
it it
y x
n
c
d xi
d S
eL
e



 
      
The maximization of this equation, now free of the incidental parameters i , can be performed 
by the conventional methods.  
 
4.2 The Temporal Dependence Issue 
A concern when dealing with the binary time-series cross-section (BTSC) is modelling the 
temporal dependence (Beck et al., 1998), as ordinary logit or probit models may result in 
overly high inferences (too high t-statistics). 
Beck et al. (1998) give evidence that panel logit data are identical to grouped duration data 
and suggest dealing with this problem by adding a series of dummy variables to the model. 
These dummies should capture the number of years since the previous occurrence of an 
‘event’ (here, a fiscal adjustment). However, this solution has the drawback of leading to an 
important loss of degrees of freedom (due to the large number of dummy variables). Thus, 
Beck et al. (1998) propose as an alternative solution replacing the dummy variables with a 
smooth function based on cubic splines.  
In this chapter, we follow Beck et al.’s (1998) suggestion and include the smooth function 
based on cubic splines in our model. Moreover, we follow another suggestion of Beck et al. 
(1998) and add another variable that captures the number of fiscal adjustments in the past (see 
also Mierau et al. (2007), who adopt the same procedure). This latter addition is justified by 
the fact that standard logit models assume the adjustments to be independent from one 
another, an argument that is obviously not true (Mierau et al., 2007). 
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4.3 Dealing with the endogeneity issue 
Although the causal relationship runs from our explanatory variables to the dependent 
variable in our model, it is likely that there is reverse causality from the dependent variable to 
certain regressors, namely remittances, development aid flows, revenue components, primary 
expenditure, domestic debt, capital flight, output gap, inflation, GDP growth, real exchange 
rate, and the quality of governance. This will lead to simultaneity bias of the regression’s 
coefficients. Note that we describe above how we transform the variable ‘quality of 
governance’ to avoid or at least mitigate its endogeneity. To address the endogeneity issue for 
the troublesome variables and produce less biased estimates, we choose two main options: 
first, we estimate the model with one-year lagged values for each of the troublesome 
variables; second, we use instrumental variable (IV) techniques, especially by relying on old 
instruments (lagged values of the troublesome variables), whereby the model is estimated 
using one-, two-, and three-year lagged values for the troublesome regressors quoted above. 
More particularly, regarding the instrumental variables’ analysis, we use two alternatives 
approaches: the traditional two-stage least squares (henceforth, 2SLS) and a residual-inclusion 
approach (Blundell & Smith, 1989, 1993). For both approaches, we first estimate for each 
troublesome regressor an equation in which the regressor is a function of the instruments (that 
is, its one-, two-, and three-year lagged values) and other (non-troublesome) explanatory 
variables of the model. We use fixed effects and adjust the standard errors by clustering 
countries. These first-stage equations allow us to derive either the predicted values of each 
troublesome regressor that will be used in the outcome equation of interest (the conditional 
logit model), thus leading to the so-called ‘2SLS approach,’ or the predicted residuals that 
will also be included in our outcome equation of interest, leading to the ‘residual-inclusion 
approach.’ However, the problem with the 2SLS approach is that it assumes a linear model for 
the second-stage estimation – whereas in our case it is a non-linear model (conditional logit 
model) – and the application of such a method to a non-linear model may result in 
inconsistent parameter estimates. This is why, to circumvent such a difficulty, Blundell and 
Smith (1989, 1993) showed that consistent parameter estimates can be obtained by including 
the predicted residuals from the first-stage estimation in the second equation (that is, the 
outcome equation of interest obtained using a conditional logit model). As these two 
instrumental variable (IV) methods include a predicted value in the outcome equation of 
interest, we should adjust the standard errors. However, the standard method for calculating 
this adjustment does not apply to the conditional logit model, rendering it impossible for us to 
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correct the standard errors for the 2SLS approach. We hope that such correction will not 
significantly change the results obtained either qualitatively or quantitatively.        
In this chapter, we perform our analysis with the use of the two options highlighted above: the 
model with the one-year lagged values for the troublesome explanatory variables and the 
model with instrumental variables for these variables, in which the 2SLS approach and the 
residual-inclusion approach are implemented. Nevertheless, we focus on the IV based on the 
residual-inclusion approach, as it should yield consistent parameter estimates. It is worth 
mentioning that the results of the estimations do not converge when we instrument the 
primary expenditures and the real growth rate, respectively, by their one-, two-, and three-year 
lagged values. Therefore, we choose not to instrument these two variables with the old 
instruments and consider them with one-year lagged values in all our regressions.   
 
5. The Discussion on the expected sign of the variables 
 In this part, we present and discuss the expected sign of each our explanatory variables 
quoted above.  
5.1 Our first variables of interest: Workers’ Remittances 
In contrast to the development aid inflows that usually accrue to the public sector (the 
government), the remittances are international transfers received by private households. 
Expressed in terms of GDP, these remittances can be used to enhance or reduce savings 
depending on whether they are used more or less proportionately for consumption or savings 
(Griffin, 1970). Therefore, the effect of remittances on the decision to implement fiscal 
adjustment measures depends on the use of these inflows, that is, on their effects on the 
government revenue and expenditure.  
If the remittance inflows are entirely saved (which is less likely to hold in developing 
countries), they will have no effect on the government budget and thus on fiscal adjustment 
measures.  
Assume now that remittance receipts are not directly taxed by the government and are used to 
finance the domestic consumption of goods and services and/or imports (see Ratha3, 2011). If, 
in the concerned economy, the domestic taxation is sufficiently broad to be able to tax 
consumption spending and if the trade-based taxation is large (that is, tariff revenues are an 
important part of the government revenue), which is the case in many developing countries – 
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see Gordon and Li4 (2006) and also Abdih et al. (2009), then we can also infer that migrants’ 
remittances, by increasing the tax base for a given level of government spending, will be 
likely to reduce the likelihood of fiscal adjustment. As a result, their decline will, all other 
things being equal, increase the likelihood of fiscal adjustment in this country, especially if 
the latter is a remittance-dependent one. By contrast, if the public revenue collected in the 
economy is mainly driven by direct taxes, then a decline in remittances will not severely 
affect the budget and consequently the likelihood of fiscal consolidation. In the meantime, one 
can also expect that remittances, by allowing higher levels of consumption and borrowing, 
can induce governments to take advantage of the fiscal space afforded by them. Therefore, 
they may reduce the incentives of governments to maintain fiscal policy discipline (Chami et 
al., 2008). Accordingly, the higher the migrants’ remittances, the higher the likelihood that the 
governments will engage in excessive deficits and thus adopt fiscal adjustment measures in 
order to signal to the financial markets (investors) or other lenders (such as international 
financial institutions and bilateral donors) that their public finances are on a sustainable path.  
Remittances are not only used for consumption, but are often also used to finance education 
or health expenditure. According to Ziesemer (2008), if workers’ remittances are used by 
households to finance their education, the government may think that people can take care of 
themselves more than before and reduce the public expenditure on education. The author also 
contends that education may become accessible in poor countries if private and public money 
supports it, but not if only one of them does so. This reasoning is also valid for the health 
expenditure of households financed by the remittances they receive. Therefore, all other 
things being equal, we can expect that if remittances lead to a decline in public expenditure on 
education and/or health, their rise will be likely to reduce the probability of fiscal 
consolidation. By contrast, if the remittances spent on education and/or health supplement the 
public expenditure in these sectors, then they will be likely to exert no effect on the 
government budget and thus on the fiscal adjustment measures.    
 
5.2 Our second variable of interest:  Unpredictability of Development Aid Inflows 
 The concepts of “aid unpredictability” and “aid volatility” are closely related and often 
used interchangeably in the empirical literature. In this chapter, we make a distinction 
between them (see for e.g. Bulir and Hamman 2001, 2003, 2005; Fielding and Mavrotas, 
2005; and DfID, 2006 for more details). Following Celasun and Walliser (2008) and Bulir and 
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Hamann (2001, 2003, 2005), we define predictability of aid flows as the situation where 
recipients can be confident about the amount and timing of aid disbursements. Celasun and 
Walliser (2008) listed the reasons underlying the lack of predictability (committed or 
expected aid differs from actually disbursed aid): failure to comply with conditionality for 
budget aid (which, as laid out above, may reflect different degrees of a country’s 
performance); administrative delays in releasing budget aid; non-compliance with procedures 
or administrative delays for project aid; and unanticipated changes in the speed with which 
project activities are executed. Celasun and Walliser (2008) also highlight that the more 
relevant concept when studying aid effectiveness issues is “aid predictability”. Conversely, 
aid is said to be volatile if it moves up and down significantly between two time periods. Low 
predictability may result in more volatile aid and, aid could simultaneously be volatile and 
predictable since volatile aid disbursements can in part mirror the lumpiness of spending of 
large investment projects (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). 
Whereas volatile aid by reflecting donor efforts to counterbalance volatile economic 
conditions such as external shock, may be stabilizing rather than destabilizing (Chauvet and 
Guillaumont, 2007), low predictability (or high unpredictability) of aid leads governments to 
adjust their spending plans in response to “aid surprises” and thus has inherently destabilizing 
characteristics (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) in the same 
vein, stress that unpredicted shortfalls in aid inflows are followed by reductions in 
government spending, often resulted in increases in taxes and were occasionally followed by 
both. According to Foster (2003), the direct costs of a shortfall in aid depend on the link 
between aid finance and specific expenditures. If aid is paying for the local provision of goods 
and services, a shortfall will cause the government to have tighter fiscal policy.  
 In addition, Odedokun (2003) argues that this tight of fiscal policy could also be 
achieved through ad hoc borrowing from the Central Bank, with associated implications for 
macroeconomic stability (e.g. higher inflation or crowding out of private investment). 
The effect of aid unpredictability on the likelihood of a tightening fiscal policy is not obvious. 
In fact, when aid flows accrue to a government, the authorities have to decide what to do with 
that aid. Several options are available to them: the aid could be saved; it could pass directly to 
the private sector through tax cuts or through a direct transfer; or it could be used to substitute 
domestic deficit financing or to augment public expenditure (or, of course, a combination of 
all of the above) (Adam, 2006).  
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Suppose that the government decides to save the entirety of the aid received. In such a case, 
these capital inflows will not affect the government’s budget and their unpredictability (for 
example an unexpected shortfall) will have no effect on the decision to adjust fiscal 
imbalances.  
Assume now that the authorities decide to transfer the aid inflows directly to the private 
sector. If the trade-based taxation and the domestic taxation in such an economy are 
sufficiently broad, then the use by the private sector of this transfer to finance the domestic 
consumption of goods and services and/or imports will be likely to result in an increase in tax 
revenue (mainly through import tariff revenue and/or value-added and excise taxes). 
Consequently, the unpredictability of such aid, if not anticipated by the government, will be 
likely to lead to a fiscal adjustment. By contrast, if the domestic taxation in the economy is 
not sufficiently broad to be able to tax consumption spending and if the custom revenue 
components of the overall tax revenue are not important, then the domestic consumption 
spending and/or spending on imports by the private sector following a direct aid receipt will 
not affect the budget. As a result, aid unpredictability will not exert any impact on the 
government’s budget and thus on its decision to adopt fiscal adjustment measures. 
In the same vein, the government may decide to transfer the aid flows received to the private 
sector indirectly by cutting taxes that benefit that sector. In such conditions, these tax cuts will 
not, all other things being equal, reduce the tax revenue since the aid flows compensate for 
these tax cuts. Accordingly, the unpredictability of aid flows will not be decisive in the 
government’s decision to adjust the government budget.     
If the government anticipates the receipt of aid flows that are supposed to finance the 
domestic deficit, then an unexpected shortfall in this aid will be likely to lead to fiscal 
adjustment measures. 
In a case in which the use of aid is a combination of the different options highlighted above, 
the effect of its unpredictability on the likelihood of fiscal adjustment will depend on the 
option that dominates.  
Furthermore, there may be other reasons that justify a lack of fiscal consolidation effect of aid 
unpredictability. In effect, there is a ‘herding behavior’ of donors which react in a similar 
fashion in terms of aid supply (in many ways as private sectors) to the signals giving to them 
by Bretton Woods Institutions. The latter send to donors some ratings signals on the basis of 
the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), the PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth 
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Facility) recently (in 2009) replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust26 (PRGT) 
and, the CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) of developing countries. 
Accordingly, when these signals lead aid to decline short of its expected level for a 
developing country, it induces costly fiscal adjustments in the form of increased taxation and 
spending cuts. Hence, a lack of aid unpredictability effect on fiscal adjustments in developing 
countries may also be motivated by the two other reasons: 
Firstly, the inclusion in the model of the institutional variable ‘quality of governance’ may, all 
other things being equal, cancel out any effect of aid unpredictability on fiscal consolidation 
in developing countries. In fact, this variable is directly related to the components of the rating 
signals elaborated by Bretton Woods Institutions and sent to the donors (the CPIA, the PRSP 
and the PRGF (now, ECF)). Thus, a country that exhibits a better quality of governance can 
be beneficiary of less unpredictable aid flows or at best predictable aid flows. In such 
circumstances, there will likely be no fiscal consolidation due to aid unpredictability. 
Secondly, we are interesting on the long-run average effects of unpredictable aid flows on 
fiscal consolidation in developing countries. Therefore, from a statistically standpoint, 
regarding the high fluctuations of aid unpredictability variable (see the Figures), we are not 
surprised that over the medium term, such effect is statistically nil because it seems to average 
significant positive and negative (short term) effects over the period 1980-2007. 
Overall, the effect of development aid flows’ unpredictability on the government’s budget and 
thus on the decision to adjust fiscal imbalances is uncertain and depends on the utilization of 
these capital inflows. 
  
5.3 The control variables 
- The Development Aid Inflows 
Irrespective of the effects of aid unpredictability, we also expect the development aid inflows 
to affect the likelihood of fiscal retrenchment in developing countries through its effects on 
government revenues. These effects can be either positive or negative, depending on whether 
or not the aid flows serve to increase the tax revenues and government spending or decrease 
them (see the above discussion). However, in the empirical literature there is no consensus 
regarding the aid effect on tax revenue. Aid inflows can increase the government revenue 
                                                          
26
 The PRGT was established in 2009 under the newly Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust in the replacement 
of the PRGF.  
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through the improvement of customs and tax administration in developing countries (see for 
example, Chambas et al., 2008). Moreover, by improving the efficiency of public spending, 
aid could lead to an increase of public services supply and thus reinforce the tax civism 
(Chambas et al. 2008). 
At the same time, when receive aid flows, recipients governments of developing countries can 
compare the social costs of each category of resources. Thus, an important flow of aid could 
reduce the tax effort of governments (Kaldor, 1963). However, if the macroeconomic 
associated costs of a surge of aid inflows are high, then tax effort is likely to increase 
(Chambas et al., 2008). 
In addition, Azam et al. (1999) also show evidence that the low quality of institutions is likely 
to exacerbate the negative effect of aid flows on tax revenues. In the same vein, Chambas et 
al. (2008) highlight that aid inflows can affect negatively tax revenues through the low quality 
of government spending.  
Summing up, the effects of aid on government revenue in developing countries remain 
uncertain. Accordingly, these effects are ambiguous on the decision to adjust or not the 
government budget.  
  
- The Real Exchange Rate 
The purpose of fiscal retrenchment to eliminate a current account deficit may result in 
domestic problems such as unemployment and low growth. Thus, fiscal stabilization may 
need to be accompanied by policies that achieve real exchange rate depreciation.  
The effect of the real exchange rate depreciation may be either positive or negative on the 
fiscal balance, and thus on the decision to consolidate the budget, depending on the structure 
of the budget. One can also expect fiscal stabilization measures to affect the real exchange 
rate, although the specific effects in terms of appreciation or depreciation are likely to reflect 
the underlying economic situations. More particularly, developing countries characterized by 
limited capital flows tend to monetize fiscal deficits to a much greater extent than industrial 
countries. Consequently, fiscal consolidation (expansion) is much more unambiguously likely 
to lead to exchange rate appreciation (depreciation), even in the short run.  
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To avoid reverse causality from the fiscal consolidation to the real exchange rate, we 
introduce the one-year lagged values of the variable ‘real effective exchange rate’ into the 
model. 
- The Primary Budget Deficit, the capital flight and the domestic debt stock 
The primary budget variables reflect the need to adjust since there is no reason to adjust in the 
absence of an adverse fiscal position. However, instead of introducing in our model the 
primary budget as a variable, we introduce its components, that is, (the overall government 
revenue components (excluding aid receipts) – that is, non-tax revenue; direct tax revenue; 
Value added tax revenue and excises revenue and trade related tax revenue – and the 
government expenditure net of interest payments on public debt). This will allow us to 
explore whether our variables of interest affect the government’s budget5. In fact, we expect a 
rise in each of the overall government revenue components (that is, the non tax revenue; the 
value added and excises tax; the trade taxes and the direct tax) to reduce the likelihood of 
fiscal consolidation, be it gradual or rapid. In the meantime, we also expect all other things 
being equal, that the higher the primary expenditure, the higher the likelihood of fiscal 
adjustment. Since the effect of remittances may translate through the public revenue 
(especially value added tax and excises revenue, and trade-related tax revenue), we expect in 
the case where the coefficient of remittances variable will be statistically significant that the 
component(s) through which such effect of remittances translate to be statistically nil. 
However, the obtained non-significant effect of such component(s) in the presence of 
significant coefficient of the remittances variable does not necessary mean that the remittance 
variable captures the effect of the revenue components on the dependent variable, since the 
model includes other fundamental determinants of remittances such as the real exchange rate, 
the growth rate, the quality of governance,..etc. 
Regarding the capital flight variable, we expect a higher capital flight to increase the 
probability of fiscal retrenchment, be the latter gradual or rapid. Since the computation of that 
variable (see Table 4) includes only the external debt in addition to other macroeconomic 
variables and because it is the total public debt stock that matters for fiscal consolidation, we 
include in addition to the capital flight variable separately the domestic debt variable in our 
model.  As the latter also reflects the need to adjust, we expect its rise to raise the probability 
of fiscal retrenchment (rapid or gradual) in developing countries. 
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- The Inflation 
Monetary easing, by increasing inflation, can induce budget deficits and thus increase the 
likelihood of fiscal adjustments, as a result of the inter-relationship exists between fiscal 
policies and monetary policies (Mélitz, 1997; Wyplosz, 1999). Furthermore, the policy mix 
between the two significantly affects the level of output, prices and interest rates in the 
economy. Mélitz (1997) and Wyplosz (1999) provide evidence that the fiscal policy tends to 
relax when the monetary policy tightens, for several reasons:   a fiscal expansion will compensate for the contraction effect on output induced by 
monetary tightening;  high interest rates induced by monetary policy tightening can make new public debt 
titles more attractive to private investors. Thus, obtaining private financing of public 
works becomes easier for the government. 
In the same vein, Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) show that monetary policy easing in year t 
increases the likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation in year t+1. Therefore, we introduce 
the variable ‘inflation’ with one-year lagged values into the model. However, it is worth 
noting that if a country’s debt is mainly denominated in local currency, easing monetary 
policy to reduce the debt level will render negative the relationship between inflation and 
fiscal consolidation. 
- The GDP Growth and the Economic Cycle 
Following the empirical literature, we expect fiscal adjustment to take place under favourable 
economic conditions like high GDP growth. However, certain countries could be forced to 
adopt fiscal retrenchment measures during bad times, namely when economic growth is low 
and financing is lacking. Once again, to avoid the simultaneity effect, we include the GDP 
growth variable with one-year lagged values. 
The distance between the actual output and its potential level (output gap) is also an important 
determinant of timing fiscal adjustments. Indeed, the economic cycle may affect the budget on 
both the revenue side and the expenditure side. For example, during economic booms, public 
revenue increases as the tax revenue rises, firms will increase their profits, more employment 
will be created and unemployment subsidies charges will be reduced for the state. By contrast, 
in an economic downturn, exactly the opposite effects will transpire. This explains why 
adjustments tend to occur when the economy is in expansion, and rarely take place during 
recessions. Accordingly, we follow Von Hagen and Strauch (2001), who stress that a large 
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output gap increases the likelihood of fiscal adjustments being started, but reduces the 
likelihood of the consolidation being long-lasting. Nevertheless, during good times 
governments could decide to delay the adoption of fiscal retrenchment measures by lowering 
taxes and/or increasing spending. However, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
empirical literature documents that the effect of the economic cycle on the budget deficit 
through automatic stabilizers is more important in developed countries than in developing 
ones.  
Summing up, we expect the output gap to exert either a positive or a negative effect on the 
two types of fiscal consolidation measures.   
Note that we follow Larvigne (2010) in including the output gap in addition to the GDP 
growth (as we do not adjust the primary deficit for the economic cycle) in our model. This is 
justified by the fact that the GDP growth may have indirect effects on the prospects for fiscal 
consolidation (e.g. it may be easier to bear the political cost of adjustment when growth is 
strong; see Annett, 2002). 
 
- The IMF Programmes 
IMF programmes may have some beneficial impacts on the attempts to make fiscal efforts 
(Larvigne, 2010). Indeed, the IMF stabilization programme, i.e. the IMF balance of payments 
assistance and conditionality, could have provided incentives to countries that are subject to 
them to undertake a fiscal consolidation episode. Thus, we expect a positive effect of IMF 
programmes on the decision to adjust the fiscal position in developing countries. 
 
- The Quality of Governance 
The overall quality of institutions plays a key role in conducting fiscal policy: a high 
institution quality could foster a more efficient public sector and minimize corruption, 
translating into a better use of revenues and increased tax collection. Furthermore, Lane and 
Tornell (1999) explain that ‘strong institutions can also guard against fiscal policy failing 
vested interests’. The indicator of institutional quality used in this chapter is the ‘Quality of 
governance’, a composite index described in the Appendix 2. We expect the good quality of 
governance to reduce the probability of fiscal adjustment in developing countries. As 
highlighted by Larvigne (2011), the use of this composite index based on subjective indexes 
raises issues regarding the consistency of the ratings between each other across time. 
Moreover, he contends that these indexes are not necessarily independent of fiscal 
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adjustments because despite the fact that the causal link runs primarily from political 
economy factors to fiscal policy, it is possible that consolidation attempts also influence 
political and institutional variables. To address such endogeneity issue, he transforms his 
initial ‘institutional quality’ variables by computing the average value of the past three years 
(not counting the current year). Hence, once transformed, this variable should be 
predetermined with respect to the country’s current fiscal situation. Therefore, we follow 
Larvigne (2011) and transforms our ‘Quality of governance’ variable to make it 
predetermined with respect to the country’s fiscal adjustment.  
   
6.  The Data  
In this section, we discuss the measures of our principal variables of interest: the 
unpredictability of aid inflows and Migrants’ remittances. The other explanatory variables 
quoted above are described in the Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics are also provided in 
Appendix 3.  
6.1 A short literature review on the measure of the Unpredictability of Aid Inflows 
We have already defined in sub-section 2 the concept of “aid unpredictability”. Here, we 
discuss the measure of “aid unpredictability”.  
Bulir and Hamann (2008) argue that aid commitments tend to be used in budgetary exercises 
in recipient countries, mainly as a result of pressures from donors. Bulir and Hamann (2001, 
2003, 2008) find evidence that commitments systematically exceed disbursements and that 
aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of commitments: aid commitments are a poor 
predictor of aid receipts and incorporating the predicted aid inflows into fiscal planning can 
be costly. Note however that these findings are obtained on the basis of an autoregressive 
model where the total gross aid disbursements (take in difference) are regressed on their 
lagged value and on total aid commitments (also take in difference). The regression is 
performed for each of the 71 countries of the sample with data covering the period 1975-
1997. 
In addition, another finding of their study is that several episodes of spikes in commitments 
were not generally followed by increased disbursements. This finding based on Bulir and 
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Hamann (2001, 2003, 2008), compares total debt commitments with disbursements of long-
term debt reported by the World Bank’s Global Development Finance database27.  
Vargas Hill (2005) in examining the issue of how the significant financial flows of ODA 
affects the stability of least developed countries, carries out a simple econometric analysis of 
the ability of aid commitments to predict aid disbursements. Out of a sample of 112 ODA 
recipients, she finds for 53 countries that commitments do not predict disbursements. For 52 
countries, commitments have predictive power for disbursements at the 5% level of 
significance and for one country (Trinidad and Tobaggo), the coefficient on commitments was 
negative and significant. The coefficient was less than one, with an average of 0.5 for all but 
one of the countries for whom the coefficient on commitments was positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that only half the changes in commitments are realized in changes 
in disbursements. She draws the conclusion that for many countries of her sample, aid is 
unpredictable (as well as volatile - though we are not dealing with this issue here): 
commitments nearly always exceed actual disbursements and, commitments are a poor 
indication of what actual disbursements will be. 
Pallage and Robe (2001) document empirical regularities in the foreign aid flows to 
developing countries. Their study covers 63 recipients and 18 donor countries between 1969 
and 1995. Among other results, they observe that “commitments for all sources are typically 
larger than disbursements”. In fact, for African recipients countries, aid flows promises 
exceed aid received by on average 2% of GDP28, whereas for other countries than Africa, the 
firm promises to disburse exceeds on average 1% of GDP the actual aid disbursements. The 
authors explain the always exceed of commitments over disbursements by the fact that 
disbursements are net of possible principal repayments, whereas gross commitments are not.        
 Celasun and Walliser (2008) examine the predictability of aid flows in 60 low income 
countries during 1990-2005 by analyzing patterns of aid commitments and disbursements in 
these countries. They compute the aid unpredictability measure by country and region as the 
absolute deviation in percent of GDP of committed and disbursed aid. Indeed, for each 
country of their sample, they calculate the absolute value of the difference between aid 
disbursements and commitments (that is the average value of periods of excess aid or aid 
                                                          
27
 Data on disbursements and commitments for technical cooperation suggests no clear pattern on whether 
technical cooperation aid is more predictable than the other types of aid. The deviations from commitments as a 
share of disbursements are broadly comparable in magnitude for technical cooperation and overall aid; the 
deviations are smaller for technical cooperation in roughly half of the sample. 
28
 More particularly, total aid disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded commitments in almost every year 
since 1990 (Pallage and Robe, 2001). 
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shortfalls) over the whole period 1990-2005. They find evidence that on average, many aid 
recipients countries receive aid disbursements that exceed aid commitments. This finding 
contrasts with the general belief that donors rarely keep their aid promises and systematically 
disburse less than they commit. Especially, it contrasts with the results obtained by Pallage 
and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2001, 2008).  
In this chapter, we construct our measure of aid unpredictability by relying upon an equation. 
 
6.2 The Measure of Unpredictability of Aid Inflows 
Our measure of aid inflows’ unpredictability refers to Levy (1987) where a measure of 
permanent aid is computed and from which we deduce our measure of aid unpredictability. 
Indeed, according to Levy (1987), commitments of future aid transfers are outcomes of 
dialogues and series of negotiations between donors and recipients. Therefore, transfers in 
time t reflect commitments made in the past, together with cancelled commitments and 
unanticipated flows of emergency aid. Accordingly, as mentioned by Levy (1987), since 
recipients are involved in the process that generates these commitments, they can estimate the 
probable level of these regular or permanent flows of aid. We follow the approach of Levy 
(1987) for the estimation of the anticipated permanent flow of foreign transfers. This 
approach consists of approximating these anticipated permanent flows by the predicted values 
obtained from an “aid earnings” or supply function, that is, a stable relationship between aid 
flows and past commitments. Hence, for a given country, we express the anticipated (or 
permanent) aid flows as a distributed lag of past commitments: 
1 2 3( , , ,.......)P C C Ct t t tA f A A A    (1) where PtA and CtA are respectively permanent aid in % of GDP 
and gross aid commitments in % of GDP. 
Since we cannot observe PtA , we will estimate it by regressing net aid disbursements (in 
percentage of GDP) on past (gross) aid commitments (in % of GDP) as follows:             
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
C C C C
t t t t t tA A A A A e               (2) 
Where CtA  is the total (gross) aid commitments in percentage of GDP for a given country in 
year t, t=1980,…., 2007; tA  is the total net aid disbursements in percent of GDP at year t ; te  
is an error term. 
 112 
 
From the equation (2), we can obtain a measure of permanent aid flows ( PtA ) as well as a 
measure of unpredicted transfers that are transitory in nature ( TtA ): T Pt t tA A A  . 
The estimation of this equation is performed for each country. The number of lagged values 
of aid commitments which is significantly related to aid transfers varies from country to 
country: it swings between 1 and 4 because additional lags appear to be statistically 
insignificant. In the estimation equations, we always correct for heteroscedasticity as well as 
autocorrelation in errors (using the Cochrane Orcutt technique). 
  
6.3 Measuring the Remittances 
Since our second variable of interest is the migrants’ remittances, its measure matters for our 
estimation results. The discussion here is based on Chami et al. (2008). Remittances are 
defined in the empirical literature (see for example Ratha, 2003) as ‘unrequited, non-market 
personal transfers between households across countries’. When compiling statistics on the 
balance of payments, three components of remittances are taken into account: workers’ 
remittances, employees’ compensation and migrants’ transfers (see Chami et al., 2008 for 
more details): 
- The first component (the worker’s remittances) records current transfers by migrants who 
are employed in, and considered a resident of, the countries that host them. 
- The employee compensation is composed of wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by 
individuals in countries other than those in which they are resident (for e.g. earning of 
seasonal works and embassy employees). 
- The third component, the migrants’ transfers are contra-entries to the flows of goods and 
changes in financial items that arise from individuals’ change of residence from one country 
to another.    
As highlighted by Chami et al. (2008), when studying the macroeconomic effects of 
remittances, the choice of the measurement of remittances matters. According to them, among 
these three categories of remittances, workers’ remittances most closely conform to the notion 
that researchers and policymakers have in mind when discussing remittances flows. The 
authors criticize the common practice in the empirical literature that consists of summing the 
three categories when compiling statistics on remittances. They demonstrate through their 
exercise that data in the categories of workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and 
migrants’ transfers capture different behavioral characteristics. Therefore, they draw the 
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conclusion that the inclusion of migrants’ transfers and employee compensation in 
remittances statistics are likely to pose problems and, researchers who use all three series 
when compiling a cross-country panel of remittances data may be making a serious error.  
Based on this conclusion, they recommend to use the data series on workers’ remittances 
(series in the World Bank Development Indicators – WBDI which best reflect the behavioral 
aspects that are trying to be captured) when conducting any econometric or statistical analysis 
and draw conclusions regarding remittance behavior.  
Following the criticism and recommendation of Chami et al. (2008), we choose to use as our 
main remittance variable “the workers’ remittances” that we scale by the Gross Domestic 
Product.  
The figures below compare the evolution of our variables of interest (workers’ remittances 
and development aid unpredictability) with that of the primary deficit. These figures will 
gives us an insight into the relationship between these variables and the government budget.  
From the figure 1 we cannot conclude for a clear relationship between the evolution of 
workers’ remittances and the primary deficit on one side and, the aid unpredictability and the 
primary deficit, on the other side. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the remittances 
exhibit a rising trend over time, whereas the unpredictability of aid flows fluctuates over time. 
For LICs (see Figure 2), between 1980 and 1995, while remittances display a slow declining 
trend, the primary deficit is increasing. After that period, especially between 1997 and 2007, 
these two variables appear to be positively correlated. Regarding the aid unpredictability 
variable, we cannot conclude for the direction of its correlation with the primary deficit. For 
the group of top 30 remittance-dependent countries, workers’ remittances are positively 
correlated with the primary deficit over time whereas the relationship between aid 
unpredictability and the primary deficit remains unclear (see Figure 3).     
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Figure 1: Evolution of workers’ remittances, aid unpredictability and primary deficit in the developing countries 
 
 Source: Author calculation based on data from CERDI’s public finance database and World Development Indicators (2011). 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of workers’ remittances, aid unpredictability and primary deficit in the LICs 
 
 Source: Author calculation based on data from CERDI’s public finance database and World Development Indicators (2011). 
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Figure 3: Evolution of workers’ remittances, aid unpredictability and primary deficit in the group G30remit  
 
 Source: Author calculation based on data from CERDI’s public finance database and World Development Indicators (2011). 
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7. Evaluation of the results 
In this section, we present and analyze the empirical results obtained from the estimations of 
our conditional logit model. This analysis will primarily focus on our variables of interest 
(namely, the unpredictability of aid and the migrants’ remittances), although we will also 
analyse the results obtained from the control variables. 
The estimations are performed using our two measures of fiscal consolidation (‘FCAlesina’ 
and ‘FCHeylen’) on different types of samples: the full sample of developing countries and 
two sub-samples: low-income countries (LICs) and the group of the 30 top remittances 
dependent countries of our sample (denoted G30remit). Before proceeding with the 
interpretation of our results, we find it useful to mention that as our model is a conditional 
logit one in which fixed or individual effects are not eliminated, it will not be possible for us 
to compute the marginal effects. This is why we opt for another way of intuitively interpreting 
these results: the use of an odds ratio analysis.  
From equation (2), the probability of an occurrence of fiscal consolidation to the probability 
of a non-fiscal consolidation is given by 
'xe  . The differentiation of this expression with 
respect to any of the regressors ( kx ) leads us to obtain ke . The meaning of this is: for any 
unitary change in kx , the odds will change by a factor of ke

, holding all other variables 
constant.  
In Table 1 (see below), we report the joint F-test conducted on the three instruments (one-, 
two-, and three-year lagged values) of each troublesome explanatory variable. The results 
provide evidence that in all cases these instruments are good predictors of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
Table 1: Joint F-test on the instruments of the first stage equation for the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
techniques 
   
 Full Sample: Developing Countries LICs Group of Top 30 
Remittances 
Variable Results of Joint F- test Results of Joint F- test Results of Joint F- test 
Log(Remit) 82.01 (0.0000) 17.86 (0.0000) 113.78 (0.0000) 
Log (Net ODA) 115.05 (0.0000) 44.09 (0.0000) 118.96 (0.0000) 
Domesticdebtgdp 38.68 (22.30) 15.10 (0.0000) 7.63 (0.0007) 
Capitalflightgdp 22.30 (0.0000) 10.86 (0.0003) 24.13 (0.0000) 
Outputgap 191.89 (0.0000) 65.34 (0.0000) 11.89 (0.0000) 
Inflation 900.84 (0.0000) 14.05 (0.0001) 904.78 (0.0000) 
Log(REER) 36.10 (0.0000) 181.49 (0.0000) 11.81 (0.0000) 
Note: The first stage equation for each of the seven explanatory variables, we include 1, 2 and 3 years lagged values; the 
variable ‘Primaryexpendituregdp’ and ‘GDP_Growth’ are considered with one year lagged values and included in the 
different equations as non-troublesome explanatory variables. This is because when these two variables are included (non 
lagged) in the model, the estimations results do not converge.  
 117 
 
Table 2 of the Appendix presents the estimation results for the full sample (the developing 
countries) when using as our two dependent variables ‘FCAlesina’ and ‘FCHeylen.’ Table 3 
in the Appendix presents the estimates of the model based on instrumental variables, in which 
the predicted residuals are included in the outcome equation of interest for our two sub-
samples.  
Let us start with the first table of results (Table 2). This table is divided into three 
compartments: in the first compartment, we report the results of the conditional logit model, 
in which one-year lagged values of the troublesome regressors quoted above are used 
(denoted ‘model 1’); in the second compartment, we present the results of the 2SLS approach 
(denoted ‘model 2’); and the third compartment reports the results of the instrumental variable 
based on the residual-inclusion approach (denoted ‘model 3’). We observe from this table and 
irrespective of the type of fiscal adjustment measure (‘FCAlesina’ and ‘FCHeylen’) that in 
almost all the cases the conditional logit model estimates (model1) produce smaller 
coefficients (in absolute values) than the estimates from the two models with instrumental 
variables (model 2 and model 3). In Table 2 (Columns 2 and 5), the student test for the 
individual duration dependence variables and the joint F-test on these variables suggest the 
absence of significance at the 10 percent level. Accordingly, we can infer that there is no 
duration dependence in the decision made by developing countries (as well as the full sample 
and the sub-samples) to adopt rapid fiscal adjustment measures. By contrast, the same tests in 
Table 2 (Columns 3 and 6) reveal the presence of significant duration dependence of the 
inclination of developing countries (the full sample and the sub-samples) to adopt gradual 
fiscal austerity measures. However, for the duration dependence variables in Columns 8 and 9 
of Table 2 (the model with IVs based on the residual-inclusion approach), the results suggest 
evidence of significant duration dependence in the developing countries’ decision to adopt 
either rapid or gradual fiscal adjustment measures. 
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Table 2: The Impact of Aid Unpredictability and Migrants’ Remittances on Fiscal Consolidation – The full sample of developing countries 
  
 
Model 1: With one year lagged values of some troublesome 
explanatory variables 
Model 2: With the Instrumental Variables: The Predicted Values of some 
troublesome explanatory variables 
Model 3: With Instrumental Variables: the residual inclusion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’  ‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’  ‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’ 
Regressors  
 
Regressors 
 
 
Regressors   
   
  
   
 
Log(Remitt-1) 0.473*** 0.355*** Predicted (Log(Remit)) 1.016*** 0.931*** Log(Remit) 1.179*** 1.009*** 
 
(0.136) (0.138) 
 
(0.250) (0.260) 
 
(0.285) (0.280) 
Unpredictability 0.0304 0.0249 Unpredictability 0.0357 0.0639 Unpredictability 0.0191 0.0239 
 
(0.0262) (0.0322) 
 
(0.0497) (0.0519) 
 
(0.0605) (0.0620) 
Log(Net ODA)t-1 -0.418** -1.058*** Predicted (Log(Net ODA)) -1.678*** -2.532*** Log(Net ODA) -2.073*** -2.876*** 
 
(0.211) (0.271) 
 
(0.454) (0.566) 
 
(0.536) (0.632) 
Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.104** -0.159*** Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.120** -0.240*** Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.106 -0.199*** 
 
(0.0449) (0.0508) 
 
(0.0587) (0.0640) 
 
(0.0676) (0.0657) 
Directtaxesgdpt-1 -0.0741 0.0170 Directtaxesgdpt-1 -0.0734 0.113 Directtaxesgdpt-1 -0.118 0.00507 
 
(0.0610) (0.0757) 
 
(0.0737) (0.109) 
 
(0.0852) (0.128) 
Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.109 -0.0520 Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.104 -0.227** Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.122 -0.256** 
 
(0.0833) (0.0849) 
 
(0.0986) (0.104) 
 
(0.109) (0.112) 
Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.318*** -0.379*** Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.199 -0.128 Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.170 -0.112 
 
(0.102) (0.106) 
 
(0.175) (0.135) 
 
(0.203) (0.143) 
Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.190*** 0.286*** Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.210*** 0.348*** Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.245*** 0.406*** 
 
(0.0389) (0.0476) 
 
(0.0469) (0.0579) 
 
(0.0554) (0.0705) 
Domesticdebtgdpt-1 -0.00347 -0.00280 Predicted (Domesticdebtgdp) 0.0378 0.0692* Domesticdebtgdp 0.0269 0.0469 
 
(0.00391) (0.00461) 
 
(0.0572) (0.0367) 
 
(0.0700) (0.0394) 
Capitalflightgdpt-1 -0.000310 0.000631 Predicted (Capitalflightgdp) -0.000765 0.0015 Capitalflightgdp -3.49e-05 0.00272 
 
(0.000455) (0.000576) 
 
(0.00118) (0.0015) 
 
(0.00128) (0.00166) 
Outputgapt-1 -2.62e-12 -1.14e-11* Predicted (Output_gap) 3.53e-12 -9.09e-12 Outputgap 1.91e-12 -3.39e-12 
 
(6.55e-12) (6.91e-12) 
 
(6.61e-12) (7.37e-12) 
 
(7.05e-12) (8.74e-12) 
Inflationt-1 -0.000309 -0.000740 Predicted (Inflation) 0.000265 -0.00316** Inflation -0.0103 -0.0152 
 
(0.000687) (0.000645) 
 
(0.00142) (0.00155) 
 
(0.00819) (0.0153) 
GDPGrowtht-1 -0.00274 -0.00188 GDPGrowtht-1 0.0179 0.0243 GDPGrowtht-1 0.0122 0.00902 
 
(0.0255) (0.0306) 
 
(0.0346) (0.0379) 
 
(0.0387) (0.0414) 
Log(REER)t-1 -1.544*** -1.709*** Predicted (Log(REER)) -2.884*** -2.824*** Log(REER) -3.613*** -3.198*** 
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(0.552) (0.603) 
 
(0.890) (0.972) 
 
(1.068) (1.165) 
IMF -0.116 -0.110 IMF 0.109 0.122 IMF 0.144 0.0645 
 
(0.258) (0.295) 
 
(0.296) (0.337) 
 
(0.316) (0.362) 
Qog -3.038** -7.763*** Qog -3.694*** -10.01*** Qog -3.771** -10.98*** 
 
(1.325) (1.831) 
 
(1.428) (2.057) 
 
(1.529) (2.381) 
NumberfcAlesina/Heylen -0.545*** -1.733*** NumberfcAlesina/Heylen -1.145*** -2.765*** NumberfcAlesina/Heylen -1.400*** -2.909*** 
 
(0.128) (0.232) 
 
(0.285) (0.340)  (0.341) (0.373) 
VariablefcAlesina/Heyle -0.127** -0.622*** VariablefcAlesina/Heylen -0.177** -0.626*** VariablefcAlesina/Heylen -0.190** -0.759*** 
 
(0.0635) (0.0820) 
 
(0.0723) (0.0882) 
 
(0.0799) (0.109) 
Spline1 -0.000929 -0.00532*** Spline1 -0.00115 -0.00416*** Spline1 -0.00161 -0.00479*** 
 
(0.000838) (0.00126) 
 
(0.000946) (0.00139) 
 
(0.00102) (0.00148) 
Spline2 -0.00110 -0.0112*** Spline2 -0.00248 -0.0114*** Spline2 -0.00468 -0.021*** 
 
(0.00288) (0.00374) 
 
(0.00348) (0.00412) 
 
(0.00406) (0.006) 
Spline3 0.000374 0.0108** Spline3 0.00243 0.0105* Spline3 0.00499 0.017*** 
 
(0.00299) (0.00480) 
 
(0.00367) (0.00545) 
 
(0.00426) (0.0065) 
Test on Spline1 1.23 (0.2675) 17.75 (0.0000) Test on Spline1 1.48 (0.2235) 8.95 (0.0028) Test on Spline1 2.49 10.48 (0.0012) 
Test on Spline2 0.15 (0.7013) 8.90 (0.0028) Test on Spline2 0.51 (0.4755) 7.66 (0.0056) Test on Spline2 1.32 11.74 (0.0006) 
Test on Spline3 0.02 (0.9004) 5.06 (0.0245) Test on Spline3 0.44 (0.5073) 3.73 (0.0534) Test on Spline3 1.37 6.76 (0.0093) 
Test on variable 3.97 (0.0464) 57.52 (0.0000) Test on variable 6.00 (0.0143) 50.29 (0.0000) Test on variable 5.63 48.81 (0.0000) 
Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables 
4.40 (0.3540) 58.80 (0.0000) Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables 
7.69 (0.1038) 55.11 (0.0000) Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables 
8.81 (0.066) 55.8 (0.0000) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
LR 85.81 (0.0000) 225.92 (0.0000) LR 93.72 (0.0000) 237.10 (0.0000) LR 120.58 255.51 (0.0000) 
Log-likelihood -263.24601 -211.81307 Log-likelihood -221.89553 -172.54185 Log-likelihood -195.21542 -151.03689 
Countries–observations 55-709 49-664 Countries–observations 50-624 43-581 Countries–observations 48-597 41-555 
 Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. 
                Note also that for sake of brevity, we do not report the results obtained for residual stemming from the first stage of instrumental variable model in the case of the 
residual-inclusion based approach. These results could be obtained upon request. 
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Furthermore, for all the estimates in Table 2, the coefficient of the variable indicating the 
number of prior adjustments is negative and always highly significant. However, this variable 
is merely used here as a covariate in order to ensure conditional independence between spells 
of adjustments and thus will have no substantial meaning here. 
Let us turn now to the interpretation of our estimation results in Table 2. 
As previously mentioned, the results of model 1, model 2, and model 3 differ in the size of the 
estimates and the standard errors. Note, however, that the results obtained from the two 
instrumental variables (see model 2 and model 3) are similar. For the interpretation of our 
results, we will rely on model3’s results, that is, the model with instrumental variables based 
on the residual-inclusion approach (see Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2). These results suggest 
that workers’ remittances increase the probability of both rapid and gradual fiscal adjustments 
in developing countries and thus confirm our hypotheses that more remittances, by allowing 
greater fiscal space, lead governments to relax their fiscal discipline and make unavoidable 
fiscal adjustment in year t. In addition, the coefficient estimates of the variables capturing the 
components of government revenue are not statistically significant for the case of ‘rapid fiscal 
consolidation’ (that is, FCAlesina), whereas the primary expenditure appears to exert, as 
expected, a positive effect on the likelihood of rapid fiscal adjustment in developing countries. 
This may imply that, irrespective of the other explanatory variables, the effect of remittances 
on the inclination of developing countries’ governments to adopt fiscal consolidation 
measures translates mainly through government revenue. However, as we mentioned above, 
the non-statistically significant effect obtained for the variables capturing government revenue 
components may be due to the presence in the model of other variables, such as the real 
exchange rate or development aid flows, which are highly significant here and which may 
have absorbed the significance of the public revenue’s components in our model. Concerning 
the ‘gradual fiscal adjustment’ variable (FCHeylen) (see Column 9 of Table 2), for which the 
significance of the positive effect of remittances is obtained in the presence of the significance 
(positive expected effect) of the primary expenditure, we find that among the revenue 
components, only two (non-tax revenues and indirect taxes) are statistically significant with 
the expected negative sign, whilst the other two (direct taxes and trade taxes) are not. This 
may suggest that the remittances’ effects on the decision of policymakers in developing 
countries to adopt gradual fiscal tightening measures translate, among other variables, through 
these two non-significant components of public revenue (that is, direct taxes and trade taxes). 
If this is the case, it means that remittances contribute significantly to the trade taxes as well 
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as to the direct taxes in these countries. A more detailed analysis relying on the group of top 
30 remittance-dependent countries of our sample will provide us with a better insight into 
whether the remittances’ effect on fiscal consolidation really translates through, among other 
variables, the public revenue, and if so, which components of revenue are concerned.  
The unpredictability of aid inflows appears to exert no significant effect on the likelihood of 
both rapid and gradual fiscal adjustments. The explanation for such results is rooted in one of 
several hypotheses made above (that is, on the utilization of aid or because of the control 
variables, especially the ‘quality of governance’ – see section 5), which leads us to conclude 
that ‘aid unpredictability does not affect fiscal consolidation.’  
What about the other control variables? 
Among the other control variables, we observe that a higher level of the net aid 
disbursements, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and a better quality of governance 
reduce the probability of either rapid or gradual fiscal tightening measures in developing 
countries. The coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are statistically non-
significant.   
Consider now the results for our sub-samples. They are reported in Table 3, in which the 
conditional logit model is primarily estimated with the use of (old) instrumental variables 
based on the residual-inclusion approach. However, for the sub-sample of low-income 
countries (LICs), the estimates do not converge when regressions are performed for the 
dependent variable ‘FCHeylen.’ Since we observe evidence for the full sample of developing 
countries that the results of the two instrumental variable approaches (2SLS and residual-
inclusion approach) are similar, we decide to rely in this specific case on the second-best 
option, that is, the estimations based on the 2SLS approach.  
Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the dependent variables ‘FCAlesina’ and ‘FCHeylen’ 
associated with the sub-sample of the group denoted G30remit. Columns 3 and 4 present the 
results of respectively the same dependent variables associated with the sub-sample of LICs 
(low-income countries).  
Regarding the group of remittance-dependent economies, the results are suggestive of a strong 
positive and significant effect of remittances on the inclination of developing countries’ 
governments to adopt either gradual or rapid fiscal adjustment measures. In the case of rapid 
fiscal adjustment, neither the revenue variables nor the primary expenditure variable are 
statistically significant. This may suggest that the effect of remittances on the fiscal 
consolidation variable translates through the government budget (the revenue and expenditure 
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variables). In other words, remittances seem to contribute significantly to the public revenue 
of this group of countries. However, we are unable to determine with precision which 
components of revenue are the most concerned. In the case of gradual fiscal adjustment, the 
primary expenditure appears to be (as expected) positively related to the dependent variable 
(though only at the 10 percent level of statistical significance) and, among the revenue 
variables, only the non-tax revenue variable is significant with the expected negative sign. 
Once again, this result may suggest that, in this sub-sample, remittances contribute 
substantially to the government revenue, especially through direct, indirect, and trade taxes; 
this may be why the positive effect of remittances on gradual fiscal adjustment is obtained in 
the presence of a non-statistically significant effect of the components of revenue other than 
non-tax revenue.  
The unpredictability of aid flows appears once again to exert no significant effect on the 
inclination of the government of this sub-sample’s countries to adopt gradual or rapid fiscal 
retrenchment measures. This probably reflects the hypotheses outlined in the discussion on 
the effect of this variable on our dependent variable, for which we conclude an absence of an 
effect of this variable.  
Regarding the other control variables, the higher the levels of development aid flows, output 
gap, and real effective exchange rate (appreciation), the higher will be the G30remit group 
countries’ inclination to adopt gradual fiscal retrenchment measures to put their public 
finances on a sustainable path. 
Column 3 of Table 3 reveals that, all other things being equal, remittances affect the 
likelihood of rapid fiscal tightening in LICs positively and significantly, and the revenue 
variables are not statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of the primary expenditure 
variable is positive and exhibits the expected sign. The reasoning put forward above 
concerning such a result also applies here. Moreover, aid unpredictability does not affect the 
likelihood of rapid fiscal adjustment in LICs. This result suggests that LICs, although highly 
dependent on the concessional resources, do not adopt rapid fiscal adjustment measures 
because of, for instance, an unexpected shortfall in the aid flows that were expected to be 
received. In the meantime, a higher level of domestic debt, real effective exchange rate 
depreciation, and the implementation of IMF programs seem to raise the likelihood of LICs 
adopting rapid fiscal tightening measures. With respect to the gradual fiscal tightening 
measures in LICs, remittances exert no significant effect and such measures are driven by 
lower non-tax revenue and an increase in primary expenditure. Note finally that all the results 
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obtained for the LICs group should be read with caution since they rely on a small number of 
countries due to the lack of data, especially regarding the variable ‘quality of governance’ for 
many of the countries of that group. 
 
8. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
In our previous analysis, we have explained the lack of significance of the fiscal policy 
(especially revenue) variables by asserting that the remittances variable (and perhaps ODA 
variable) is the driving force behind the receipts. In this part, we try to check this by using 
different interaction terms between 'remittances' and fiscal policy variables (both revenue 
variables and expenditure variable) in the model on one hand and 'Development Aid' variables 
(the ratio of ODA over GDP and the aid unpredictability) and fiscal policy variables (both 
revenue variables and expenditure variable) on the other hand in the model. To perform our 
analysis, we first discuss the econometric method for the estimation – given the fact that our 
dependent variable is binary - and then present the estimations' results. 
 
8.1 Discussion on the econometric method 
The econometric literature has started discussing how to treat empirically models with a 
binary dependent variable and which contains interaction explanatory variables. Although 
there is not yet a conclusion regarding the best way to estimate non-linear models with 
interaction terms, some consensus seems to appear with regard to the fact that in non-linear 
models (for e.g. logit, probit or conditional logit models), we could neither interpret the sign 
nor the magnitude of the interaction coefficient that will be obtained. 
Indeed, Ai and Norton (2003)29 show that the marginal effect of an interaction term in 
nonlinear models, as provided by standard econometrics packages, may hold the wrong sign 
and significance and, consequently, cannot be interpreted as such. Greene (2010) challenges 
the way of interpreting Ai and Norton’s (2003) results and notes that ‘the process of statistical 
testing about partial effects, and interaction terms in particular, produces generally 
uninformative and sometimes contradictory and misleading results. The mechanical reliance 
on statistical measures of significance obscures the economic, numerical content of the 
                                                          
29
 According to these authors, the interaction effect is based on cross-partial derivatives with respect to the two 
interacted variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction term different for observations. 
They thus recommend relying on these derivatives and using the Delta method to assess the statistical 
significance of the marginal effect associated to the interaction term. 
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estimated model’ (p. 295). He recommends performing the analysis not only through 
statistical procedures (see Greene, 2010 for details) but also by graphical presentations. 
Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) also criticise Ai and Norton’s (2003) interpretation of the 
interaction term. They first contend that in Ai and Norton’s (2003) results ‘it is difficult to 
interpret the sign of interaction term coefficient because for some observations, the cross 
partial derivative of the probability of occurrence with respect to interacted covariates can 
have the sign opposite to that of the interaction term coefficient’. They argue that this is 
because of a mechanical saturation effect30, which is irrelevant for researchers primarily 
concerned with proportional marginal effects. For such researchers, small changes in 
probability are more important near the boundaries than they are near the centre. Kolasinski 
and Siegel (2010) conclude that the interaction term coefficient (provided by nonlinear logit 
or probit regressions) remains a valid measure of interaction because it is already purged of 
the saturation effect. Consequently, they suggest researchers who are not concerned with the 
saturation effect, use it as such, while others (those for whom the mechanical saturation effect 
is important) use Ai and Norton’s (2003) measure of interaction. 
Overall, this ongoing discussion does not lead to a best way of obtaining good 
interaction terms and interpreting them in nonlinear models. Since our dependent variable is 
binary (a dummy), an alternative way of estimating our model is the linear probability model 
(LPM) where the probability of success and failure is considered to be a linear function of the 
covariates. Despite the concerns associated with this method and particularly the fact that in 
contrast to non-LPMs (for e.g., Logit or probit models) the predicted probabilities of success 
or failure in an LPM may lie out of the interval [0,1], the LPM has the advantage to allow us 
for easily interpreting interaction terms (the coefficients of the interaction variables). 
Moreover, Wooldridge (2002: 455) highlights that ‘if the main purpose is to estimate the 
partial effect of the explanatory variables on the response probability, averaged across the 
distribution of these covariates, then the fact that some predicted values are outside the unit 
interval may not be very important. The linear probability model needs not provide very good 
estimates of partial effects at extreme values of the covariates’. In the same vein, Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005: 495) mention that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of such models 
provide a good guide to which variables are statistically significant. Ree and Nillesen (2009: 
                                                          
30
 Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) explain why saturation effects might not be economically relevant in certain 
contexts. They particularly show that, under general conditions, the saturation effect guarantees that the Ai and 
Norton measure of interaction will have the opposite sign from the interaction term coefficient, as one or more of 
the covariates take on extreme values. 
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306–307) also emphasise that ‘the probit/logit and LPM often produce rather similar 
outcomes because the conditional distribution function tends to ‘look’ rather linear around its 
expected value, while at the same time, most draws from any conditional distribution are 
‘close’ to the expected value’. On the other side, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) point out that 
OLS estimates of LPMs where the predicted probabilities are outside the unit interval, may 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. They propose the sequential least squares (SLS) 
procedure as a way of remedying this problem. This iterative procedure first trims from the 
data those OLS estimate observations with predictions lying outside the unit interval. Based 
on these estimations, the data are trimmed again and the model re-estimated. The procedure is 
repeated until no predictions are outside the unit interval and the SLS estimates are thus 
obtained. 
In this study, the use of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) method does not allow the 
convergence of the estimations’ results due to insufficient number of observations. This is 
why we finally rely on the simple LPM based on the traditional two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach described above (see above) to perform our regressions. In fact, given the 
presence of many interaction variables in our model, the ‘2SLS approach’ compared to the 
‘residual-inclusion approach’ will permit us to not only obtain consistent parameters but also 
to easily correct the standard errors31. In cases where the R-squared (R2) from the first-stage 
regression is very high, the estimated standard errors in the second-stage regression must be 
taken as the true estimates (see Gujarati, 1995, - Appendix 20A, Section 20A).  
 
8.2 Interpretation of the estimations’ results 
In our specific case, when focusing on our two troublesome variables of interest (remittances 
over GDP and ODA over GDP), we obtain R2 = 0.94 for the first-stage regression model of 
'remittances' variable and R2 = 0.96 for the first-stage regression model of “ODA” variable. 
As these two R2 are very high, we will consider both the standard errors associated with 
parameters of these two variables and their interactions with fiscal policy variables as the true 
estimates. 
                                                          
31The 2SLS approach generates consistent estimates of the model parameters (when quality instrumental 
variables are used) but the standard errors are wrong because they are based on the predicted values of the 
endogenous explanatory factor. Hence, the standard errors in this manual two-stage approach could be adjusted 
(especially when all endogenous variables are continuous) by the use of standard formulas (see Gujarati, 1995, - 
Appendix 20A, Section 20A or Achen, 1986).     
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Accordingly, we have run full-model regressions (LPM based on 2SLS procedure) with all 
variables, including interaction variables but given the focus of the chapter and the need to 
simplify our presentation, we report here only the results of interaction variables in addition to 
the results of remittances and aid variables (ODA over GDP ratio and ODA Unpredictability). 
These results are reported in Table 4 below. 
For the sake of brevity, we will interpret solely the results of the Table 4 where the 
coefficients, particularly those of interaction variables are statistically significant. It is also 
worth mentioning that irrespective of the sample considered (full sample or sub-samples), the 
unpredictability of aid inflows does not exert any influence on the probability of fiscal 
adjustment, be the latter gradual or rapid. 
Consider first the full sample of developing countries (see Column 1 and 2 of the Table 4). 
The results in Column [1] show evidence that a rise in direct taxes (in % of GDP) in year t-1 
or a diminishing of either indirect taxes (in % of GDP) or even primary spending (in % of 
GDP) combined with an increase in remittances in year t raise the chance of rapid fiscal 
adjustments (although the coefficient are significant only at 10% level). In the meantime, an 
increase in the unpredictability of aid inflows in year t lowers the probability of the adoption 
of rapid fiscal adjustment measures in countries where non-tax revenue increased in year t-1. 
Note that despite the inclusion of interaction variables in the model, we also observe like in 
the Table 2 (Column 4 and 5) the positive and negative significant effects of respectively 
remittances and aid (Net ODA in % of GDP) variables. 
In column 2 of Table 4, the results are suggestive evidence of absence of significant effect of 
the remittances and aid variables on the likelihood of gradual fiscal adjustments. However, 
surprisingly, an increase in remittances in year t induces a higher probability of gradual 
adjustment in countries where direct taxes (in percent of GDP) increased the previous year. 
This probability appears to diminish when remittances increase in the context of trade taxes 
diminishing. In the meantime, the marginal impact of net aid inflows (in year t) on the 
likelihood of gradual fiscal adjustment decreases when the level of trade taxes in previous 
year went up; a higher unpredictability of aid inflows contributes to raise the probability of 
gradual fiscal adjustment in countries that register a rise in primary spending in the previous 
year.   
Let us turn now to the results obtained on our two sub-samples.   
 Considering the sub-sample of 30 remittance-dependent economies (denoted G30remit), the 
results indicate that in addition to the positive significance of the additive ‘remittances’ 
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variable, only one interaction term is statistically significant in the case of rapid fiscal 
adjustment: the interaction between remittances (in year t) and the primary expenditures of the 
previous year. This means that rises in remittances are associated with lower probability of 
rapid fiscal adjustments in the context of higher previous year's primary spending. As regard 
gradual fiscal adjustment, we observe once again the positive and negative significant effects 
of respectively remittances and aid (Net ODA) variables. In the meantime, remittances are 
associated with lower probability of gradual fiscal adjustments in countries where previous 
year's primary spending increased. Furthermore, a rise in net aid inflows decreases the 
likelihood of gradual fiscal adjustment in countries where non-tax revenues of the previous 
year diminished.  
In columns 5 and 6, the results concern the sub-sample of Low-Income Countries and lead us 
to conclude that: 
- Except the net aid variable for the case of gradual fiscal adjustment (where a negative 
effect is obtained at only 10% level of significance), none of the additive variable (remittances 
and aid variables) is significant in explaining the probability of these countries to engage in 
either gradual or rapid fiscal adjustment. 
- The higher the net aid inflows (in percentage of GDP), the higher the probability of 
LICs to engage in rapid fiscal adjustment when non-tax revenue of previous year increased.  
- In LICs where direct taxes of year t-1 increased, a rise in the unpredictability of aid 
inflows in year t raises the likelihood of these countries to engage in gradual fiscal adjustment 
in year t.  
 
 
9.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This chapter examines the impact of migrants’ remittances and the unpredictability of aid 
flows on the inclination of governments in developing countries to adopt fiscal adjustment 
measures. The study is conducted over the period of 1980–2007 and starts from a sample of 
74 developing countries which is reduced (during estimations) to 55 countries because of data 
unavailability. We also perform the analysis on two sub-samples:  low-income countries and 
the group of the top 30 remittance-dependent countries of our sample. After controlling for 
several variables in a conditional logit model and using (old) instrumental variables 
approaches to mitigate the possible endogeneity bias for several explanatory variables, our 
results suggest that workers’ remittances increase the likelihood of fiscal consolidation, be the 
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latter gradual or rapid. This result remains valid for the two different sub-samples analysed in 
this chapter, except for low-income countries, for which we observe no effect of remittances 
on the decision to consolidate the budget gradually. However, whatever the sample 
considered, some interactions of the 'remittances' variable with some of our fiscal policy 
variables are statistically significant while others are not. Hence, this positive effect of 
remittances (irrespective of the sample considered) seems to have sometimes translated 
through fiscal policy variables. Overall, this result suggests that despite the well-known 
positive macroeconomic effects of remittances, the rise of the latter appears to lead 
governments’ recipients in developing countries to adopt fiscal profligacy measures and to 
consolidate their budgets further. Better management of the revenues derived from these 
private transfers during their booms could help avoid such situations and allow greater room 
for manoeuvre for governments’ recipients to implement countercyclical measures during bad 
times.   
Furthermore, we find evidence that the unpredictability of aid inflows does not affect the 
adoption of fiscal consolidation measures in all the groups considered. The explanation can be 
rooted in either the utilization of such aid by the recipient countries that makes unaffected the 
government’s budget, or because we control for the quality of governance variable. However, 
even if aid unpredictability does not seem to affect here the inclination of recipient countries 
to adopt fiscal retrenchment measures, it remains that unexpected aid shortfalls or rises can 
affect other macroeconomic variables (for e.g., on inflation and real exchange rate) and 
consequently threaten the macroeconomic stability of the recipient country. Obviously, this is 
not the topic of our study here.  
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Table 3: The Impact of Aid Unpredictability and Migrants’ Remittances on Fiscal Consolidation – The Sub-samples of top 30 Remittance-dependent  
Countries and Low Income Countries (LICs). 
 
The Model is based on Residuals inclusion method for Instrumentation. 
 
 
G30remit LICs 
 
   
  
 
 
‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’ ‘FCAlesina’   ‘FCHeylen’a 
Regressors (1) (2) (3)  Regressors (4) 
  
 
 
  
 
Log(Remit) 1.009*** 2.061*** 3.349**  Predicted (Log(Remit)) 1.877 
 (0.372) (0.596) (1.657)   (1.482) 
Unpredictability -0.224 0.138 0.0528  Unpredictability -0.437 
 (0.170) (0.164) (0.194)   (0.270) 
Log(Net ODA)
 
-1.076 -4.444*** -2.239  Predicted (Log(Net ODA)) 2.432 
 (0.777) (1.308) (3.148)   (3.853) 
Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.0715 -0.334** -0.817  Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -2.018* 
 (0.101) (0.133) (0.628)   (1.030) 
Directtaxesgdpt-1 -0.452 0.0482 0.286  Directtaxesgdpt-1 1.058 
 (0.340) (0.362) (0.548)   (0.937) 
Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.167 -0.172 0.0397  Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.0763 
 (0.183) (0.237) (0.796)   (1.078) 
Tradetaxesgdpt-1 0.0930 -0.248 -0.17  Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.335 
 (0.517) (0.367) (0.49)   (0.666) 
Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.0458 0.442* 0.544**  Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.834** 
 (0.208) (0.231) (0.254)   (0.405) 
Domesticdebtgdp 0.0743 0.0489 0.306*  Predicted (Domesticdebtgdp) 0.0453 
 (0.0869) (0.0593) (0.162) 
  
(0.193) 
Capitalflightgdp
 
-0.00040 0.00247 -0.0116  Predicted (Capitalflightgdp) 0.0145 
 (0.0016) (0.00240) (0.0094)   (0.0124) 
Outputgap -4.67e-11 4.81e-10** -6.50e-10  Predicted (Output_gap) -2.61e-10 
 (1.25e-10) (1.94e-10) (2.05e-09)   (1.73e-09) 
Inflation
 
0.0452 -0.0401 -0.035  Predicted (Inflation) 0.114 
 (0.0433) (0.0534) (0.123)   (0.163) 
GDPGrowtht-1 0.203 -0.0314 0.313*  GDPGrowtht-1 0.19 
 (0.143) (0.156) (0.176)   (0.231) 
Log(REER)
 
-2.723 -12.76*** -13.10**  Predicted (Log(REER)) -3.053 
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 (1.917) (3.583) (5.426)   (6.35) 
IMF 1.531 1.104 5.317**  IMF 0.363 
 (0.947) (1.135) (2.582)   (3.236) 
Qog 3.896 -3.457 -2.995  Qog -14.25 
 (4.773) (6.476) (7.609)   (17.74) 
NumberfcAlesina/Heylen -1.26*** -5.068*** -1.763**  NumberfcAlesina/Heylen -6.131*** 
 (0.357) (0.835) (0.826)   (2.128) 
VariablefcAlesina/Heylen -0.176 -0.695*** -0.21  VariablefcAlesina/Heylen -1.106** 
 (0.141) (0.19) (0.441)   (0.482) 
Spline1 0.00209 -0.0045 -0.0043  Spline1 -0.000201 
 (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0128)   (0.0111) 
Spline2 -0.0103 -0.004 -0.0268  Spline2 0.0139 
 (0.0082) (0.012) (0.0317)   (0.0541) 
Spline3 0.00679 0.00042 0.0228  Spline3 -0.0118 
 (0.0089) (0.0128) (0.0388)   (0.0604) 
Test on Spline1 0.51 (0.474) 2.54 (0.111) 0.11 (0.7377)  Test on Spline1 0.00 (0.9856) 
Test on Spline2 1.56 (0.211) 0.11 (0.741) 0.71 (0.3988)  Test on Spline2 0.07 (0.7971) 
Test on Spline3 0.59 (0.44) 0.00 (0.974) 0.35 (0.5569)  Test on Spline3 0.04 (0.845) 
Test on variable 1.55 (0.213) 13.36 (0.0003) 0.23 (0.6347)  Test on variable 5.27 (0.0217) 
Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables
3.82 (0.431) 18.33 (0.001) 1.01 (0.9076)  Joint F-test on ‘duration dependence’ variables 8.42 (0.0773) 
       
LR 78.01 (0.0000) 193.89 60.71 (0.0003)  LR 92.52 (0.0000) 
Log-likelihood -96.423761 -58.865986 -27.154335  Log-likelihood -16.310218 
Countries–observations 23-334 21-317 11-122  Countries–observations 9-118 
 Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. 
 a: The results stem from the Instrumental Variable (IV) model based on the predicted values of the troublesome explanatory variables because the results of the IV 
model based on the residual inclusion do not converge for the LICs sub-sample due to insufficient data.    
              G30remit = Group of Top 30 Dependent Remittances Countries (Average over the period 1980-2007) of our sample. 
                Note also that for sake of brevity, we do not report the results obtained for residual stemming from the first stage of instrumental variable model in the case of the 
residual-inclusion based approach. These results could be obtained upon request. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Aid Unpredictability and Migrants’ Remittances on Fiscal Consolidation  
The estimations rely on the Linear Probability Model (LPM) based on Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Approach  
 
 Model with the Instrumental Variables: The Predicted Values of some troublesome explanatory variables 
 Full sample of developing countries G30remit LICs 
 ‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’ ‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’ ‘FCAlesina’ ‘FCHeylen’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressors       
       
Predicted (Log(Remit)) 0.276*** 0.166 0.445** 0.306** -0.00932 -0.190 
 (0.0962) (0.101) (0.173) (0.128) (0.267) (0.210) 
Unpredictability 0.0371 -0.0114 -0.0369 -0.0183 -0.0310 0.00909 
 
(0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0367) (0.0393) (0.0773) (0.0527) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA)) -0.361** 0.0952 -0.165 -0.464* -0.501 -0.874* 
 (0.165) (0.224) (0.282) (0.260) (0.581) (0.477) 
Predicted (Log(Remit))*Directtaxesgdpt-1 0.00821* 0.00728* -0.0147 -0.0313 0.00761 0.00792 
 (0.00422) (0.00376) (0.0322) (0.0284) (0.0546) (0.0461) 
Predicted (Log(Remit))*Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.0129* -0.00705 0.00500 0.0131 -0.0147 0.0383 
 (0.00749) (0.00711) (0.0172) (0.0148) (0.0437) (0.0342) 
Predicted (Log(Remit))*Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.00463 -0.0202** -0.0112 0.0237 -0.0421 -0.0114 
 
(0.0111) (0.00970) (0.0345) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0231) 
Predicted (Log(Remit))*Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 0.00250 0.000768 -0.00115 0.00484 0.00702 0.00973 
 
(0.00449) (0.00340) (0.00883) (0.00618) (0.0279) (0.0260) 
Predicted (Log(Remit))*Primaryexpendgdpt-1 -0.00588* 0.000546 -0.0199** -0.0180** 0.0119 0.00579 
 (0.00350) (0.00355) (0.00848) (0.00798) (0.0100) (0.00617) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA))*Directtaxesgdpt-1 0.00245 -0.00288 -0.0300 -0.00874 0.0170 0.167 
 
(0.0106) (0.0127) (0.0236) (0.0252) (0.102) (0.107) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA))*Vatexcisesgdpt-1 0.0152 -0.0120 0.0118 -0.0123 0.0564 0.0832 
 
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0182) (0.0222) (0.0758) (0.0686) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA))*Tradetaxesgdpt-1 -0.00580 -0.0376*** -0.0200 -0.00961 -0.0645 -0.139 
 
(0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.105) (0.101) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA))*Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.00287 -0.00823 0.00993 0.0179* 0.157* 0.129 
 
(0.00679) (0.00831) (0.00987) (0.00896) (0.0759) (0.0829) 
Predicted (Log(Net ODA))*Primaryexpendgdpt-1 -4.91e-05 -0.00618 -0.00150 0.00263 -0.0169 -0.000288 
 
(0.00449) (0.00559) (0.00821) (0.00761) (0.0163) (0.0217) 
Unpredictability*Directtaxesgdpt-1 -0.000233 0.00391 0.00756 0.00549 0.0120* -0.00123 
 
(0.00386) (0.00277) (0.00553) (0.00530) (0.00664) (0.00703) 
Unpredictability*Vatexcisesgdpt-1 -0.000545 0.000949 0.00136 0.000702 -0.00671 -0.000569 
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(0.00163) (0.00200) (0.00184) (0.00207) (0.00439) (0.00450) 
Unpredictability*Tradetaxesgdpt-1 0.000399 -0.000643 -0.00148 -0.00249 -0.00118 0.00374 
 
(0.00283) (0.00279) (0.00441) (0.00453) (0.0113) (0.00756) 
Unpredictability*Nontaxrevenuegdpt-1 -0.00188** -0.000839 -0.00122 -0.000672 -0.000232 -0.000587 
 (0.000729) (0.000699) (0.00102) (0.000952) (0.00112) (0.00115) 
Unpredictability*Primaryexpendgdpt-1 0.000704 0.00181* 0.00222 -0.000560 -0.00751 -0.00440 
 
(0.000826) (0.00102) (0.00155) (0.00177) (0.00828) (0.00656) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard Errors are in parenthesis. 
Although we have run the full model regression, we present here only the results of our variables of interest, namely the results of interaction variables in addition to the 
results of remittances and aid variables (ODA over GDP ratio and Aid Unpredictability). 
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Appendices and Tables 
Appendix1: The Periods of Fiscal Adjustments in developing countries 
Country Rapid Adjustments Gradual Adjustments 
Albania 94-95; 98-00; 03;05-06 94-95; 98-00; 02-07 
Algeria 91 ; 95-96 ; 99-00 ; 03 ; 05-06 94-97 ; 99-00 ; 05-06 
Argentina 86 ; 90-91; 96 ; 01 ; 03-04 90-91 ; 00-01 ; 03-05 
Armenia 96 ; 98-99 ; 01-02 ; 07 98-99 ; 01-02 
Bangladesh 89 - 
Belarus 96-97 ; 01 ; 03-07 96-97 ; 01-07 
Bolivia 85-86 ; 90 ; 04-06 85-86 ; 89-92 ; 94-95 ; 97-98 ; 04-06 
Botswana 82-85 ; 88 ; 90 ; 95-96 ; 00 ; 06 82-85 ; 95-96 ; 05-06 
Brazil 81 ; 83 ; 85 ; 87 ; 89-90 ; 92-94 ; 98 81-83 ; 89-90 ; 92-95 ; 98-02 
Burkina Faso 84-85 ; 90-91 ; 96-97 ; 99 ; 03 ; 07 84-85 ; 90-91 ; 95-99 ; 06-07 
Cameroon 81-84 ; 94-96 ; 00 ; 05-06 81-84 ; 94-96 ; 05-06 
Chile 84 ; 95 ; 00 ; 04-07 00-01 ; 04-07 
China 94-95 ; 97 ; 00 ; 06-07 94-95 ; 97-98 ; 00-07 
Colombia 85 ; 01 ; 04-05 85-87 ; 99-02 ; 04-07 
Congo, Rep. 85 ; 89-90 ; 93-94 ; 96 ; 99-01 ; 03-06 84-85 ; 88-90 ; 93-94 ; 99-01 ; 03-06 
Costa Rica 83 ; 92 ; 99 ; 06-07 91-93 ; 97-99 ; 05-07 
Cote d'Ivoire 81 ; 83-85 ; 90 ; 94 ; 04 81-85 ; 90-91 ; 03-04 
Dominican Republic 85-86 ; 88 ; 92 ; 97 85-88 ; 00-01 
Ecuador 82 ; 84-85 ; 89-90 ; 95 ; 99-00 ; 04 ; 06 84-85 ; 88-90 ; 99-00 ; 06-07 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 81-83 ; 91-92 ; 05-06 81-83 ; 91-92 ; 04-06 
El Salvador 92-93 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06 91-95 ; 99-03 ; 06-07 
Ethiopia 84-85 ; 92 ; 95 ; 01 ; 04 ; 06 83-86 ; 91-92 ; 95-97 ; 04-06 
Gabon 81-82 ; 89 ; 91 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 99 ; 01 ; 05 81-82 ; 94-95 ; 05-06 
Gambia, The 82 ; 84 ; 86 ; 94 ; 98 ; 02-04 85-86 ; 91-92 ; 02-04 
Ghana 84 ; 86 ; 91 ; 93 ; 95 ; 02-03 ; 05 82-88 ; 02-03 
Guatemala 91 ; 95 ; 98 ; 06 91-92 ; 95-96 
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Guinea 81-82 ; 87 ; 05 81-82 ; 04-05 
Guinea-Bissau 81 ; 87 ; 90 ; 94 ; 96 ; 99 ; 03 ; 06 84-87 ; 93-94 ; 03-06 
Haiti 95 ; 97-98 ; 04 97-99 ; 03-04 
Honduras 95 94-95 
India 93-94 ; 03 ; 05 91-94 ; 00-05 
Indonesia 98 ; 05 93-98 ; 04-05 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 81-82 ; 87 ; 89-90 ; 96 ; 99 ; 02 ; 05 81-82 ; 89-90 ; 95-96 ; 02-03 
Jamaica 81 ; 84-85 ; 95 ; 99-00 ; 07 84-85 ; 99-00 
Jordan 82-83 ; 85-86 ; 88-92 ; 95 ; 04-06 82-83 ; 85-86 ; 88-92 ; 04-07 
Kazakhstan 97-98 ; 00 ; 03 ; 05 ; 07 97-00 ; 05-07 
Kenya 88 ; 93 ; 04 ; 06 86-89 
Lebanon 02-03 01-03 
Liberia 83 ; 88 ; 02-04 ; 06-07 81-84 ; 02-04 ; 06-07 
Madagascar 84 ; 86-87 ; 97 ; 99 ; 04 ; 06 86-87 ; 96-99 
Malawi 84 ; 90 ; 98 ; 04-05 84-85 ; 89-90 ; 04-05 
Malaysia 01 96-97 
Maldives 81-82 ; 87 ; 94-95 ; 06-07 81-83 ; 87-89 ; 94-95 ; 01-03 ; 06-07 
Mali 82 ; 86 ; 89-90 ; 92 ; 96 ; 99 86-87 ; 89-90 ; 96-97 ; 01-02 
Mexico 81-83 81-83 
Moldova 97-00 ; 03-04 ; 06 97-00 ; 03-06 
Mongolia 93 ; 95 ; 97 ; 99-01 ; 06-07 99-03 ; 06-07 
Morocco 88 ; 92 ; 96 ; 01 ; 06-07 87-89 ; 96-98 ; 06-07 
Mozambique 95 ; 05 ; 07 95-96 
Namibia 83-85 ; 87 ; 89 ; 91 ; 96-97 ; 02 ; 04 ; 06 83-87 ; 96-97 ; 04-06 
Nicaragua 91 ; 94 ; 97-98 93-98 ; 03-05 
Niger 84 ; 93 ; 95 ; 98 ; 01-02 ; 06 95-98 ; 01-02 ; 06-07 
Nigeria 89-90 ; 92 ; 95 ; 99-01 ; 05 89-90 ; 99-01 
Pakistan 89 ; 93 89-90 
Panama 91-92 ; 99 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06 91-92 ; 06-07 
Papua New Guinea 82-84 ; 86-87 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 04 ; 06 82-84 ; 86-87 ; 93-95 
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Paraguay 95 ; 01 ; 03-04 97-99 ; 03-04 
Peru 84 ; 88 ; 90-91 ; 93 ; 96 ; 06-07 84-85 ; 90-93 ; 95-96 ; 02-07 
Philippines 94 91-94 
Senegal 07 94-96 ; 00-02 ; 06-07 
South Africa 95 ; 05 95-96 ; 04-07 
Sri Lanka 83-84 ; 89 83-84 ; 89-90 ; 92-93 ; 01-03 
Sudan 81 ; 83 ; 87 ; 92 ; 97-00 ; 04 97-00 
Tanzania 87 ; 89-91 ; 93-96 ; 07 89-91 ; 93-96 
Thailand 03 - 
Togo 82-85 ; 88 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06-07 82-85 ; 94-97 ; 01-03 ; 06-07 
Tunisia 82 ; 84 ; 93 82-82 ; 91-94 
Uganda 82-83 ; 88 ; 91 ; 94 82-83 ; 91-94 
Uruguay 92-93 ; 97 ; 04 ; 06 91-93 ; 96-98 
Venezuela, RB 94 ; 96-97 ; 99 96-97 
Vietnam 04 88-02 
Yemen, Rep. 91 ; 95-97 ; 99-00 ; 04-06 95-97 ; 99-00 ; 03-06 
Zambia 83 ; 85-86 ; 90 ; 93-95 ; 99-00 85-87 ; 93-95 ; 98-00 
Zimbabwe 81-83 ; 89 ; 96-98 ; 03-04 81-83 ; 96-98 ; 03-04 
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Appendix 2: Variables - Definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source Comments 
Wrgdp Workers' remittances, 
receipts (% of GDP). World Bank Development Indicators – WBDI (2010). 
Workers’ remittances record current transfers by 
migrants who are employed in, and considered a 
resident of, the countries that host them. 
Unpredictability 
Unpredictability of 
development aid 
inflows. 
Author’s calculation based on Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) variables. 
For the computation of this variable in reference to 
Levy (1988); see section 6. 
FCAlesina Episodes of large (rapid) tight Fiscal Policy. 
Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank 
Development Indicators – WBDI (2010), Government 
Development Finance (GDF) – 2010 and Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010)’s definition of “fiscal consolidation episode”. 
For this variable, we use the definition of “fiscal 
consolidation episode” of Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010). These calculations are based on total 
government revenue (excluding grants), 
expenditure, interests payments on government’s 
debt and GDP data. The total government revenue 
and government’s spending stem from CERDI’s 
database.  The interest payments on external debt 
stem from the Government Development Finance 
(GDF) – 2010. The source of the GDP is the WDI 
2010. 
FCHeylen Episodes of gradual tight Fiscal Policy. 
Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank 
Development Indicators – WBDI (2010), Government 
Development Finance (GDF) – 2010 and Heylen and Everaert 
(2000)’s definition of “fiscal consolidation episode”. 
For this variable, we use the definition of “fiscal 
consolidation episode” of Heylen and Everaert 
(2000). These calculations are based on total 
government revenue (excluding grants), 
expenditure, interests payments on government’s 
debt and GDP data. The total government revenue 
and government’s spending stem from CERDI’s 
database. The interest payments on external debt 
stem from the Government Development Finance 
(GDF) – 2010. The source of the GDP is the WDI 
2010. 
 137 
 
Outputgap Output Gap Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank Development Indicators – WBDI (2010). 
The Output Gap is calculated as the difference 
between the actual output and the potential output. 
The actual output is the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), PPP, (constant 2005 international $) of 
WDI 2010 and the potential output is computed by 
the use of the Hodrick Prescott Filter (with lambda 
= 100). 
Inflation Inflation (annual %) 
Author’s calculation using Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) from WBDI (2010) and Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
also from WBDI (2010). 
This variable is the inflation (Consumer prices, %) 
where we replace the missing data by those of the 
Inflation (Deflator GDP, %). 
GDPGrowth Growth of GDP (annual %) WBDI 2010 
We use the GDP (based on PPP 2005 Constant 
2005 International $) to compute the GDP growth 
rate (annual %). 
REER Real Effective Exchange Rate. 
Database of CERDI (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le 
Developpement International) - France 
This is the Real Effective Exchange Rate, base 
2005 = 100 computed by CERDI.: it is the ratio of 
prices in the country to prices in the main import 
partners adjusted for variations in nominal effective 
exchange rate. An increase means an appreciation. 
IMF IMF Programmes Database of CERDI and IMF’s annual reports, various years. 
Dummy Variable that takes the value "1" (the value 
“0”, otherwise) if the country is under agreement 
with the IMF in the previous fiscal year. IMF 
programs considered here are non-crisis programs: 
Standby Credit Facility (SCF), Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF), Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF), Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF).  
Odanetdisbgdp 
ODA Total, Net 
disbursements - in % of 
GDP 
Author’s calculation using data from OECD.Stat DAC dataset 
and the WBDI 2010. 
We use the Total Net disbursements of ODA in US 
current Dollars (source: OECD.Stat DAC dataset) 
that we divide by the GDP in US current Dollars 
(source: WDI 2010). 
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Nontaxrevenuegdp Non Tax Revenue, in % 
of GDP CERDI’s Database of Government Revenues (in % of GDP) 
This is the first component of the overall tax 
revenue (excluding grants). 
Directtaxesgdp Direct Taxes, in % of GDP CERDI’s Database of Government Revenues (in % of GDP) 
This is the second component of the overall tax 
revenue (excluding grants). 
Vatexcisesgdp Value Added and Excises Taxes,  in % of 
GDP 
CERDI’s Database of Government Revenues (in % of GDP) This is the third component of the overall tax 
revenue (excluding grants). 
Tradetaxesgdp Trade Taxes, in % of GDP CERDI’s Database of Government Revenues (in % of GDP) 
This is the fourth and last component of the overall 
tax revenue (excluding grants). 
Primaryexpendituresgdp Primary Expenditures, in % of GDP 
Author’s calculation using several sources of data: CERDI’s 
Database for Government Revenues (in % of GDP) and 
government expenditures (in % of GDP) and the GDF (2010) 
for interest payments on government debt (in % of GDP). 
The Primary expenditure is computed for each 
country as follows: Primary Expenditure = 
Expenditure (in % of GDP) minus Interest 
payments on government debt (in % of GDP). 
Capitalflightgdp Capital Flight, in % of GDP Author’s calculation using WDI (2010) data. 
The capital flight, in % of GDP is computed as 
follows:  Capitalflightgdp = [change in external 
debt in % of GDP + Foreign Direct Investment (net 
inflows) in % of GDP  + Current account in % of 
GDP + change in net reserves in % of GDP]*100. 
Domesticdebtgdp Domestic debt,  in % of GDP 
Author’s calculation using several sources of data: the 
Historical Public Debt Database of IMF [which can be found 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262.] for the 
Gros Public Debt in % of GDP and the WBDI 2010 for 
external debt, in % of GDP data. 
The domestic debt in % of GDP is computed as 
follows:  Domesticdebtgdp = Gross Public Debt 
in % of GDP minus External debt (in % of GDP). 
NumberfcAlesina 
Number of prior 
adjustments using 
“FCAlesina” 
Calculation of the Author by focusing on the variable 
“FCAlesina” 
For instance, if there is a continuous adjustment 
over 4 consecutive years, it is considered as 1 
adjustment. 
Numberfcheylen 
Number of prior 
adjustments using 
“FCHeylen” 
Calculation of the Author by focusing on the variable 
“FCHeylen”. 
For instance, if there is a continuous adjustment 
over 4 consecutive years, it is considered as 1 
adjustment. 
VariablefcAlesina 
Time since previous 
Adjustment for 
“FCAlesina” 
Author's calculation Variable constructed by the author at the same time 
as the Splines variables used in our study. 
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VariablefcHeylen 
Time since previous 
Adjustment for 
“FCHeylen” 
Author's calculation Variable constructed by the author at the same time 
as the Splines variables used in our study. 
Qog The Quality of Governance 
The quality of governance is measured by subjective indices 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The 
quality-of-governance index from ICRG used here is an 18-
point scale, created by summing the following three six-point 
scales: corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the 
rule of law. See the ICRG for the criteria used in coding these 
measures. The rationale for corruption and bureaucratic quality 
is obvious. The rule-of-law definition indicates that this 
measure reflects the government's administrative capacity in 
enforcing the law, as well as the potential for rent-seeking 
associated with weak legal systems and insecure property 
rights. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
As mentioned in the section 4, to avoid the 
endogeneity of this variable stemming from the 
simultaneity between the fiscal adjustment variable 
and the quality of governance, the latter is 
transformed by taking the average value of the past 
three years (not counting the current year). 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
     
Wrgdp 1482 3.026585 4.851511 0 31.03261 
Unpredictability 1768 -0.08782 5.102131 -56.24728 41.44596 
Odanetdisbgdp 1932 6.875867 10.1976 -.6928778 108.325 
Nontaxrevenuegdp 1317 6.540749 6.376471 -1.91e-06 51.67495 
Directtaxesgdp 1350 4.776211 3.997292 0.1503 28.67735 
Vatexcisesgdp 1579 5.815693 3.180165 0 21.96181 
Tradetaxesgdp
 
1563 3.598655 2.682772 0 18.13286 
Primaryexpendituresgdp 1868 15.95348 8.787456 -1.026296 64.03642 
Domesticdebtgdp 1812 2.967178 47.99027 -681.1356 1027.918 
Capitalflightgdp 1717 213.5482 298.0549 -1196.991 3432.027 
Outputgap 1966 1.78e+08 1.75e+10 -1.80e+11 4.82e+11 
Inflation 1980 78.0509 758.6056 -100 24411.03 
GDPGrowth 1819 3.451455 6.198314 -51.03086 106.2798 
REER 1935 224.744 3775.504 29.74355 166045.4 
IMF 2072 0.2784749 0.4483566 0 1 
Qog 1667 0.4426812 0.1508666 0.050926 0.8734568 
NumberfcAlesina 1646 2.097813 1.805303 0 10 
VariablefcAlesina 1646 2.814095 3.798825 0 26 
Numberfcheylen 1645 1.119149 1.045395 0 5 
Variablefcheylen 1646 3.23633 4.345075 0 26 
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Appendix 4: List of the Sub-samples countries 
 
Low-Income Countries (LICs) : Bangladesh; Burkina Faso; Ethiopia; Gambia, The; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Kenya; Liberia; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mozambique; Niger; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zimbabwe.   
The classification of the LICs group of countries is based on the World Bank’s classification. 
 
Group of the Top 30 Remittances-Dependent Countries: This list is obtained by averaging the data on workers’ remittances over our period of 
study (1980-2007). 
 
Albania Bangladesh Burkina Faso Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep; El Salvador; Gambia, The; Guatemala; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; 
Honduras; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Lebanon; Liberia; Mali; Moldova; Morocco; Nicaragua ; Nigeria ; Pakistan ; Senegal ; Sri Lanka ; Sudan ; 
Togo ; Tunisia ; Uganda ; Yemen, Rep. 
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PART II: STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY AND 
PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
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CHAPTER III32: Does Structural Economic Vulnerability Matter for Public 
Indebtedness in Developing Countries? 
 
                 
Abstract 
In this study, we examine the effect of structural economic vulnerability of developing 
countries on their public indebtedness. We perform our econometric analysis by relying on 97 
developing countries over the period 1980-2008. The results suggest evidence of a “U-
shaped” relationship between the structural vulnerability and the total public debt in 
developing countries. In Low-Income Countries (LICs), the build-up of the total public debt is 
particularly explained by structural vulnerability. Accordingly, international institutions 
should take into account such structural vulnerability when designing development policies, 
especially the ones related to debt sustainability in developing countries and particularly LICs. 
 
Keywords: Structural Vulnerability; Public debt. 
JEL Classification: E60; H63; O10. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter strives to explore the impact of structural vulnerability on the total public debt, 
especially in developing countries. The latter, through their history have been prone to several 
types of shocks33 such as shocks to international commodity prices, natural disasters, conflict 
related shocks, global financial market shocks, shocks to international interest or exchange 
rates, shortfalls in external aid flows, shocks of sudden human diseases (e.g. Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)) which can hit tourist revenues, changes in host country policies 
for migrant labour, which can cut remittances (see Matthew M. and Bargawi H., 2004).   
According to the World Bank classification, the developing countries group – different from 
that of high income countries – is heterogeneous and include low income countries (LICs), 
lower-middle income countries (LMICs), and upper middle income countries (UMICs), the 
two latter are referring to as middle income countries (MICs). While high income countries 
are highly exposed to market development as well as natural disaster shocks, we can 
distinguish two groups of developing countries in terms of vulnerability to shocks: those that 
have a limited access to private financing (especially the LICs and certain MICs) and those 
with a higher access to market-related financing. Many LICs and LMICs have in fact, 
benefited from the substantial debt cancellation under international schemes such as the 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) initiative and the multilateral debt relief initiative 
(MDRI). However, these initiatives provided by the Paris Club (and several other creditors) 
left the world developing countries at very different levels of indebtedness (UNDP, 2010). 
Indeed, on one side certain countries (for instance, many countries in the MICs group as well 
as many countries in small island developing state34, SIDS) have not benefited from the 
multilateral debt relief initiatives and have managed only to reschedule bilateral credits owed 
to the Paris Club. As a result, these countries incur persistent and unresolved high public debt 
burden as measured by both stocks (solvency) and service (liquidity) indicators. On another 
side, many countries including in LICs, despite the debt cancellation schemes they have 
benefited, are engaging in rapid debt accumulation (sometimes from the domestic markets 
                                                          
33
 Shocks is best defined as an event which impacts on an economy and which is “exogenous” – beyond the 
control of the government to prevent – though, neither the unexpected nature nor the lack of government control 
are inevitable (see Matthew and Bargawi, 2004). 
34
 The group of SIDS is a group of small open economies established by the United Nations in 2009. These 
countries have the particularity to be highly exposed and vulnerable to external shocks. Note that certain 
countries of this group belong either to the group of Low-Income Countries or to that of Middle Income 
Countries.  
 
 145 
 
that are developed especially in sub-Saharan Africa, see Christensen, 2005; Rocher, 2007 and 
Cabrillac and Rocher, 2009) which give serious cause of concern.   
Several studies (for e.g. Guillaumont, 2006 and UNDP, 2010) highlight that the greater 
vulnerability to high levels of public debt is owed to a range of structural weaknesses (that we 
will develop further). Many developing countries lack the required economic policies (that we 
will call later the “resilience”) to deal adequately with such shocks and to avoid the 
subsequent debt accumulation. The latter associated with a high level of debt service has in 
turn, limited the governments’ fiscal space and abilities to respond effectively to these shocks.        
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section (section 2), we will briefly 
present the state of the literature related to the definition and measurement of the concept of 
“economic vulnerability” in developing countries. From that literature review, we will also 
derive our preferred measure of “structural vulnerability”. The section 3 will be devoted to the 
model of public debt accumulation that will help us examine how the latter is related to the 
structural vulnerability of developing countries. In section 4, we present our model 
specification, the discussion on the expected sign of covariates and the econometric method. 
In the section 5, we will expose and discuss the empirical results. The section 6 concludes and 
discusses the policy implications of this study. 
 
2. The concept of ‘economic vulnerability’: A literature review on the 
definition and measurements 
2.1 A literature review on the definition of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
The concept of ‘vulnerability’ refers to that of ‘risk’. There are several definitions associated 
with the concept of ‘risk’ depending on the disciplines where it is studied. Generally, 
vulnerability can be seen as the risk that a ‘system’ undergoes from negative change due to a 
‘perturbation’ (see e.g. Naudé et al., 2009).  
In economics, vulnerability is either associated with poverty where the concern is the risk of 
households falling into or remaining in poverty, or natural hazards and macro-level shocks 
where the concern is how the hazards adversely affect a country or region’s economy (see e.g. 
Naudé et al., 2009). Guillaumont (2009) highlights that the first type of vulnerability can be 
derived from the second one. We focus in this chapter on the second kind of vulnerability: the 
‘economic or structural vulnerability’. 
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The concept of ‘economic vulnerability’ was defined for the first time in 1990 by the Maltese 
Ambassador his Excellence Mr. Alexander Borg Olivier who states that ‘such an index is 
important because it reiterates that the per capita GDP [gross domestic product] of island 
developing countries is not itself an adequate measurement of the level of development of 
these countries as it does not reflect the structural and institutional weaknesses and the several 
handicaps facing island developing countries’ (Maltese Government, 1990: 7). Since then 
many conceptual and empirical studies35 have been conducted on the issue of economic 
vulnerability. More specifically, Briguglio and Kisanga (2004), Briguglio and Galea (2003), 
Cordina, (2004a, b) and Briguglio et al., (2008) define economic vulnerability as ‘a country’s 
proneness to exogenous shocks lying outside their control or its proneness to increased 
susceptibility of such a country to the adverse effects of these shocks’.  
In the same vein, several studies of Patrick Guillaumont (see e.g. Guillaumont, 2009; 
Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) have been devoted to the study of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
where he defines ‘the economic or structural vulnerability of a country as the risk of a (poor) 
country seeing its development hampered by the natural and external shocks it faces’. Thus 
the author considers two main types of exogenous shocks (in other words, two main sources 
of vulnerability):  
- the environmental or ‘natural’ shocks which encompass, for instance, natural disasters 
(earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) and the more frequent climatic shocks (typhoons, 
hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc); 
-  external (trade-and-exchange-related) shocks which comprise, for instance, slumps in 
external demand, world commodity price instability (and correlated instability of 
terms of trade), international fluctuations of interest rates, and so forth. 
Other domestic shocks such as unforeseen political changes are thus excluded from being 
exogenous.  
All these studies make a distinction between the concept of ‘economic vulnerability’ and that 
of ‘economic resilience’. For example, according to Briguglio et al., (2008), economic 
resilience refers to the policy-induced ability of an economy to recover from or adjust to the 
negative impact of adverse exogenous shocks and to benefit from positive shocks. Thus 
                                                          
35
 The conceptual and empirical viewpoints of economic vulnerability are well documented in the literature (see 
e.g. Atkins et al., 2000; Briguglio 1995; Briguglio and Galea, 2003). Cordiana and Farrugia (2005) also provide 
a summary on the measurement issue of the concept of ‘economic vulnerability’. 
 
 147 
 
defined, economic resilience may take the form of higher savings and investments which may 
occur in the wake of pronounced uncertainty and may enable small island states to achieve 
high levels of economic development (Cordina, 2004a,b). Guillaumont (2009) considers 
economic resilience as the capacity of a country to react to shocks. He highlights that this 
resilience depends more on current policy, is more easily reversed, and is less structural but 
may also comprise a structural element36.  
Briguglio and Kisanga (2003) develops the concept of the ‘Singapore Paradox’, according to 
which many small island states, in spite of their economic vulnerability, manage to generate a 
relatively high GDP per capita when compared to other developing countries. To explain this 
phenomenon, Briguglio and Galea (2003) and Briguglio and Kisanga (2004) take the case of 
Singapore which experiences high rates of economic growth and high GDP per capita despite 
its high exposure to external shocks. Thus the ‘Singapore Paradox’ stems from the 
juxtaposition of economic vulnerability and economic (nurtured) resilience, where economic 
vulnerability was confined to inherent features which are permanent or quasi-permanent, 
while economic resilience was associated with man-made measures which enable a country to 
withstand or bounce back from the negative effects of external shocks.  
 
2.2 A literature review on the measurement of economic vulnerability 
In line with the definitions of economic vulnerability provided above, we summarise here the 
different measures of that concept. The propositions of vulnerability indices have mainly 
focused on the quantification of the special features of the countries by relying on indicators 
such as economic openness, export concentration, dependence on imports of energy and 
peripherality. Other approaches attempt to measure vulnerability in terms of the phenomenon, 
namely the variability of output and similar indicators.  
The first vulnerability index was proposed by Briguglio (1993) and is composed of three 
variables: the exposure to foreign economic conditions, insularity and remoteness, and 
proneness to natural disasters. This index has been the subject of several modifications in 
1995, in 1997, and updated by Briguglio and Galea in 2003. Other authors such as Chander 
                                                          
36
 According to Guillaumont (2009) a distinction close to this three component is given in Rodrik (1999) who, in 
looking at the risk of social conflict in countries facing external shocks, considers the individual severity of the 
shocks, the depth of latent social conflict (likely to increase the impact of the shocks), and the quality of conflict 
management institutions. 
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(1996) and Wells (1996) follow the methodology adopted by Briguglio (1995) and propose a 
vulnerability index. Wells (1997) revised its measure of vulnerability and uses a methodology 
that departs from the previous ones where he relies on the idea that ‘vulnerability manifested 
in instability in economic growth’. He then uses regression analysis to build its index. Atkins 
et al. (1998) also adopt the econometric analysis and show evidence that export dependency 
ratio, merchandise export diversification and vulnerability to natural disasters are the main 
determinants of economic vulnerability (measured by output volatility). Crowards (2000) also 
contributes to the literature by suggesting an index of economic vulnerability for developing 
countries which is composed of more variables than in the previous studies. In line with 
Wells’ (1997) study, the Committee for Development Policy (CDP)37 of the United Nations 
(UN) developed a composite index in order to identify the causes of vulnerability of least 
developed countries (LDCs). By capturing vulnerability through economic growth instability, 
this index is a weighted average of five variables, namely the share of manufacturing and 
modern services in GDP, merchandise export concentration ratio, instability of agricultural 
production, instability of exports of goods and services and population size. The weights are 
obtained through an econometric analysis where the impact of each economic indicator 
quoted above on economic growth is examined. All these studies convey the same message 
according to which small states are inherently more vulnerable. However, Gonzales (2000) 
criticizes these studies, arguing that they lead to considerable variations and contradictions 
due to the differences of the parameters and the methodologies employed by them.  
Following the renewal growing concern over macroeconomic vulnerability of least developed 
countries and the demand of these countries to build an adequate vulnerability indicator which 
should be taken into account in the design of international development policies, the CDP has 
developed and progressively refined, after successive revisions (2003, 2006 and 2009) an 
economic vulnerability index which captures vulnerability caused by structural factors. The 
structural economic vulnerability employed in this study referred to the so-called 
‘retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI)’ jointly calculated on an annual basis by 
the FERDI38 (see Cariolle, 2011; Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) with the UN/United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). This indicator covers 128 
                                                          
37
 This committee was previously called Committee for Development Planning. 
38
 FERDI is the ‘Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International’. The method of 
retrospective EVI’s calculation can be found in details in Cariolle (2011) and descriptive statistical analysis on 
the retrospective EVI can be found in Guillaumont (2011), and Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011). This is why we 
do not find it useful to replicate this statistical analysis here and refer the readers to those articles. 
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developing countries over the period 1975–2008 (unbalanced panel data) and has the 
advantage of being simple, transparent and parsimonious. Moreover, several multilateral 
development banks are exploring whether to move from their traditional indicator to EVI for 
aid allocation (see Guillaumont, 2011, for more details).  
The data available for our study (once we take into account all our variables – see below for 
the details on these variables) cover a panel of 96 developing countries over the period 1980–
2008. The 'economic vulnerability' is a result of three components: (i) the size and frequency 
of the exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante 
vulnerability); (ii) exposure to shocks; and (iii) the capacity to react to shocks, or resilience. 
Therefore, structural vulnerability (that is, the EVI), which results from factors that are 
independent of a country’s current political will is different from the vulnerability deriving 
from policy, which results from recent policy choices. In other words, an index of structural 
economic vulnerability is related to structural factors—not policy factors—that are beyond the 
present control of the country and which also influence global vulnerability, mainly through 
resilience (Guillaumont, 2009). This structural vulnerability index is a composite index of 
‘shocks’ and ‘exposure to shocks’; both indicators are equally weighted39. We display below 
the structure of the (retrospective) EVI where the weights of indices are in brackets. 
 
Structure of the EVI 
-Smallness (50%)
-Location Index (Remoteness) (25%)
Exposure Index (50%)
-Specialization Index (Merchandise Export concentration and 
share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries) (25%)
Shock Index 

-Natural Shock Index(Homelessness due to natural disasters; instability of 
(50%)     agriculture production) (50%)
-Trade Shock Index (Instability of exports of goods and services) (50%) 
  
Source: Guillaumont et al. (2011) 
 
Guillaumont (2011) concludes with regard to each of these indicators that the LDCs appear, 
on average, to be more vulnerable than other developing countries and even more so when 
                                                          
39
 See for example Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011) for a discussion on the weight of indicators. 
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compared to other low-income countries. Figures 1–4 below compare the evolution of the 
average total public debt with that of the average EVI for, respectively, the developing 
countries and the sub-samples of the low-income countries (LICs), lower middle income 
countries (LMICs) and the upper middle income countries (UMICs).  
 
Figure 1: Average Total Public debt and Average EVI of Developing Countries 
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Source: Authors calculations based on data from IMF (2010) and Guillaumont and Cariolle 
(2011). 
 
Figure 2: Average Total Public debt and Average EVI of Low-Income Countries (LICs) 
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Figure 3: Average Total Public debt and EVI of Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) 
 
  
Source: Authors calculations based on data from IMF (2010) and Guillaumont and Cariolle 
(2011). 
 
Figure 4: Average Total Public debt and EVI of Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on data from IMF (2010) and Guillaumont and Cariolle 
(2011). 
 
Note that we do not include the group of small island developing states (SIDS) because of the 
insufficiency of data on certain explanatory variables (specifically the quality of governance). 
However, several countries belonging to this group also pertain to one of the three sub-groups 
of developing countries. All these graphs suggest a strong correlation between the average 
EVI and the average total public debt and a co-evolution of these two variables over time.  
In the next section, we expose the simple mathematical model of the public finances 
sustainability usually described in the literature. 
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3. The presentation of the simple mathematical model of the public 
finances sustainability 
Since the purpose of our study is to examine the effect of economic vulnerability on the total 
public debt, we start with a public finances sustainability model and then derive the 
appropriate model that will help us perform our regressions. 
First of all, we find useful to mention that the concept of “debt sustainability” is improperly 
used in the discussions of international financial and fiscal policy issues in developing 
countries, whereas the relevant and the best known concept is that of fiscal sustainability, that 
is, the sustainability of public finances. The concept of fiscal sustainability refers to the fact 
that governments cannot maintain indefinitely the same set of policies (for e.g. expenditures 
and taxes policies) and remain simultaneously solvent. This means in other words that fiscal 
sustainability analysis is often not on defaulting itself – which governments try to avoid – but 
on the consequences of the policy changes needed to prevent defaulting (Vera, 2009).  
Despite the old debate on that concept (it dated from more than a century now), there is no 
agreed definition on what constitutes a fiscal sustainable position. In fact, there are several 
methods proposed by the literature to assess the fiscal sustainability, depending on the time 
horizons (short, medium, or long term) and the variables considered.  
In theory, the study of fiscal sustainability rests on the government’s budget constraint which 
requires that current spending on goods and services plus the costs of servicing current debt 
equals current tax revenues plus the issuance of new debt. Thus, the debt financing from a 
long-term perspective is defined with respect to two main approaches (Cuddington, 1996):  
The first approach is the so-called “accounting” or Domar’s approach. It is also named the 
borrower based approach and is defined on the basis of the static government’s budget 
constraint. The latter is satisfied if the public sector is able to finance its current expenditures 
with its revenues and new borrowing, and meet or roll over its maturing liabilities; that is, if it 
is not liquidity-constrained. 
The second approach is the solvency criterion of government finances or the Present- Value 
Constraint (PVC) approach, also called the lender based approach. This approach relies on the 
intertemporal budget constraint which requires that the present discounted value of future 
primary budget balances should at least be equal to the outstanding stock of debt. Thus, the 
public sector cannot be a debtor and the private sector cannot be a creditor, in present value 
terms, any debt incurred should eventually be fully repayable. If there is debt at present, the 
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primary balance should become positive at some date in the future in order for the present-
value budget constraint to be respected. 
Irrespective of the conceptual approach adopted, the fundamental block of the fiscal 
sustainability corresponds to a simplification of the government budget constraint (Vera, 
2009). We rely in this chapter on the mathematical model of fiscal sustainability underlying 
that fundamental block, to estimate the effect of structural economic vulnerability on public 
debt in developing countries.  
We assume first that the government finances its deficit only by issuing debt. Hence, we 
exclude for the moment other financing items such as seigniorage revenue, privatization 
proceeds, and the sales of public assets.      
Let us denote tB  the stock of the public debt at the end of the year t; ti  the nominal interest 
rate on total public debt; tG  and tT  be respectively the total tax revenue and the total 
government consumption (excluding interest payments on the total public debt).  
The government budget constraint is given by: 
Debt in period t = (Debt in period t-1) + (Primary Deficit +Interest Payments on public debt) 
or Debt in period t - (Debt in period t-1) = Primary Deficit +Interest Payments on public debt 
= Primary Deficit (in year t) + ti  *(Debt for period t-1). 
This equation can be rewritten as: )()( 11   tttttt BrTGBB                                         (1) 
To analyze the evolution of the total public debt, we need to normalize the public debt by 
some measure of the country’s ability to service and repay its debt: the most common choice 
is typically the nominal Gross Domestic Product, denoted tY . Thus, the evolution of the debt-
to-GDP ratio could be obtained by analyzing derivative of 
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where t  stands for the rate of inflation and tg for real GDP growth. The substitution of (3) 
into (2) leads to: )(1 ttt
t
ttt
t gbY
rBTGb   
                                                               (4) 
By defining
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G , and
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T , then we obtain in terms of ratios to GDP:  
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rBb                                                                                               (5) 
If we assume that the debt ratios are steady state and that the real rate of interest on debt is 
defined by  ri , the rearrangement of (5) leads to: )()( 1   tt bgib                 (6) 
The equation (6) shows that if the primary surplus ratio is equal to zero, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
will grow or shrink at the rate )( gi  , within a framework where it is assumed that there is a 
level beyond which the debt-to GDP-ratio cannot or should not rise. Under this situation, the 
public debt ratio increases when the real effective interest rate on government debt exceeds 
the growth rate of GDP (that is, when the growth-adjusted real effective rate is positive) 
unless there is a sufficient amount of primary budget surplus. In other terms, the Domar’s 
condition for debt stability (and thus fiscal sustainability) can be held when the real GDP 
growth rate is higher than the real interest rate, even if the primary balance continues to be 
just zero.     
 
4. The model specification, the discussion of the expected effects of 
covariates and the econometric technique 
 
4.1 The model specification  
When developing the previous model of fiscal sustainability, we assume that the budget 
deficit is financed only by debt creation. However, other financing items (such as those 
mentioned above) should be considered. For example, in developing countries, governments 
usually resort to the monetisation of deficit (the seigniorage); they can also use public 
investment to stimulate private investment or use it as a countercyclical tool and thus obtain 
revenues if the expected rate of return of the development projects related to public 
investment exceeds the cost of borrowing. In addition, the significant assets (buildings, 
mineral deposits and various forms of liquid reserves) held by governments in developing 
countries could provide them with substantial revenue, the latter being possibly used to 
alleviate the burden of public debt of these countries.  
To take into account such items (at least partially) in the equation (6), we define the primary 
balance not as the difference between tax revenue and the government spending, but rather as 
the difference between the overall government revenue and excluding grants —with these 
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revenue comprising several items, including other non-tax revenue— and non interest 
(primary) expenditure. 
Overall, from the equation (6) and based on the discussion made above, the fiscal 
sustainability depends upon the following factors: 
- the primary surplus; that is, the difference between the overall government revenue  
including seigniorage and other types of revenues and excluding grants, and the non-
interest (primary) expenditure; 
- the growth of real GDP;  
- the real interest rate.  
We take into account these elements and further augment the model with our variables of 
interest (the EVI or its components and/or as we will see later, their square values), as well as 
other control variables which are likely to influence both the variables of interest and the 
dependent variable (the overall public debt).  
In fact, we follow a general approach that consists of estimating some version of the 
following equation: ittiitit XD    (1) where i denotes the country index (i = 1,....., 
97) and t denotes the year’s index, t = 1980–2008. The dependent variable 
itit GDPDebtD )/(  represents the total public debt as a percentage of GDP of the country i 
in year t.  
The vector itX  represents the structural economic vulnerability variables (that is, the EVI or 
its components—and/or the square values of EVI or the squared values of its components). 
We also include in the model a set of other time-varying control variables which act as 
(economic) resilience-related variables. They include the fiscal balance (in percent of GDP), 
the GDP growth rate, the terms of trade, the real effective exchange rate, the grants (as a 
percentage of GDP), the inflation rate (captured here through the GDP deflator), and the 
quality of governance. The definition and the source of these variables are provided in Table 1 
(see below). Note that we present the model estimated with and without the institutional 
variable (quality of governance). 
i  represents country fixed effects that are incorporated in the model and capture the 
heterogeneity among countries as well as the likely importance of unobservables correlated 
with the error term in determining the total public debt. The use of fixed effects i  in our 
regressions is dictated by two main reasons: first, since our sample is composed of 
heterogeneous countries, there are likely state-invariant and unmeasured factors (colonial 
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histories, political and financial institutions and the degree of creditworthiness) correlated 
with the error term in determining the evolution of the public debt to GDP ratio. Second, our 
macro panel contains, in principle, most countries of interest (representing the whole 
population of developing countries, especially those that are structural vulnerable), and thus 
will not likely be a random sample from a much larger universe of countries where the use of 
random effects may be more suitable.  
t are time-specific dummies that are included in all specifications to account for the general 
trends in the debt-to-GDP ratio, the swings in international economic policies and other 
common shocks to all countries, such as debt relief, that affect their public debt-to-GDP ratio 
over time.  
The disturbance 
,i t  is assumed to be i.i.d. (0, 2 )—that is, assumed not to be correlated with 
the explanatory variables of the model and the normality of which is not required (Baltagi, 
2002). 
In the next section we discuss the expected sign of the different regressors included in the 
model. 
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Table 1: Definition, Source of variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable and Definition Source and Comments Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Pubdebtgdp = Public Debt in 
% of GDP 
IMF's database on Public Debt – The IMF’s 
database weblink on Gross Public debt is: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262. 
2502 73.911 69.601 
EVI = Economic Vulnerability 
Index Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 
2689 40.211 11.780 
Exposure = Exposure Index Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 2813 44.994 16.258 
Shock = Shock Index Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 2689 35.854 15.190 
Exposuresq 
This is square values of the variable 
“Exposure”.  The data are computed by the 
Author based on data from Guillaumont and 
Cariolle, J. (2011). 
3132 2361.679 1486.927 
Shocksq 
This is square values of the variable “Shock”.  
The data are computed by the Author based on 
data from Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 
2982 1499.736 1271.295 
Exposureshock 
This variable is the interaction between the 
variables “Exposure” and “Shock”. The data 
are computed by the Author based on data from 
Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 
2982 1653.404 954.914 
Fiscal balance = Fiscal 
Balance in percentage of GDP 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le 
Developpement International (CERDI)’s Public 
Finance Database. Fiscal balance is the overall 
revenue (tax and non-tax revenue), excluding 
grants minus government expenditures. 
2238 5.996 7.953 
Gdpgrowth = Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
2685 3.716 5.869 
Termstrade = Net barter terms 
of trade index (2000 = 100) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
2317 110.754 38.072 
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REER = Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, Base 100 = 
2000 
CERDI’s Database: This is the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, base 2005 = 100 computed by 
CERDI: it is the ratio of prices in the country to 
prices in the main import partners adjusted for 
variations in nominal effective exchange rate. 
An increase means an appreciation. 
2602 183.492 3023.179 
Grantsgdp = Grants in percent 
of GDP. 
 
Grants data are grants disbursements by all 
donors expressed in current millions of US 
Dollars. They are extracted from the OECD 
Statistical Database. The GDP used to calculate 
the ratio of Grants in percentage of GDP is 
extracted from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2011. 
 
2700 6.265 9.460 
Inflation = Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %) 
 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
2684 61.084 692.329 
Importsgdp = Total Imports, in 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
825 43.099 24.007 
Qog = Quality of Governance 
The quality of governance is measured by 
subjective indices from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-
governance index from ICRG used here is an 
18-point scale, created by summing the 
following three six-point scales: corruption in 
government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule 
of law. See the ICRG for the criteria used in 
coding these measures. The rationale for 
corruption and bureaucratic quality is obvious. 
The rule-of-law definition indicates that this 
measure reflects the government's 
administrative capacity in enforcing the law, as 
well as the potential for rent-seeking associated 
with weak legal systems and insecure property 
rights. Source: International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data. 
1821 0.441 0.151 
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4.2 Discussion on the expected signs of the explanatory variables 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the expected effects (signs) of our explanatory 
variables, we would like to mention that, in order to make our regressors predetermined with 
respect to the dependent variable (the total public debt), we take the precaution to use where it 
appears necessary the lagged values of the explanatory variables. This allows us to avoid 
simultaneous relationships between certain regressors and the dependent variable.  
Now what about the expected effect of each explanatory variable? 
 
The EVI’s variable 
In analyzing the effect of economic vulnerability on economic growth, Cordina (2004a, b) 
shows that increased risk can adversely affect economic growth as the negative effects of 
downside shocks would be commensurately larger than those of positive shocks. Furthermore, 
he presents a conceptual application of the ‘Singapore Paradox’ approach and shows evidence 
that, in response to a situation of vulnerability, saving and capital formation in an economy 
can be important sources of resilience. Guillaumont (2009) discusses the effects of each 
component of the (retrospective) EVI on economic growth and poverty. He concludes that the 
EVI reduces economic growth and, through the latter, exerts deleterious effects on the pace of 
poverty reduction. These impacts occur through the channels of export earnings instability, 
the primary instabilities (especially through their effects on public finances or through the 
passed through price fluctuations to producers), political instability, the smallness of the 
country, the structure of the economy and the location of the country.  
More recently, Ferrarini (2009) re-assessed the analysis underlying the New Debt 
Sustainability Framework (NDSF) endorsed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF – 
International Monetary Fund - and the World Bank), which guides the borrowing decisions of 
low-income countries. This re-evaluation consists of testing the significance and the reliability 
of the World Bank’s CPIA – Country Policy and Institutional Assessment - or the governance 
indicators as predictors of debt distress episodes across LICs. He obtains strong evidence that 
factors of illiquidity and structural vulnerability40 are more suitable predictors of the 
occurrence of debt distress episodes across low-income countries (LICs). Thus by challenging 
the NDSF prospects, whose aim is to solve the long-standing debt crisis involving many of 
                                                          
40
 The EVI used is that of United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs—Division of Sustainable 
Development. 
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the LICs, the author concludes that the NSDF is bound to distort aid allocation away from the 
country-specific circumstances which truly matter for the achievement of debt sustainability.    
Based on this short literature review related to the macroeconomic impact of EVI, we discuss 
its possible impact on public debt.  
- Hypothesis of Linear relationship between EVI and total public debt  
We first suppose the following regarding the EVI’s linear effect on public debt: the structural 
vulnerability, by reducing tax revenue (unless the government increases taxes after either an 
exogenous shock or a rise in its exposure to shocks, though such a measure is politically 
sensitive and difficult to implement) and increasing government spending, is expected to 
increase the budget deficit. We also hypothesise that, irrespective of its effect on the public 
finances (the budget deficit), the structural vulnerability of a developing country is expected 
to increase its public indebtedness, either directly or indirectly, through its effect on the other 
control variables.  
In the meantime, we can conjecture that the structural vulnerability of a country can exert a 
statistically nil or a reducing effect on the public indebtedness. Let us describe how such a 
situation can occur. When facing a rise in its vulnerability, stemming either from exposure 
increases or shocks rises, or both, a developing country has several options, apart from 
resorting to indebtedness, to accommodate the additional costs induced by this rise in 
structural vulnerability:  
- Option 1: It can adjust its fiscal policies by either increasing taxes or reducing public 
spending or adopting both measures (a tax rise and expenditure reduction), although, 
as mentioned above, these measures could be politically difficult to implement. 
- Option 2: Instead of borrowing even at low cost to cope with the additional financial 
needs induced by such structural vulnerability, the government can rely on non-costly 
financial means such as the proceeds of privatisation, seigniorage and the sale of its 
assets (buildings, infrastructure, mineral deposits, and various forms of liquid 
reserves) (Vera, 2009). However, we are unable to provide statistical evidence on the 
hypothesis underlying that option because of a lack of data. In the case where the 
government resorts to one or several of these measures, it is possible to obtain a 
significant negative effect of EVI on the accumulation of public debt that cancels out 
the effect of the fiscal balance (the coefficient of the variable capturing the ‘the fiscal 
balance’ may not be statistically significant).   
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- Option 3: The third option is for these countries to seek debt relief granted by the 
creditors (the extra revenues are used to cope with the shocks). 
That said, to analyze empirically the channels through which the structural economic 
vulnerability affects public indebtedness, we proceed as follows:  
- Firstly, we regress each of the control variables (considered here as the dependent 
variable) on the EVI (considered here as the explanatory variable) to see if the latter 
has an effect on the former;   
- Secondly, we regress the public indebtedness variable (public debt-to-GDP ratio) on 
the EVI and on all the controls. Three scenarios can emerge from that regression:    If the EVI turned from significant to insignificant while the other controls were 
significant, the EVI would have an indirect effect on public indebtedness 
through the significant controls, provided that the EVI had a significant effect 
on the controls in the first set of regressions.  If the EVI and the controls were found to be significant, all of them would have 
an independent effect on public indebtedness. Other parts of it would not. The 
more the inclusion of the control variables weakens the effect of EVI on public 
indebtedness, the more important will be the indirect effect (via the controls). 
If the EVI coefficient changes little, it indicates that the controls are not 
important channels.  If the EVI remains significant and the controls are not significant, it indicates 
that the causal effect of the EVI on public indebtedness is not mediated mainly 
through them. 
 
- Hypothesis of Non-Linear relationship between EVI and total public debt  
We push our analysis further by conjecturing the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between the EVI and the overall public debt. The argument underlying this hypothesis is the 
following: based on the previous discussion of the possible channels through which the EVI 
can affect the overall public debt in developing countries, we can have two main expectations 
regarding the non-linearity of the EVI with respect to the public indebtedness: 
Expectation 1: we expect the public debt not to be affected or even to be reduced in 
the first stages of EVI increases (in the cases of fiscal adjustment or drawing on non-costly 
means of financing, or debt relief), but as the EVI becomes higher, these countries will have 
no choice but to resort to domestic and/or external debt, thereby increasing their public 
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indebtedness. As a result, we expect a positive sign of the variable ‘EVI square’ (or the square 
of its components) and a negative sign of the coefficients associated with ‘EVI’ or its 
components. These coefficients may also be statistically insignificant. 
Expectation 2: we also expect the public debt to rise in the first stages of the EVI 
increases (if the countries choose to borrow internally or abroad to accommodate the EVI 
increases) and then to decline for higher EVI because, for instance, of the debt relief granted 
by creditors to the country, or its use of non-costly financial resources or also its adoption of 
fiscal adjustment measures. Hence, the sign of ‘EVI’ or its components will be positive and 
that of its square or its components’ square will be negative. We may also obtain here a 
statistically insignificant coefficient of these variables. 
  
The fiscal balance: as mentioned above, we expect an improvement in the fiscal balance to 
reduce the overall public debt. If the EVI (or its components) effect translates through the 
fiscal balance, the impact of the latter on public debt will be statistically nil. However, we 
acknowledge that a statistically nil effect of fiscal balance may not necessarily be due to the 
presence of the EVI or its components in the model, but may also be explained by the effect 
of other control variables of the model that influence the fiscal balance (e.g. economic 
growth; the terms of trade; the quality of governance).    
 
The real GDP growth: we expect the indebtedness of a country to rise following losses in 
output; that is, lowering of real GDP growth (see also Barro, 1979). Accordingly, the real 
GDP growth is expected to be negatively related to the accumulation of public debt.  
 
The real effective exchange rate 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) indicates a country’s competitiveness. In our case, a 
rise in the REER means an appreciation and a decline means depreciation. The effect of the 
real effective exchange rate on the overall public debt of a country depends on its effect on the 
domestic and external debt.  
Regarding the domestic debt, on the supply side its issuance may be easier to countries when 
the currency is appreciating because the expected appreciation allows prudent policymakers to 
hide the implicit insurance premium embedded in domestic currency borrowing (Caballero 
and Cowan, 2006; Panizza et al., 2011). On the demand side, a real appreciated exchange rate 
is, at any given interest rate, likely to discourage the demand of domestic currency bonds as 
 163 
 
investors may foresee an ex-post appreciation of the foreign currency rate (a real depreciation 
of local currency; see also Panizza et al., 2011). Furthermore, in terms of valuation effects, a 
real effective exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) automatically induces a higher (lower) 
domestic indebtedness of the government.  
With respect to the external public debt, the effect of REER changes on its build-up is also 
ambiguous. In fact, a real exchange rate depreciation will lead to a declining of the external 
debt stock if the induced rise in export earnings of this depreciation is sufficiently enough to 
service the external debt; otherwise, the depreciation of the REER will result in a rise of 
external indebtedness (Craigwell et al., 2010; see also Ng’eno, 2000).   
Overall, we cannot conclude a priori about the effect of REER changes on the accumulation 
of the total public debt (domestic and external debt).  
 
The terms of trade 
An improvement in terms of trade (an increase in the relative price of exportables for a 
country) is likely to increase the export (foreign) revenues of the beneficiary country, reduce 
current expenditures and therefore improve the fiscal balance. Note that the reduction effect 
of public expenditures owe to the terms of trade improvement appears through a relative 
decline in the price of inputs (in the cases where imports represent an important share of 
expenditures - which is usually observed in many developing countries. Furthermore, such 
improvement in terms of trade, by increasing the economic growth may also reduce the need 
for social assistance from government and in fine, add to the reduction of current 
expenditures. Thus, an improvement in terms of trade is expected to be positively related to 
lower external and /or domestic borrowing.   
Conversely, a decline in terms of trade, by lowering revenue, increasing (substantially) public 
spending and thus worsening the fiscal balance, will likely result in higher total public debt. 
As a result, the likelihood of excessive debt will rise. The positive effect of such terms of 
trade deterioration on public expenditures translated through for example, the rise of social 
assistance needs, and the high demand by public enterprises of support from the government 
because they cannot adjust their pricing policies to changes in export and import prices. 
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The grants  
According to Cline (2003), since in low-income countries (LICs) the grants elements (foreign 
grants, which represent a substantial fraction of GDP) are available to pay some part (or all) 
of the interest due on debt, it is important to modify our previous debt sustainability condition 
by taking into account the amount of foreign grants as a fraction of GDP. This is why we 
include in our model specification the foreign grants as a percentage of GDP. We thus expect 
the grants to alleviate the burden of indebtedness of developing countries—that is, to exert a 
negative effect on public debt. But we can also hypothesise that the higher the grants are for a 
developing country, the lesser it will be inclined to correctly manage its public finances to 
avoid unsustainable debt situations. In such instances, the grants will exert a positive effect on 
the total public debt. 
 
The inflation rate 
The impact of inflation on the public debt depends on how the latter is distributed among 
domestic and foreign creditors. In the case of developing countries where (usually) a 
substantial part of the public debt is denominated in foreign currency, the inflation impacts 
directly the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio and indirectly the ratio of external debt to GDP 
through the real effective exchange rate.  
A rise in inflation erodes the real value of the domestic debt hold by creditors and the 
effective debt ratio, unless all domestic debt is indexed to prices or foreign currencies (though 
according to Panizza et al., 2011, in such cases inflation can debase indexed to prices if the 
government tinkers with the price index), a government can inflate away the domestic public 
debt by money creation, with the result of this inflating away of debt depending on the share 
of debt that is indexed to inflation. Panizza et al. (2011)41 also point out the exceptional case 
where inflation can lead to a rise of public debt: in the case of a country facing a real 
appreciation (that is, where inflation outweighs the currency depreciation) and where a large 
share of domestic debt is indexed to inflation, the valuation effects will create a positive link 
between inflation and domestic currency debt.  
 
                                                          
41
 These authors recognise, however, that such a situation is exceptional and argue it will likely be dominated by 
the case where inflation impacts negatively the domestic debt, in the absence of financial repression. 
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The Imports 
A developing country usually has a higher need for imports (in terms of inputs, equipment 
…etc) for its development. An increase in imports will deteriorate the trade balance and 
substantially reduce the ratio of reserves to imports (although the level of reserves depends on 
many factors of which the exchange rate regime). Hence, for a given level of international 
reserves, the likely result will be a declining of the national revenue and thereby an 
accumulation of public debt.      
Suppose now that this country incurs a substantial level of public debt. Unless it has 
accumulated sufficient foreign reserves to simultaneously repay its debt and finance its 
imports, it will likely be constrained to reduce its imports (for a given level of international 
reserves) because of its incapacity to secure additional loans on the domestic market (if the 
latter is sufficiently developed) and/or on the international markets (for many countries, via 
the bilateral donors or multilateral financial institutions),. Hence, as this variable may be 
endogenous with respect to the total public debt, due to the reverse causality among other 
factors, we consider its (the imports-to-GDP ratio) one-year lagged values in our model 
specification.    
 
The quality of governance 
We introduce this variable in the model because we think that it is not only a main 
determinant of public debt management, but it is also susceptible to influence the effect of 
EVI (Economic Vulnerability Index) on the public debt. In fact, we expect the better quality 
institutions (especially fiscal ones) to be associated with a lower public debt. In addition, there 
is a need for developing countries (especially small countries and Low Income Countries) that 
are structurally vulnerable to set up the adequate institutions that should promote 
competitiveness, build economic resilience and promote sustainable development (Farrugia, 
2007). More specifically, as almost all developing countries are open to international trade, 
they should need institutions that boost their competitiveness (state and private sector 
competitiveness). In other words, these institutions should help them create a conducive 
operational environment for businesses in order to enable them take advantage of the 
globalization process (Farrugia, 2007). Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2002) discuss why 
substantial economic instability may arise in societies with institutional problems. More 
particularly, they highlight among others that, in weak institutional societies, politicians may 
be forced to pursue unsustainable policies in order to satisfy various groups and remain in 
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power. These unsustainable policies will in turn generate greater economic volatility, the 
latter being captured through the EVI. The same authors also underscore that with weak 
institutions, entrepreneurs may choose sectors/activities from which they can withdraw their 
capital more quickly, thereby contributing to potential economic instability. The institutions 
in developing countries and particularly in small countries should therefore be as strong as 
possible to reflect the aspects of governance in their economic environment. Therefore we 
include in our model the variable ‘quality of governance’ and expect it to be negatively 
associated with the build-up of public debt. Note that as aforementioned, we transform this 
variable to avoid the simultaneity bias with respect to the total public debt. We consider the 
average value of the past three years (not counting the current year) for a given country and a 
given year, (see Larvigne, 2011).  
 
4.3 The econometric technique 
As the time and cross-sectional dimensions of our panel data are important (T = 29 and N = 
74), there will likely be serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
in residuals of the model. Therefore we perform three statistics tests where the null 
hypotheses are respectively: the absence of autocorrelation test (Wooldridge AR[1] test); the 
homoscedasticity test and the absence of cross-sectional dependence42 test (unfortunately, 
because of the unbalanced and short nature of our samples, we are not able to implement any 
of the available tests for cross-sectional dependence; Hoyos and Sarafides, 2006). The results 
allow us to conclude for the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals. To address these concerns, we use the fixed effects technique with the Driscoll and 
Kraay’s43 (1998) standard errors. In fact, in addition to their heteroscedasticity consistence, 
Driscoll-Kraay’s standard errors estimates are both robust to within- and between-group44 
dependence (robust to very general forms of spatial and temporal dependence in the residuals 
when the time dimension of the panel is large45). The spatial correlation may in practice result 
                                                          
42
 The erroneous ignorance of spatial correlation in panel data estimation severely biased the estimates. 
43
 We perform our regressions using the stata’s command ‘xtscc’ implemented by (Hoechle, 2007) to obtain 
Driscoll and Kraay’s covariance matrix. 
44
 The robustness of Driscoll-Kraay’s standard errors are certainly based on asymptotic theory, but their values 
have been demonstrated in panels down to T = 5 (Hoechle, 2007). 
45
 Driscoll and Kraay’s robust standard errors underperform White’s robust standard errors in the absence of 
between-group dependence while outperforming in its presence (Hoechle, 2007). 
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from unobserved common shocks to the total public debt that is not captured either by the 
time dummies or by the other determinants of the public debt.  
Another econometric technique that could allow us to perform our regressions using fixed 
effects while dealing with serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation in the residuals is the panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) developed by Beck 
and Katz (1995). However, for the reason mentioned above (the unbalanced and shortness 
nature of our sample and sub-samples), we cannot use this technique. Finally, we rely solely 
on the fixed effects technique where standard errors are computed using the Driscoll-Kraay 
(1998) technique.     
    
5. The empirical results 
In this section, we discuss the results obtained from the regressions by either employing fixed 
effects with cluster-robust standard errors (Table 2 and Table 5) or fixed effects where the 
standard errors are corrected with Driscoll-Kraay’s (1998) technique (Table 3 and Table 4).  
 
5.1 An empirical analysis of the channels through which the EVI affects the total 
public debt 
In this sub-section, we do not interpret the model estimations’ results per se, but rather we 
discuss whether there is a direct significant impact of the variable “EVI” on the different 
control variables. To explore the existence of this direct significant impact, we perform a set 
of tests. Hence, we proceed as follows: we consider as a dependent variable each of the 
control variables introduced in the model (both the ones with one-year lagged values 
introduced because of the likely simultaneity bias and the ones that are not lagged) that we 
regress on the "EVI" variable. As we could not
 
regress the lagged explanatory variables on 
EVIt, but rather on EVIt,1, we need to ensure that EVIt  EVIt-1. To do so, we perform a 
stationarity test on the variable EVIt. If the EVI is judged to contain unit root (that is, it is not 
stationary), then we can write that EVIt  EVIt-1. The results of the stationarity test suggest 
that the EVI is not stationary, that is, it contains unit root (the p-value associated with the 
Fisher test for panel unit root where the null hypothesis is that the “variable “EVI” contains 
unit root” is 0.99). As a consequence, we can write EVIt  EVIt-1.  
Given this previous result, we now perform our analysis of the existence of a direct impact of 
EVI on the other control variables, depending on whether the latter are lagged or not. The 
results are displayed in Table 2 below. Consider first the results obtained for the entire sample 
 168 
 
of developing countries. We can observe from this table that the EVI affects significantly only 
the “grants-to-GDP ratio” and the “quality of governance” variables (though at 10% level of 
significance). The effects of the EVI on the other variables are statistically insignificant. We 
therefore conclude that the EVI exerts a direct effect only on these two variables. From 
columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 (see below), we observe that the significance of the EVI’s effect 
on the public debt-to-GDP ratio remains robust to the inclusion of the controls, though the 
coefficient of the EVI declines slightly between column [1] (that is, the model with only the 
EVI variable as regressor) and column [2] (the model with the EVI and all the controls). The 
significance of the EVI’s components in column [3] confirms the previous results obtained for 
the EVI variable. The combination of these results with those of the developing countries in 
Table 2 leads us to conclude that there is at least a part of the EVI that exerts an independent 
effect on the build-up of public debt in developing countries, irrespective of the controls 
effects. Given the slight weakening of the EVI’s coefficient (from column [1] to column [2]), 
we can conclude that the EVI’s effect passes through certain control variables, namely the 
grants-to-GDP ratio and the quality of governance. We also observe evidence from column 
[3] of Table 3 that the significance of the EVI’s effect on the total public debt of developing 
countries is driven by both “exposure” and “shocks” factors in these countries.  
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Table 2: The effects of Economic Vulnerability on each control variable over the full sample of developing countries as well as the sub-samples.   
  Dependent Variables 
 Explanatory Variables Fiscal_balancet-1 Gdpgrowtht-1 Termstrade Reert-1 Grantsgdpt-1 Inflationt-1 Importsgdpt-1 Qog 
          
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
Evi [or Evit-1] -0.0566 0.0871 0.570 22.81 0.194** 6.952 -0.157 -0.00256* 
 (0.0468) (0.0636) (0.345) (22.73) (0.0884) (4.332) (0.107) (0.00149) 
Constant 8.228*** 0.198 88.34*** -734.2 -1.659 -214.7 45.84*** 0.535*** 
 (1.843) (2.553) (13.33) (915.4) (3.566) (173.9) (4.290) (0.0555) 
Observations - Countries 2,122-97 2,515-97 2,272-97 2,509-97 2,527-97 2,514-97 2,510-97 1,747-74 
Within R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.006 0.018 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
    
    
LI
C
s 
(L
o
w
-
In
co
m
e 
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s) 
Evi [or Evit-1] -0.0437 0.144 0.448 0.453 0.384** 0.270 -0.0961 -0.00373* 
 (0.0629) (0.136) (0.613) (1.006) (0.165) (4.547) (0.201) (0.00212) 
Constant 3.963 -2.888 97.73*** 110.7** -4.550 52.60 38.69*** 0.531*** 
 (2.683) (5.857) (26.19) (43.52) (7.139) (196.3) (8.650) (0.0880) 
Observations - Countries 790-34 852-34 814-34 868-34 862-34 851-34 841-34 560-24 
Within R-squared 0.002 0.012 0.005 0.0004 0.049 0.000 0.002 0.052 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
       
 
LM
IC
s 
(L
o
w
er
-
M
id
dl
e 
In
co
m
e 
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s) 
Evi [or Evit-1] -0.105 0.0135 0.732 82.19 0.0895 16.06 -0.250 -0.00364 
 (0.0975) (0.0600) (0.436) (75.25) (0.0733) (11.59) (0.178) (0.00255) 
Constant 10.68*** 3.496 79.16*** -2,814 0.927 -534.1 52.08*** 0.566*** 
 (3.659) (2.268) (15.75) (2,856) (2.784) (437.9) (6.767) (0.0900) 
Observations - Countries 758-34 893-34 805-34 872-34 909-34 893-34 906-34 669-28 
Within R-squared 0.009 0.0002 0.016 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.026 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
    
    
U
M
IC
s 
(U
pp
er
 
M
id
dl
e 
In
co
m
e 
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s) 
Evi [or Evit-1] 0.00167 0.0844* 0.585 -1.145 0.0177 6.625 -0.135 0.000742 
 (0.0911) (0.0465) (0.618) (0.782) (0.0190) (4.470) (0.160) (0.00259) 
Constant 10.35*** 0.386 86.64*** 153.2*** 0.925 -206.8 46.80*** 0.484*** 
 (3.402) (1.838) (22.69) (30.92) (0.755) (176.6) (6.293) (0.0909) 
Observations - Countries 574-29 770-29 653-29 769-29 756-29 770-29 763-29 518-22 
Within R-squared 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.002 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
    
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. We use as estimator, the fixed effects where the “robust” and “cluster” options are used to correct respectively for heteroscedasticity of 
residuals due respectively to correlation of residual within countries and between countries (clusters). 
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Table3: The effects of Economic Vulnerability on Public Debt – the full sample of Developing Countries - Fixed Effects Driscoll-Kraay estimator (FEDK).  
 Dependent Variable: Total Public Debt in percentage of GDP 
Explanatory Variables Developing Countries LICs LMICs UMICs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evi 1.406*** 0.840***  1.734*** 0.530  1.987 1.670  -0.704 0.970**  
 (0.354) (0.172)  (0.530) (0.334)  (1.268) (1.440)  (0.469) (0.414)  
Exposure   1.689***   1.786**   -1.428   1.398* 
   (0.566)   (0.649)   (1.561)   (0.792) 
Shock   0.349***   0.159   0.959   0.423* 
   (0.0930)   (0.148)   (0.708)   (0.207) 
Fiscal_balancet-1  -0.260 -0.314  -0.188 -0.232  -1.476*** -1.410***  0.433 0.398 
  (0.248) (0.241)  (0.569) (0.580)  (0.361) (0.372)  (0.366) (0.355) 
Gdpgrowtht-1  -1.083*** -1.011***  -1.230*** -1.121***  -1.651*** -1.815***  -0.801 -0.805 
  (0.142) (0.147)  (0.227) (0.226)  (0.555) (0.593)  (0.475) (0.473) 
Termstrade  -0.176** -0.190***  -0.116* -0.141**  -0.184 -0.170  -0.194 -0.195 
  (0.0637) (0.0635)  (0.0609) (0.0581)  (0.167) (0.164)  (0.129) (0.131) 
Reert-1  0.0195 0.0195  -0.140*** -0.140***  0.0149 0.0128  0.147* 0.138* 
  (0.0266) (0.0271)  (0.0414) (0.0422)  (0.0198) (0.0193)  (0.0755) (0.0721) 
Grantsgdpt-1  -0.251 -0.218  -0.533* -0.489*  0.976 1.061  5.323*** 4.660*** 
  (0.477) (0.471)  (0.278) (0.274)  (1.344) (1.274)  (1.279) (1.402) 
Inflationt-1  0.00181 0.00165  1.47e-05 -0.000232  0.00632** 0.00665**  -0.00326* -0.00292* 
  (0.00127) (0.00129)  (0.000885) (0.000835)  (0.00268) (0.00258)  (0.00169) (0.00159) 
Importgdpt-1  0.489*** 0.513***  0.801*** 0.808***  0.674*** 0.616***  -0.297 -0.278 
  (0.117) (0.113)  (0.276) (0.279)  (0.209) (0.168)  (0.239) (0.228) 
Qog  -18.65** -17.99*  -9.545 -6.376  -19.01 -18.26  -41.89** -44.43** 
  (8.788) (9.478)  (21.40) (21.89)  (28.97) (29.23)  (19.65) (19.59) 
Constant -  21.01 -36.51* - - -13.62 - - 66.80*** - - 
 -  (23.26) (20.85) - - (49.65) - - (19.57) - - 
Observations – Countries 2,436-96 1,334-74 1,334-74 801-33 455-24 455-24 886-34 497-28 497-28 749-30 382-22 382-22 
Within R-squared 0.0945 0.2231 0.2277 0.3467 0.4276 0.4353 0.0968 0.3607 0.3680 0.1233 0.2586 0.2625 
Significance of Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance of Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Standard Errors (corrected with Driscoll-Kraay technique) are in parenthesis. The sign “–“ in the table means that the 
constant is omitted by the regression. 
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Consider now the sub-sample of Low-Income Countries (LICs). The results reported in Table 
2 suggest evidence that the EVI affects significantly the same variables as in the case of 
developing countries: the “grants-to-GDP ratio” and the “quality of governance”. In the 
meantime, the results in columns [4] and [5] of Table 3 suggest that the coefficient of the EVI 
turns from significant (column [4]) to insignificant (column [5]). Therefore, we can conclude 
that the EVI exerts a significant indirect effect on the accumulation of the public debt through 
the variables “grants-to-GDP ratio” and “quality of governance”. An interpretation of these 
results could be the following: all other things being equal, EVI reduces the quality of 
governance because repeated experiences of structural shocks by LICs (and/or increasing 
these countries’ exposure to shocks) will reduce their capacity to develop appropriate policy 
and institutional responses to further shocks. As a result, these countries will likely 
accumulate their public indebtedness to cope with such shocks. In addition, LICs facing 
higher structural vulnerability could obtain from the international community a high level of 
grants-to-GDP ratio which in turn could likely reduce its inclination to maintain fiscal 
discipline. As a result, the government will increase its public indebtedness. 
The results in column [6] of Table 3 suggest that the exposure of LICs to shocks influences 
significantly their build-up of public debt, irrespective of the effect of the other control 
variables, whereas the shocks affecting these countries do not.  
Let us now turn to Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs). In Table 2, we observe 
evidence that the EVI affects significantly none of the controls, whereas in columns [7] and 
[8] of Table 3, the EVI’s coefficient remains always insignificant. We conclude that the EVI 
exerts no significant effect on the accumulation of public debt in these countries. This 
conclusion remains valid for the EVI’s components (see column [9] of Table 3).  
For the last sub-sample, that is, the Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs), evidence is 
shown in Table 2 that the EVI exerts a significant effect only on the real GDP growth, though 
at 10% level of significance. At the same time, we obtain evidence from columns [10] and 
[11] of Table 3 that the EVI’s coefficient turns from non-significant to significant. The 
combination of these different results allows us to draw the conclusion that the EVI exerts an 
independent effect on the public indebtedness of these countries, irrespective of the controls 
effects. In column [12] of Table 3, the results suggest that this significant effect of the EVI is 
driven by both “exposure to shocks” and “shocks” themselves in UMICs.    
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5.2 Interpretation of the results 
In this sub-section, we interpret the results reported in Tables 3 to 5. These results are related 
to the full sample of developing countries as well as the sub-samples of LICs, LMICs and 
UMICs. In the previous section, we have only discussed whether the EVI exerts a direct or 
indirect effect on the total public debt of developing countries (and the three sub-samples), as 
well as the channels through which such an effect is materialized. Table 3 (see columns [2] 
and [3], [5] and [6], [8] and [9] and, [11] and [12]) reports the results associated with the 
EVI/or its components and the control variables of the model. We interpret in detail the 
results associated with the EVI/or its components and the control variables of the model. 
Table 4 presents the results associated with the EVI/and its components, the EVI’s square 
values/and the square values of its components, as well as the control variables. Table 5 
reports the results stemming from splitting the time period 1980-2008 into 10-year intervals 
(1980-1989; 1990-1999; and 2000-2008) with a view to verifying how the parameters evolve 
over the decades. It is worth noting that the results from the regressions on the panel time 
series over the whole period could be different from the ones carried out on the panel over 
decades. In fact these results are often different and there is no reason for them to be the same 
because the methods used to control for common shocks are different. As mentioned in the 
section 4.1, time-specific dummies are included in the model of panel time series over the 
whole period to account for the common shocks that affect all countries, whereas in the model 
over decades, the average of data over decades is expected to smooth or even eliminate the 
effect of these common shocks.        
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Table 4: The effects of Structural Economic Vulnerability on Public Debt over the full period 1980-2008 – Fixed Effects Driscoll-Kraay estimator (FEDK). 
 Dependent Variable: Total Public Debt in percentage of GDP 
Explanatory Variables Developing Countries LICs LMICs UMICs 
 FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK FE-DK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Evi -5.197**  -1.160  -10.87**  -5.812***  
 (2.245)  (1.794)  (4.045)  (1.249)  
Evisq 0.0710**  0.0194  0.144***  0.0832***  
 (0.0259)  (0.0187)  (0.0465)  (0.0184)  
Exposure  -2.716  -3.683  -10.09*  -2.749* 
  (1.638)  (4.493)  (4.959)  (1.591) 
Exposuresq  0.0452**  0.0707  0.0920**  0.0214 
  (0.0192)  (0.0503)  (0.0329)  (0.0185) 
Shock  -2.446**  -0.122  -4.787**  -2.962*** 
  (1.010)  (0.651)  (2.056)  (0.960) 
Shocksq  0.0231**  0.0200***  0.0283  -0.000110 
  (0.00940)  (0.00547)  (0.0241)  (0.00916) 
Exposureshock  0.0199  -0.0285**  0.0726  0.0865*** 
  (0.0161)  (0.0103)  (0.0463)  (0.0253) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 -0.102 -0.166 -0.190 -0.254 -1.100*** -0.846** 0.685* 0.606* 
 (0.208) (0.229) (0.561) (0.523) (0.367) (0.374) (0.359) (0.326) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -1.096*** -0.993*** -1.230*** -1.072*** -1.722*** -1.778*** -0.893* -0.871* 
 (0.142) (0.130) (0.224) (0.239) (0.519) (0.502) (0.463) (0.437) 
Termstrade
 
-0.181*** -0.196*** -0.121** -0.164*** -0.129 -0.115 -0.195 -0.167 
 (0.0562) (0.0535) (0.0582) (0.0584) (0.148) (0.132) (0.121) (0.135) 
Reert-1 0.0113 0.0104 -0.139*** -0.122*** 0.00408 0.00903 0.140* 0.162** 
 (0.0275) (0.0284) (0.0417) (0.0412) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0705) (0.0770) 
Grantsgdpt-1 -0.150 -0.101 -0.500* -0.434** 1.239 1.374 3.580** 4.155* 
 (0.431) (0.408) (0.275) (0.202) (1.022) (1.242) (1.338) (2.125) 
Inflationt-1 0.00178 0.00160 4.91e-05 0.000226 0.00444** 0.00374** -0.00358** -0.00259 
 (0.00118) (0.00112) (0.000892) (0.000786) (0.00176) (0.00179) (0.00172) (0.00170) 
Importsgdpt-1 0.443*** 0.461*** 0.809*** 0.815*** 0.557** 0.604*** -0.426 -0.370 
 (0.123) (0.120) (0.280) (0.228) (0.217) (0.191) (0.257) (0.225) 
Qog -19.06* -21.33* -9.107 -2.335 -26.60 -26.51 -44.69** -36.94** 
 (9.233) (10.87) (21.19) (23.47) (24.12) (24.43) (20.14) (17.25) 
Constant 193.0*** 159.4*** - - - - - - 
 (49.24) (53.55) - - - - - - 
Observations - Countries 1,334-74 1,334-74 455-24 455-24 497-28 497-28 382-22 382-22 
Within R-squared 0.2442 0.2566 0.4292 0.4581 0.4184 0.4229 0.3013 0.3499 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance of Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Standard Errors clustered by country to correct for heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The sign “–“ in the table means that the constant is 
omitted by the regression. 
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Table 5: The effects of Structural Economic Vulnerability on Public Debt –Fixed Effects with clustered Standard errors - NB: We consider sub-
periods of decades: 1980-1989; 1990-1999 and 2000-2008. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Total Public Debt in percentage of GDP 
 Explanatory Variables Developing Countries LICs LMICs UMICs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Evi 1.729 -12.43*** 3.266* -15.12*** -1.039 -4.548 -0.117 -5.919** 
 (1.098) (3.820) (1.743) (5.318) (1.546) (3.620) (1.033) (2.343) 
Evisq  0.174***  0.216***  0.0496  0.0750** 
  (0.0518)  (0.0703)  (0.0580)  (0.0289) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.128 1.229 3.283 3.753** 0.771 0.813 0.958 0.927 
 (0.919) (0.831) (1.992) (1.740) (0.547) (0.518) (0.817) (0.815) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -2.360 -2.014 0.408 -0.565 -7.257*** -7.136*** -5.197** -4.703** 
 (2.038) (1.955) (5.170) (4.726) (2.124) (2.094) (1.984) (2.050) 
Termstrade
 
-0.0924 -0.0773 0.241 0.382 -0.364** -0.371** -0.201 -0.182 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.393) (0.338) (0.164) (0.164) (0.136) (0.134) 
Reert-1 0.0735 0.0197 -0.100 -0.135** 0.538*** 0.503*** 0.383* 0.399* 
 (0.134) (0.112) (0.0611) (0.0626) (0.0729) (0.100) (0.203) (0.197) 
Grantsgdpt-1 4.476** 3.520** 2.874 1.655 1.148 1.266 10.07*** 10.97*** 
 (1.765) (1.446) (1.822) (1.845) (3.065) (2.956) (2.862) (2.569) 
Inflationt-1 0.0369** 0.0343** 0.0321* 0.0287** 0.0281 0.0256 -0.0287** -0.0269* 
 (0.0158) (0.0136) (0.0170) (0.0135) (0.0209) (0.0190) (0.0132) (0.0133) 
Importsgdpt-1 -0.257 -0.814 -0.978 -1.207 -0.843 -0.889 -0.951* -1.259** 
 (0.504) (0.517) (0.786) (1.037) (0.594) (0.558) (0.519) (0.523) 
Qog 47.86 46.71 65.82 51.48 -8.143 -4.939 -100.7* -102.7* 
 (33.17) (29.10) (82.10) (40.81) (48.41) (49.40) (57.52) (55.31) 
Constant -21.68 269.1*** -87.75 297.1** 147.0*** 207.5*** 122.5*** 228.8*** 
 (67.62) (62.30) (129.0) (113.7) (52.10) (55.73) (34.56) (47.50) 
         
Observations - Countries 176-74 176-74 55-24 55-24 64-28 64-28 51-22 51-22 
Within R-squared 0.379 0.474 0.571 0.676 0.867 0.870 0.374 0.433 
Significance of Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Standard Errors (corrected with Driscoll-Kraay technique) are in parenthesis. The sign “–“ in the table means that the 
constant is omitted by the regression. 
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Let us start with Table 3 where only the EVI or its components are included in the model, in 
addition to the control variables (see columns [2] and [3], [5] and [6], [8] and [9] and [11] and 
[12] of Table 3). Note that for our sample and each of our sub-samples, the results show 
evidence that replacing the EVI by its components (“Exposure” and “shocks”) does not 
change neither the statistical significance nor the direction of the coefficients of control 
variables. 
For developing countries as the full sample, we obtain that the structural economic 
vulnerability increases significantly the total public debt-to-GDP ratio. This positive effect is 
particularly explained by higher exposure to shocks and higher shocks in these countries. In 
addition, the real GDP growth, the terms of trade, and the imports-to-GDP ratio exhibit the 
expected effect on the total public debt; the other controls exert no effect on the public 
indebtedness of these countries. 
For LICs, whereas evidence is shown that the composite index of structural economic 
vulnerability (EVI) does not affect significantly the public indebtedness of these countries, we 
also find -when turning to the EVI’s components-, that the greater the exposure of these 
countries, the greater their build-up of total public debt. Regarding the controls, a rise in real 
GDP growth, an improvement in terms of trade, a depreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate, as well as an increase in the grants-to-GDP ratio appear to affect significantly and 
negatively the total public debt. As expected, a rise in the imports-to-GDP ratio induces 
public debt accumulation. The other control variables are insignificantly related to the build-
up of public debt in these countries. However, these results obtained for LICs appear to 
contrast with the Bretton Woods institutions’ approach of debt sustainability in LICs where 
institutions are key determinants of LICs’ public debt sustainability46.    
The accumulation of public debt in LMICs is driven neither by the EVI nor by any one of its 
components, but rather only by a deterioration of the fiscal balance, a decline in real GDP 
growth rate, high inflation and an increase in imports (in percent of GDP).   
Finally, in UMICs, the structural economic vulnerability increases significantly the 
accumulation of public debt, a result which is confirmed when turning to the EVI’s 
components. With regard to controls, the decline of public debt is only the fact of a 
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, a decline of the grants-to-GDP ratio, a rise of 
inflation and a good quality of governance.   
                                                          
46
 The coefficient of the variable « quality of governance » is not statistically significant. 
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Let us examine the results reported in Table 4. At the outset, we would like to mention that 
for the full sample as well as for the sub-samples, the significance of the controls almost 
always remains the same, irrespective of whether we consider the model with the EVI 
variable or the one with its components. In addition, in Table 5, the coefficients of the 
controls in each pair of columns almost always exhibit the same significance. 
Consider first our full sample of developing countries.  
The results in column [1] of Table 4 suggest, all other things being equal, evidence of a non-
linear relationship (in the form of a ‘U’ curve) between the EVI and the total public debt: on 
average, as the EVI increases, the total public debt decreases, but beyond the threshold EVI 
value of approximately 37 an additional rise in the EVI is associated with an accumulation of 
public debt. In fact, as we have already discussed in section 4.2, this result can find its 
interpretation in expectation 1, that is, until an average threshold of 37 for the EVI is reached, 
these countries resort to either fiscal adjustments, temporary debt relief obtained from 
multilateral institutions or bilateral creditors, or the use of their non-costly financial means 
(either privatisation proceeds, or seigniorage, or the sale of public assets or public investments 
proceeds) to cope with such structural vulnerability. However, beyond this threshold, 
countries do not have any other options than borrowing either abroad (inducing an increase in 
external debt) or domestically (thus raising the domestic debt), which leads to a higher total 
public debt. Turning to column [2] of Table 4, we obtain a non-linear relationship between the 
EVI’s components and their square values, and the total public debt. Indeed, a rise in 
exposure of these countries to external shocks appears to increase permanently their 
indebtedness, whereas the shocks variable exhibits a U-shaped relationship with respect to 
public debt (the turning point is 52.9).   
 Regarding the other control variables, we observe from columns [1] and [2] of Table 4 that 
strong economic growth, an improvement in terms of trade and a decline in the imports-to-
GDP ratio are associated with a fall in the total public debt-to-GDP ratio; the other control 
variables do not affect significantly the accumulation of public debt.  
Turning to Table 5, evidence is shown (which confirms our previous results) that over the 
decades, there is a non-linear relationship, in the form of a “U” curve, between the EVI and 
the public indebtedness of developing countries.   
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Consider now the three sub-samples.  
For LICs, the results are more interesting when we introduce either both the EVI and its 
square values or its components and their square values into the model: neither the squared 
EVI variable nor the EVI variable itself exerts a significant effect on the total public debt, 
suggesting the absence of a non-linear relationship between the composite index EVI and the 
public debt for LICs (column [3] of Table 5). When turning to column [4] of Table 5, we 
obtain that the non-significance effect of the EVI on the total public debt hides other results if 
we consider the EVI’s components: the coefficients of the variable “shock square” and the 
variable “exposureshock” -which captures the interaction between the variables “shock” and 
“exposure” - are respectively significantly positive and negative. This is suggestive of the fact 
that the size of shocks and that of the exposure to shocks are non-linearly related to the 
accumulation of public debt by these countries. This is because in column [4] of Table 5, the 
results show that the final effect of both “exposure to shocks” and “shocks” on the build-up of 
public debt depends on the sizes of both of these two variables. Note that the variables 
“shock”, “exposure” and “exposure square” are non-significantly related to the total public 
debt of LICs.      
The results in column [3] of Table 5 lead us to conclude that the EVI is positively and 
significantly (though at only 10% level of significance) associated with the public debt 
accumulation in LICs over decades. In contrast with the absence of a non-linear relationship 
between the EVI and the build-up of public debt found above for LICs, we find evidence in 
column [4] of Table 5 that over decades the EVI is non-linearly (U-shaped relationship) 
associated with the accumulation of public debt in LICs, with the turning point of the EVI 
being approximately 35. As aforementioned, this peculiar result is not in fact surprising 
because of the different methods used to control for the common shocks that affect the 
countries of our sample and our different sub-samples.   
The findings are different for the sub-samples of both LMICs and UMICs. Indeed, the results 
(columns [5] to [8] of Table 4) suggest a non-linear relationship in the form of a U curve 
between the EVI and the total public debt. The threshold of the EVI calculated for LMICs is 
37.74, while that of UMICs is 34.92.  
Analysis of the association between the EVI’s components and the build-up of public debt in 
LMICs and UMICs (see columns [6] and [8]) suggests the following: 
- For LMICs, there exists a U-shaped curve between the “exposure” variable and the 
public debt (with a turning point of 54.84) but not between public debt and the 
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“shock” variable, where the latter is linearly associated with the dependent variable 
(the greater the shocks that affect these countries, the lower the accumulation of their 
public debt).  
- For UMICs, we also observe a non-linear relationship between the EVI’s components 
and the total public debt: the impact on the total public debt of the size of the exposure 
to shocks depends on the size of the shocks and vice-versa, thus leading a priori to an 
uncertainty of the sign of the overall effect. The non-linear relationship previously 
highlighted between the EVI and the public debt for these countries is dictated not by 
the square values of the variables “exposure” and “shock”, but by the linear terms of 
these two variables as well as the interaction between them: the coefficients associated 
with the variable “exposure” and “shock” are significant and negative, whilst the 
coefficient of the variable “exposureshock” is positive and statistically significant.  
For each of these sub-samples, the regressors that appear to be significant are the same in 
columns [5] and [6] of Table 4 for LMICs and in columns [7] and [8] for UMICs. In fact, for 
LMICs, the reduction of public debt accumulation is associated (as expected) with an 
improvement of the fiscal balance, a higher level of economic growth, a rise in inflation and 
unexpectedly, a rise in imports. This unexpected result obtained for the variable imports-to-
GDP ratio may be explained by the fact that these countries' imports, by contributing to a 
positive economic growth (see for e.g., Frankel and Romer, 1999; Humpage, 2000) reduces 
the build-up of public debt. With respect to UMICs, the build-up of public debt appears to be 
explained by an improvement of the fiscal balance, a fall in real GDP growth (although the 
two latter results are significant at only 10%), an appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate, a rise in the grants-to-GDP ratio and a deterioration in the quality of governance.   
The analysis of the behaviour of the EVI with respect to the total public debt for these two 
sub-samples over decades (columns [5] to [8] of Table 5) suggests the following: 
- For LMICs, the absence of a long run average effect of the EVI on the total public 
debt found in column [8] of Table 3 is confirmed here (see column [5] of Table 5). 
Furthermore, contrary to our previous findings (see column [5] of Table 4), we do not 
obtain evidences of the existence over decades of a non-linear relationship between 
the total public debt and the EVI. In other words, the non-linear relationship between 
the EVI and the total public debt is only valid for the analysis carried out in time series 
over the whole period of study, but not over individual decades. The explanation of 
this result is once again rooted on the reasons provided above. 
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- For UMICs, there is no effect of the EVI on the build-up of public debt over decades 
(see column [7] of Table 5) when we introduce the EVI variable but not its square in 
our model. This finding (for the analysis performed over decades) contrasts with the 
one obtained in column [11] of Table 3. However, evidence (when we introduce both 
the EVI and its square in the model) of a non-linear relationship in the form of a U 
curve between the EVI and the total public debt is obtained over decades (see column 
[8] of Table 5). This validates our previous findings in column [7] of Table 4. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
In this study we explore how the structural vulnerability in developing countries influences 
their indebtedness. To do so, we use the (structural) economic vulnerability index (EVI) 
jointly computed by Guillaumont et al. (2011) and the UN-DESA and focus on a panel of 97 
developing countries over the period 1980–2008. In addition to the full sample of the 97 
developing countries, we also consider three sub-samples (according the World Bank’s 
classification): LICs; LMICs and UMICs. To perform our regression, we employ the fixed 
effects with Driscoll-Kraay’s (1998) technique to correct standard errors for spatial and 
temporal dependence.  
After controlling for several potential covariates, we obtain the following results regarding the 
EVI’s effects on total public debt: 
- With regard to the full sample of developing countries, EVI affects positively the 
build-up of public debt, but this positive effect appears after a threshold of the EVI. In 
other words, we observe the existence of a non-linear relationship (in the form of a U 
curve) between the EVI and public indebtedness in developing countries. The same 
findings apply when we use EVI’s components rather than EVI itself. This result of 
EVI is confirmed when the analysis is performed over decades.  
- For LICs, the analysis performed on time series over the entire period shows neither a 
significant effect of EVI on the total public debt, nor a nonlinear relationship between 
EVI and the total public debt. However, over decades, we find evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship in the form of U curve between EVI and the total public debt. When 
turning to EVI’s components, we observe that: 
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 the insignificant effect obtained of the EVI on the build-up of the public 
debt hides the fact that LICs’ exposure to shocks affects positively and 
significantly their accumulation of total public debt.   the size of shocks and that of the exposure to shocks in LICs are non-
linearly related to the accumulation of public debt by these countries and, 
their impact on the public debt depends on the size of each of these EVI’s 
components. 
- Regarding both sub-samples of LMICs and UMICs, the results are suggestive of a 
non-linear relationship in the form of a ‘U’ curve between EVI and the total public debt. 
When the model is estimated over decades, such results are confirmed only for UMICs, but 
not for LMICs where there is no nonlinear relationship between EVI and the public 
indebtedness. Considering EVI’s components, while we obtain a non-linear relationship 
between EVI’s components and the total public debt for UMICs, such relationship is observed 
only for the ‘exposure’ variable in the case of LMICs.  
These results suggest that, as for economic growth and other macroeconomic indicators, 
structural vulnerability also matters seriously for indebtedness in developing countries, 
particularly in LICs where the effect appears to be very strong. Given the development 
challenges faced by developing countries and particularly LICs, the repeated experience of 
structural shocks will likely reduce their ability to develop appropriate policy and institutional 
responses to further shocks. Accordingly, there is a need for the international community and 
particularly the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund – IMF - and the 
World Bank) to take into account the structural vulnerability of developing countries 
(especially LICs) in designing appropriate development policies, especially those related to 
debt sustainability. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 1: The List of samples and sub-samples 
The Sample of Developing Countries: List of the 97 Developing Countries used in this study 
according to the World Bank Classification 
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Republic of Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
The Sub-sample of Low-Income Countries (LICs): List of the 33 LICs used in this study according 
to the World Bank Classification 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Lao 
PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
The Sub-sample of Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs): List of the 35 LMICs in this study 
according to the World Bank Classification 
Angola, Belize, Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Lesotho, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Republic of 
Vanuatu. 
The Sub-sample of Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs): List of the 29 UMICs used in this 
study according to the World Bank Classification 
Algeria, Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Fiji, Gabon, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Oman, Panama, Peru, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, Suriname, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
  
182 
 
CHAPTER IV47: Structural vulnerability and excessive public indebtedness in 
CFA Franc Zone Countries 
 
Abstract 
This chapter relies on the ‘institutional debt rule’ implemented in Franc Zone countries to 
assess whether the structural vulnerability of these countries matter for their probability to 
enter into excessive indebtedness. This structural vulnerability is measured by retrospective 
‘Economic Vulnerability Index’ (EVI) recently computed jointly by the United Nations and 
Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011). We observe evidence that the impact of ‘EVI’ is non-linear 
with respect to the probability of these countries to engage into excessive indebtedness and 
that, this effect appears to be the same for the two monetary areas belonging to the CFA Franc 
Zone countries: a rise of EVI induces a higher probability of excessive debt and for higher 
EVI, this probability declines. Consequently, international development institutions such as 
the Bretton Woods should take into account such vulnerability in their assessment of the 
adequate development policies and recommendations to these countries. 
 
Keywords: Structural Vulnerability; Public debt; unconditional logit model; linear probability 
model. 
JEL Classification: E60; H63; O10 ; C33 ; C35. 
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 This Chapter has been published in the Review "Economic Modelling", (35) 816–832, September 2013. 
.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of conducting fiscal policy in a monetary union is longstanding. Fiscal discipline 
and fiscal restructuring in a monetary area have been the subjects of many theoretical and 
empirical studies in the developed world, particularly in the European Union. For example, 
many studies have been conducted on the determinants of excessive deficits in the euro area 
(e.g. Bayar, 2001; Bayar and Smeets, 2009; Castro, 2007; Tiryaki, 2008; Huges-Hallet and 
Lewis, 2004, 2005). However, to our knowledge, such topics have been scarcely explored in 
the context of African monetary unions such as the CFA48 Franc Zone. This study aims to fill 
this gap. 
The CFA Franc Zone was created in 1945 during the Bretton Woods agreement and it 
currently comprises 14 Sub-Saharan African countries that belong to two separate monetary 
areas: WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) and Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS). These countries are also classified as the most vulnerable 
developing countries to natural and external shocks (see Guillaumont, 2009, 2011). 
The present chapter investigates whether this vulnerability of CFA Franc Zone countries 
matters for their public indebtedness. In other words, we rely on the budgetary institutional 
criteria (especially related to debt) set up in 1999 by WAEMU member countries and adopted 
by the end of 2001 by ECCAS members to explore whether the structural vulnerability of 
these countries matters for their excessive debt. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the institutional arrangements of the CFA Franc Zone’s monetary unions. Section 
3 summarises the state of the literature on the definition and measurement of the concept of 
‘economic vulnerability’ in order to derive our vulnerability index. Section 4 is devoted to 
some data analysis. Section 5 reviews the literature on debt sustainability, - since the setup of 
the institutional debt rule within the CFA Franc Zone aims at helping countries maintain a 
sustainable path of their public debt -, and sets the stage for the model used. Section 6, based 
on Section 5, describes the empirical model and discusses the expected signs of the variables 
and the econometrics technique. Section 7 presents the empirical results and Section 8 
concludes. 
                                                          
48
 CFA was defined as ‘Communauté Française d’Afrique’, but is now known as ‘Franc de la Communauté 
Financière d’Afrique’ for WAEMU area and ‘Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale’ for ECCAS area.    
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2. Institutional arrangements of CFA Franc Zone countries 
Of the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries in the CFA Franc Zone, 12 were once French 
colonies. Formally, these countries belong to two separate monetary areas (WAEMU and 
ECCAS) and share two single currencies that hold the same acronym, the CFA Franc. Thus, 
the CFA Franc is issued and managed by two regional central banks: the Central Bank of 
West African States (known as BCEAO in French) and the Central Bank of Central African 
States (known as BEAC in French). These two CFA Francs were by design initially pegged at 
the same rate to the French Franc in 1948, and since 1999 to the Euro, following the creation 
of the euro area. Since the inception of the CFA Franc Zone, the French Treasury has 
guaranteed an unlimited convertibility of the CFA currencies and participated on the 
executive boards of the two regional central banks. The counterpart of this guarantee has been 
the obligation of each central bank to maintain a proportion of its official reserves (50% for 
BCEAO and 65% for BEAC) in an operation account at the French Treasury. 
In line with the adoption by the European Union of the Maastricht treaty49 in 1992, and 
recognising the crucial role of fiscal policy management in achieving macroeconomic 
stability, sustainable growth and macroeconomic convergence, both WAEMU and ECCAS 
have adopted a set of measures. In 1999, WAEMU member countries adopted a regional 
‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’, which defines a set of primary and 
secondary convergence criteria pertaining to public finance, the real sector, the balance of 
payments and common currency (the list of these criteria can be found in Adedeji and 
Williams, 2007 or the ‘Note d’information n°127 of Banque de France50, 2010’). ECCAS, 
following the establishment of a multilateral committee in 1993, adopted by the end of 2001 a 
framework of convergence criteria that comprises the same primary criteria as WAEMU. 
Accordingly, the two monetary areas share a set of primary criteria within the CFA Franc 
Zone. However, while a directive imposes sanctions against a WAEMU country’s non-
compliance of a primary convergence criterion, such a sanction measure does not exist for 
ECCAS.  The primary criteria include:  
                                                          
49
 This treaty comprises a set of rules reinforced in 1999 within the framework of the stability and growth pact 
for countries in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
50This note can be found at 
 http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Information_diverses/infoetlib/note127.pdf. 
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- The ratio of the basic fiscal balance to nominal GDP must be in balance or in 
surplus. 
- The ratio of outstanding domestic and foreign debt to nominal GDP must not 
exceed 70%. 
- Average annual inflation rate cannot exceed 3% a year. 
- The non-accumulation of domestic and external arrears. 
The institutional debt rule is the core of our study. This rule, by constraining CFA Franc Zone 
countries to maintain their public debt under the threshold of 70%, acts as a debt sustainability 
rule. This is why Section 5 draws on the literature on debt sustainability to build the presented 
empirical model. Section 3 reviews the state of the literature on the definition and 
measurement of ‘economic vulnerability’. 
 
3. The concept of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
3.1 A literature review on the definition of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
The concept of ‘vulnerability’ refers to that of ‘risk’. There are several definitions associated 
with the concept of ‘risk’ depending on the disciplines where it is studied. Generally, 
vulnerability can be seen as the risk that a ‘system’ undergoes from negative change due to a 
‘perturbation’ (see e.g. Naudé et al., 2009).  
In economics, vulnerability is either associated with poverty where the concern is the risk of 
households falling into or remaining in poverty, or natural hazards and macro-level shocks 
where the concern is how the hazards adversely affect a country or region’s economy (see e.g. 
Naudé et al., 2009). Guillaumont (2009) highlights that the first type of vulnerability can be 
derived from the second one. We focus in this chapter on the second kind of vulnerability: the 
‘economic or structural vulnerability’. 
The issue of ‘economic vulnerability’ was really raised for the first time (in 1990) by the 
Maltese Ambassador, his Excellency Ambassador Alexander Borg Olivier51 (see Maltese 
Government, 1990:7). Since then, many conceptual and empirical studies52 have been 
conducted on that issue. More specifically, Briguglio (e.g. 2004), Briguglio and Galea (2003), 
Cordina, (2004a, b) and Briguglio et al., (2008) define economic vulnerability as a country’s 
                                                          
51
 He was the Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations. 
52
 The conceptual and empirical viewpoints of economic vulnerability are well documented in the literature (see 
e.g. Atkins et al., 2000; Briguglio 1995; Briguglio and Galea, 2003). Cordina and Farrugia (2005) also provide a 
summary on the measurement issue of the concept of ‘economic vulnerability’. 
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proneness to exogenous shocks lying outside their control or a proneness to increased 
susceptibility of such a country to the adverse effects of these shocks’.  
In the same vein, several studies of Patrick Guillaumont (see e.g. Guillaumont, 2009; 
Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) have been conducted on the issue of ‘economic 
vulnerability’ where he defines ‘the economic or structural vulnerability of a country as the 
risk of a (poor) country seeing its development hampered by the natural and external shocks it 
faces’. Two main types of exogenous shocks (in other words, two main sources of 
vulnerability) are therefore considered:  
- the environmental or ‘natural’ shocks which encompass, for instance, natural 
disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) and the more frequent climatic shocks 
(typhoons, hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc); 
- external (trade-and-exchange-related) shocks which comprise, for instance, slumps 
in external demand, world commodity price instability (and correlated instability 
of terms of trade), international fluctuations of interest rates, and so forth. 
Other domestic shocks such as unforeseen political changes are thus excluded from being 
exogenous.  
Meanwhile, all these authors highlight the difference between the concept of ‘economic 
vulnerability’ and that of ‘economic resilience’. For example, Briguglio (2008) defines the 
resilience as the policy-induced ability of an economy to recover from or adjust to the 
negative impact of adverse exogenous shocks and to benefit from positive shocks. Thus 
defined, economic resilience may take the form of higher savings and investments which may 
occur in the wake of pronounced uncertainty and may enable small island states to achieve 
high levels of economic development (Cordina, 2004a,b). Guillaumont (2009) considers 
economic resilience as the capacity of a country to react to shocks. He underscores that this 
resilience depends more on current policy, is more easily reversed, and is less structural but 
may also comprise a structural element53.  
Briguglio (2003) develops the notion of the ‘Singapore Paradox’, according to which many 
small island states, in spite of their economic vulnerability, manage to generate a relatively 
                                                          
53
 According to Guillaumont (2009) a distinction close to this three components is given in Rodrik (1999) who, 
in looking at the risk of social conflict in countries facing external shocks, considers the individual severity of 
the shocks, the depth of latent social conflict (likely to increase the impact of the shocks), and the quality of 
conflict management institutions. 
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high GDP per capita when compared to other developing countries. To explain this 
phenomenon, Briguglio and Galea (2003) and Briguglio and Kisanga (2004) take the case of 
Singapore which experiences high rates of economic growth and high GDP per capita despite 
its high exposure to external shocks. Hence, the ‘Singapore Paradox’ stems from the 
juxtaposition of economic vulnerability and economic (nurtured) resilience, where economic 
vulnerability was confined to inherent features which are permanent or quasi-permanent, 
while economic resilience was associated with man-made measures which enable a country to 
withstand or bounce back from the negative effects of external shocks.  
 
3.2 A literature review on the measurement of economic vulnerability 
In line with the definitions of economic vulnerability provided above, we summarise here the 
different measures of that concept. The propositions of vulnerability indices have mainly 
focused on the quantification of the special features of the countries by relying on indicators 
such as economic openness, export concentration, dependence on imports of energy and 
peripherality. Other approaches attempt to measure vulnerability in terms of the phenomenon, 
namely the variability of output and similar indicators.  
The first vulnerability index was proposed by Briguglio (1993) and is composed of three 
variables: the exposure to foreign economic conditions, insularity and remoteness, and 
proneness to natural disasters. This index has been the subject of several modifications in 
1995, 1997, and updated by Briguglio and Galea in 2003. Other authors such as Chander 
(1996) and Wells (1996) follow the methodology adopted by Briguglio (1995) and propose a 
vulnerability index which remains to a certain extent in line with Briguglio (1997)’s. Wells 
(1997) revised its measure of vulnerability and uses a methodology that departs from the 
previous ones by relying on the idea that ‘vulnerability manifested in instability in economic 
growth’. He then uses regression analysis to build its index. Atkins et al. (1998) also adopts 
the econometric analysis and show evidence that economic vulnerability captured by ‘output 
volatility’ depends mainly on the export dependency ratio, the merchandise export 
diversification and the vulnerability to natural disasters. Crowards (2000) also contributes to 
that literature by suggesting an index of economic vulnerability for developing countries 
which is similar to the previous ones, but is rather composed of more variables. In line with 
Wells’ (1997) study, the Committee for Development Policy (CDP)54 (2000) of the United 
                                                          
54
 This committee was previously called Committee for Development Planning. 
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Nations (UN) developed a composite index in order to identify the causes of vulnerability of 
least developed countries (LDCs). By capturing vulnerability through economic growth 
instability, this index is a weighted average of five variables, namely the share of 
manufacturing and modern services in GDP, merchandise export concentration ratio, 
instability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services and 
population size. The weights are obtained through an econometric analysis where the impact 
of each economic indicator quoted above on economic growth is examined. All these studies 
convey the same message according to which small states are inherently more vulnerable. 
However, Gonzales (2000) criticizes these studies, arguing that their results lead to 
considerable variations and contradictions due to the differences of the parameters and the 
methodologies employed by them.  
Following the renewal growing concern over macroeconomic vulnerability of least developed 
countries and the demand of these countries to build an adequate vulnerability indicator which 
should be taken into account in the design of international development policies, the CDP has 
developed and progressively refined, after successive revisions (2003, 2006 and 2009) an 
economic vulnerability index which captures vulnerability caused by structural factors. The 
structural economic vulnerability employed in this study referred to the so-called 
‘retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI)’ jointly calculated on an annual basis by 
the FERDI55 (see Cariolle, 2011; Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) with the UN/United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). This indicator covers 128 
developing countries over the period 1975–2008 (unbalanced panel data) and has the 
advantage of being simple, transparent and parsimonious. Moreover, several multilateral 
development banks are exploring whether to move from their traditional indicator to EVI for 
aid allocation (see Guillaumont, 2011, for more details).  
This ‘economic vulnerability’ is a result of three components: (i) the size and frequency of the 
exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante 
vulnerability); (ii) exposure to shocks; and (iii) the capacity to react to shocks, or resilience. 
Therefore, structural vulnerability (that is, the EVI), which results from factors that are 
independent of a country’s current political will is different from the vulnerability deriving 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
55
 FERDI is the ‘Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International’. The method of 
retrospective EVI’s calculation can be found in details in Cariolle (2011) and descriptive statistical analysis on 
the retrospective EVI can be found in Guillaumont (2011), and Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011). This is why we 
do not find it useful to replicate this statistical analysis here and refer the readers to those articles. 
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from policy, which results from recent policy choices. In other words, an index of structural 
economic vulnerability is related to structural factors—not policy factors—that are beyond the 
present control of the country and which also influence global vulnerability, mainly through 
resilience (Guillaumont, 2009). This structural vulnerability index is a composite index of 
‘shocks’ and ‘exposure to shocks’; both indicators are equally weighted56. We display below 
the structure of the retrospective EVI (henceforth, EVI) where the weights of indices are in 
brackets. 
 
Structure of the EVI 
-Smallness (50%)
-Location Index (Remoteness) (25%)
Exposure Index (50%)
-Specialization Index (Merchandise Export concentration and 
share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries) (25%)
Shock Index 

-Natural Shock Index(Homelessness due to natural disasters; instability of 
(50%)     agriculture production) (50%)
-Trade Shock Index (Instability of exports of goods and services) (50%) 
  
Source: Guillaumont et al. (2011) 
 
4. Data analysis 
Our study covers a sample of 14 CFA Franc Zone countries57 over the period 1980–2008. 
Within this group, eight countries belong to WAEMU58 and six to ECCAS59. Graph 1 in the 
Appendix compares the evolution of average total public debt with the average economic 
vulnerability index (EVI) for CFA Franc Zone countries. This graph suggests a strong 
correlation between average EVI and average total public debt over time. 
Graph 2 illustrates the cumulative frequency distribution of the duration of ‘non-excessive 
debt’ spells over the full sample of CFA Franc zone countries. This analysis provides an 
insight into the durations of ‘non-excessive debt’ spells for this monetary zone. The spell 
refers to the concept used in the “duration” or “survival” or “hazards” analysis to study the 
                                                          
56
 See for example Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011) for a discussion on the weight of indicators. 
57
 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
58
 WAEMU countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. 
59
 ECCAS include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon. 
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length of the time spent by individual (in our case, a country) within  a given state. Hence, the 
“spell length” represents the “time to event” or “time failure”. In this chapter, the ‘non-
excessive debt’ spells length indicates the time spent by a given CFA Franc Zone country 
within the state of ‘non-excessive debt’ (i.e., before entering ‘excessive debt’). ‘Non-
excessive debt’ spells are computed as follows:  
- We first use a dummy variable ‘dummy non-excessive debt’ which takes the value 1 if 
for a given CFA Franc Zone country, the debt-to-GDP ratio is lower than 70% and 0, 
otherwise. 
- From that variable, we construct a duration variable – that is, the ‘non-excessive debt 
spells’ - associated with each country - which represents the time spent within the state 
of ‘non-excessive debt’ (i.e., before entering ‘excessive debt’).  
- Next, we construct the cumulative frequency graph of that duration variable over the 
full sample of CFA Franc Zone countries (see Graph 2).  
In fact, we plot the observed spell lengths on the x-axis and the proportion of observations 
where the observed spell of non-excessive debt exceeds a given length, on the y-axis. Note 
that of the total of 50 spells, there are 21 spells of ‘excessive debt’, representing 42% of all 
spells. 
 
Graph 1: Comparative evolution of the Average Total Public debt and Average EVI of CFA Franc 
Zone Countries 
 
 Source: The Author Calculation based on IMF’s data on Public Debt.  
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Graph 2: The empirical distribution of the Duration of ‘Non-Excessive Debt Spells’ in CFA Franc 
Zone countries 
 
 
Source: The Author calculation is based on IMF’s data on Public Debt. Figures in the graph represent the 
percentage of spells duration until the entry into excessive debt state in CFA Franc Zone where the observed 
spells exceed a given length.   
 
Graph 2 also suggests for the CFA Franc Zone that among the spells of non-excessive debt 
and over the period 1980–2008, 24.14% enter into a state of “excessive debt” after the first 
year of non-excessive debt. After five years, more than half (58.6%) of the spells enter into a 
state of ‘excessive debt’. The figure is approximately 76% after 8 years and approximately 
96.55% after 14 years. Note that no spell lasts between 9 and 11 years and between 15 and 28 
years. In addition, only one spell lasts 12 years, one, 13 years, four spells last 14 years and 
finally only one lasts 29 years. We can thus conclude that whereas a small proportion of spells 
of 'non-excessive debt’ are long-lasting, the most important ‘non-excessive debt’ spells last 
only a few years. Thus, CFA Franc Zone countries seem to display a high tendency to enter an 
‘excessive debt’ state. Section 5 presents the traditional accounting mathematical model of the 
sustainability of public finances. 
 
5. Sustainability of public finances 
Since the purpose of our study is to examine the effect of economic vulnerability on the total 
public debt, we start with the standard public finances sustainability model and then derive the 
appropriate model that will help us perform our regressions. Although there is no consensus 
among economists regarding the public debt threshold that maintain the public debt path 
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sustainable, the empirical literature distinguishes between three main approaches60 used to 
assess the public debt sustainability. These approaches have been discussed in IMF (2003) 
(see also Vera, 2009).  
The first and most common approach starts from the basic accounting identity (or Domar’s 
approach) and links the changes in the debt stock to public sector revenues and expenditures. 
According to this approach, fiscal policy is sustainable if it delivers a stable ratio of public 
debt to GDP. In other words, if the actual primary balance is less than the debt stabilizing 
balance, current fiscal policy that implies an increasing ratio of public debt to GDP is viewed 
as unsustainable. This approach allows calculating the so-called “debt stabilizing primary 
balance” which is the primary balance that would make the debt-to-GDP ratio stable. Hence, 
the degree of the needed fiscal adjustment stems from the difference between the actual and 
debt stabilizing primary balance. The second approach (a more flexible one) refers to the 
called Present-Value Constraint (PVC) approach. It assesses the debt sustainability within the 
context of the broader objectives and constraints of the fiscal policy decision-making process. 
For example, it consists in estimating fiscal policy reaction functions where the relationship 
between fiscal policy instruments and fiscal policy objectives (such as the stabilization of 
output fluctuations, the maintenance of debt sustainability) is examined. Hence, if the primary 
balance responds positively to public debt, this generally implies that fiscal policy is 
consistent with long-run solvency (see Bohn, 1998). The third approach to assessing public 
debt sustainability is to examine whether the government is “overborrowing”, that is, its debt 
stock is higher than the present discounted value of its expected future primary surpluses. 
However, irrespective of the conceptual approach adopted, the fundamental block of the fiscal 
sustainability corresponds to a simplification of the government budget constraint (Vera, 
2009).  
We first assume that the government finances its deficit only by issuing debt. Hence, we 
exclude for the moment other financing items such as seigniorage revenue, privatization 
proceeds, and the sales of public assets.      
                                                          
60
 Note that the World Bank and IMF have in the last few years defined the concept of public finance 
sustainability (or ‘debt sustainability’ according to their used expression) as in first time, a group of indicators 
and lately as a set of threshold (see IMF, 2002a).    
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Let us denote tB  the stock of the public debt at the end of the year t; ti  the nominal interest 
rate on total public debt; tG  and tT  are respectively the total tax revenue and the total 
government consumption (excluding interest payments on the total public debt).  
The government budget constraint is given by: 
Debt in period t = (Debt in period t-1) + (Primary Deficit +Interest Payments on public debt), 
that is: 
Debt in period t - (Debt in period t-1) = Primary Deficit +Interest Payments on public debt = 
Primary Deficit (in year t) + ti *(Debt for period t-1).  
In other words, this equation can be rewritten as:  
                      )()( 11   tttttt BrTGBB                                                                          (1) 
To analyze the evolution of the total public debt, we need to normalize the public debt by 
some measure of the country’s ability to service and repay its debt: the most common choice 
is typically the nominal Gross Domestic Product, denoted tY . Thus, the evolution of the debt-
to-GDP ratio could be obtained by analyzing the derivative ( ) of 
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where t  stands for the inflation rate and tg for the real GDP growth. The substitution of (3) 
into (2) leads to: )(1 ttt
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By supposing that the debt ratios are steady state and that the real rate of interest on debt is 
given by  ri , the rearrangement of (5) leads to:  
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)()( 1   tt bgib                                                                                                          (6) 
The equation (6) shows that if the primary surplus ratio is equal to zero, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
will grow or shrink at the rate )( gi  , within the framework where we assume that there is a 
level beyond which the debt-to GDP-ratio cannot or should not rise. Under this situation, the 
public debt ratio increases when the real effective interest rate on government debt exceeds 
the growth rate of GDP (that is, when the growth-adjusted real effective rate is positive) 
unless there is a sufficient amount of primary budget surplus. In other terms, the Domar’s 
condition for debt stability (and thus fiscal sustainability) can be held when the real GDP 
growth rate is higher than the real interest rate, even if the primary balance continues to be just 
zero.     
     
To estimate the effect of structural economic vulnerability on public debt in CFA Franc Zone 
countries, we rely in this chapter on the mathematical model of fiscal sustainability 
underlying that fundamental block. 
 
6. Model specification 
In the previous model of fiscal sustainability, we assume that the budget deficit is financed 
only by debt creation. We now relax this hypothesis and consider the additional financing 
items that can add to government revenue (non-tax revenues) such as seigniorage revenue, 
privatization proceeds, and the sales of public assets. To take into account such items in the 
equation (1), we define the primary balance not as the difference between tax revenue and the 
government spending, but rather as the difference between the overall government revenue 
(excluding grants) - comprising several items (non-tax revenue) -  and non interest (primary) 
expenditure. 
Our model relies thus on the equation (1) augmented with our variables of interest (the EVI or 
its components), and other control variables which are likely to influence both the variables of 
interest and the dependent variable (the overall public debt).  
We first present our model specification and discuss the expected signs of the covariates and 
finally the econometric technique. 
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6.1 The model specification  
      In this sub-section, we describe the model that allows us to examine the effect of the 
structural vulnerability of CFA Franc Zone countries in their probability of excessive 
indebtedness. More specifically, the model examines the probability of a country breaching 
the 70% of GDP debt rule (that is, leading to excessive public debt). The structural model is 
stipulated as follows:   
* '
* *
it it=1 if >70%, and =0 if <=70%
it it it
it it
y x
y y y y
         
where i = 1,…N =14, denotes the country index and t = 1980-2008, denotes the period (year) 
index; *y  is an unobserved outcome; ity represents the excessive debt status: 1ity   if in a 
country i of the CFA Franc Zone at the year t, the government incurs an excessive public debt, 
that is, its total debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to or higher than 70%; 0ity  , otherwise. The 
vector itx  represents the structural economic vulnerability variables (that is, the EVI or its 
components) as well as a set of other control variables which act as (economic) resilience-
related variables which are supposed to influence the impact of EVI on the probability of 
excessive debt. These variables include the fiscal balance (in percentage of GDP), the real 
GDP growth rate, the terms of trade, the real effective exchange rate, the grants (as a 
percentage of GDP), the inflation rate (captured here through the GDP deflator), and a 
dummy variable representing the period since the entrance into force of the ‘‘Pact of 
Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity’’ within the zone franc. The definition and the 
source of these variables are provided in the Appendix 1.  it  is an error term. 
 
6.2 Discussion on the expected signs of the explanatory variables 
Before starting the discussion of the expected effects (signs) of our explanatory variables, let 
us highlight one important pitfall regarding both the linear and the nonlinear model. Indeed, 
for the model’s parameters to be consistent and efficient, our regressors should be 
predetermined with respect to the dependent variable. In our case, to avoid any suspicion of 
endogeneity issue related to the simultaneity bias between certain regressors and the 
dependent variable, we use in the model where it appears necessary the lagged values of the 
explanatory variables (especially for the variables ‘fiscal balance’, ‘real economic growth’, 
‘inflation’, grants-to-GDP ratio’ and ‘real effective exchange rate’). While this precaution 
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could at least mitigate the simultaneity bias in any model like ours, in our specific case, the 
dependent binary variable is defined by institutional rules rather than by economic variables. 
As a result, there is likely no simultaneity bias and, the endogeneity issue will not thus be a 
problem. Nevertheless, to take into account such eventual problem along with the delay in 
processing some economic data, we do consider the previously quoted one year lagged 
variables in our different model specifications. 
Now what about the expected effect of each explanatory variable? 
 
The EVI’s variable 
In analyzing the effect of economic vulnerability on economic growth, Cordina (2004a, b) 
shows that increased risk can adversely affect economic growth as the negative effects of 
downside shocks would be commensurately larger than those of positive shocks. Furthermore, 
he presents a conceptual application of the “Singapore Paradox” approach and shows 
evidence that in response to a situation of vulnerability, saving and capital formation in an 
economy can be important sources of resilience. Guillaumont (2009) also discusses the effects 
of the (retrospective) EVI on economic growth and poverty and concludes that the EVI 
reduces economic growth and, through the latter, exerts deleterious effects on the pace of 
poverty reduction. These impacts occur through the channels of export earnings instability, 
the primary instabilities (especially through their effects on public finances or via the passed 
through of price fluctuations to producers), political instability, the smallness of the country, 
the structure of the economy and the location of the country.  
More recently, Ferrarini (2009) re-assesses the analysis underlying the New Debt 
Sustainability Framework (NDSF) endorsed by both the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank) - which guides the borrowing decisions of Low-Income Countries. This 
re-evaluation consists in testing the significance and the reliability of the World Bank’s CPIA 
or the governance indicators as predictors of debt distress episodes across LICs. He obtains 
strong evidence that factors of illiquidity and structural vulnerability61 are more suitable 
predictors of the occurrence of debt distress episodes across Low-Income Countries (LICs). 
Thus, by challenging the NDSF prospects whose aim is to solve the long-standing debt crisis 
involving many of the LICs, the author concludes that “the NSDF is bound to distort aid 
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 The Economic Vulnerability Indicator (EVI) used is that of United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development. 
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allocation away from the country-specific circumstances which truly matter for the 
achievement of debt sustainability”.  
In our case, we argue the following: the structural vulnerability, by reducing tax revenue 
(unless the government increases taxes after an exogenous shock or when its exposures to 
shocks rises, though such measure is politically sensitive and difficult to implement) and 
increasing government spending is expected to increase the budget deficit. We hypothesise 
that, irrespective of its effect on the public finances (the budget balance), the structural 
vulnerability of a country is expected to increase its public indebtedness and thus to raise the 
probability of excessive indebtedness (especially in the case of CFA Franc Zone countries). 
However, one can think that when a government experiences a higher structural vulnerability 
of its economy, instead of borrowing even at low cost to cope with the additional financial 
needs induced by such rise in structural vulnerability, it can rely on non-costly financial 
means such as the privatisation proceeds, the seigniorage62 and the sale of its assets 
(buildings, infrastructure, mineral deposits, and various forms of liquid reserves) (Vera, 
2009). In such cases an obtained positive effect of EVI on the accumulation of public debt or 
on the probability of excessive debt may cancel out the effect of the fiscal balance (the 
coefficient of the variable capturing the ‘the fiscal balance’ may not be statistically 
significant), since in the latter, we include tax revenue as well as other forms of non-tax 
revenues.  
One can also think that countries facing structural vulnerability benefit from (temporary) debt 
forgiveness from their creditors, the extra revenues are used to cope with the shocks. In such 
situation, we can observe in the regressions a statistically significance of both the coefficient 
of the fiscal balance and that of the EVI. 
We also conjecture that there exists a nonlinear (in the form of curve-linear or inverted U-
shape) relationship between EVI/or its components and the probability of excessive debt and 
that, whether the membership of a CFA Franc Zone country to WAEMU or ECCAS matters 
for such non-linearity. The hypothesis underlying the inclusion of both the ‘EVI’/or its 
components and the square of EVI/or the square of its components is the following: When 
facing a rise in their vulnerability stemming either from exposure increases or shocks rises, or 
                                                          
62
 Note however that only the ECCAS countries can use seigniorage to finance their deficits, as this measure is 
forbidden in WAEMU area.   
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both, a CFA Franc Zone country has several options apart from resorting to indebtedness to 
accommodate the additional costs induced by a such rise in structural vulnerability: the first 
option is to adjust its fiscal policies by either increasing taxes or reducing public spending or 
adopting both measures (taxes rise and expenditures reduction), although, as we mention 
above, these measures could be politically difficult to implement; the second option consists 
on using the non-costly means of financing (previously quoted) that are available to them. 
Note however that only the ECCAS countries can use seigniorage to finance their 
expenditures as this measure is forbidden in WAEMU area. The third option is for these 
countries to seek for debt relief granted by the creditors.  
Therefore, we can have two main expectations regarding the nonlinearity of the EVI with 
respect to the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries: 
Hypothesis 1: we expect the public debt not to be affected or even to be reduced in the 
first stages of EVI increases (in the cases of fiscal adjustment or drawing on non-costly means 
of financing or debt relief), but as EVI becomes higher, these countries will have no choice 
but to resort to domestic and/or external debt. As a result, we expect a positive sign of the 
variable ‘EVI square’ (or the square of the components) and a negative sign of the coefficients 
associated to ‘EVI’ or its components. These coefficients may be statistically insignificant. 
Hypothesis 2: we also expect the likelihood of excessive public debt to rise in the first 
stages of EVI (if the countries choose to borrow internally or abroad to accommodate the EVI 
increases) and then to decline for higher EVI, because of the debt relief granted by creditors 
or the use of non-costly financial resources or also the adoption of fiscal adjustment measures. 
Hence, the sign of ‘EVI’ or its components will be positive and that of its square or its 
components’ square will be negative.        
 
The fiscal balance: as mentioned above, we expect an improvement in the fiscal balance to 
reduce the overall public debt and thus the probability of excessive debt. If the EVI (or its 
components) effect translates through the fiscal balance, the impact of the latter on public debt 
will be statistically nil. However, we acknowledge that a statistically nil effect of fiscal 
balance may not necessarily be due to the presence of the EVI or its components in the model, 
but may also be explained by the effect of other control variables of the model that influence 
the fiscal balance (e.g. economic growth; the terms of trade).    
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The real GDP growth 
The indebtedness of a country is expected to rise following losses in output, that is, lowering 
of real GDP growth (see also Barro, 1979). Accordingly, the real GDP growth is expected to 
be negatively associated with the build-up of public debt and accordingly, with the likelihood 
of excessive debt.  
 
The real effective exchange rate 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) indicates a country’s competitiveness. In our case, a 
rise in the REER means an appreciation and a decline means depreciation. The effect of the 
real effective exchange rate on the overall public debt of a country depends on its effect on the 
domestic and external debt.  
Regarding the domestic debt, on the supply side, its issuance may be easier to countries when 
the currency is appreciating because the expected appreciation allows prudent policymakers to 
hide the implicit insurance premium embedded in domestic currency borrowing (Caballero 
and Cowan, 2006; Panizza et al., 2011). On the demand side, a real appreciated exchange rate 
is, at any given interest rate, likely to discourage the demand of domestic currency bonds as 
investors may foresee an ex-post appreciation of the foreign currency rate (a real depreciation 
of local currency) (see also Panizza et al., 2011). Furthermore, in terms of valuation effects, a 
real effective exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) automatically induces a higher (lower) 
domestic indebtedness of the government.  
With respect to the external public debt, the effect of REER changes on its build-up is also 
ambiguous. In fact, a real exchange rate depreciation will lead to a declining of the external 
debt stock if the induced rise in export earnings of this depreciation is sufficiently enough to 
service the external debt; otherwise, the depreciation of the REER will result in a rise of 
external indebtedness (Craigwell et al., 2010; see also Ng’eno, 2000), and hence the 
likelihood of excessive debt. 
Overall, we cannot conclude a priori about the effect of REER changes on the probability of 
excessive debt. 
 
The terms of trade 
An improvement in terms of trade (an increase in the relative price of exportables for a 
country) is likely to increase the export (foreign) revenues of the beneficiary country, reduce 
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current expenditures and therefore improve the fiscal balance. Note that the reduction effect 
of public expenditures owe to the terms of trade improvement appears through a relative 
decline in the price of inputs (in the cases where imports represent an important share of 
expenditures - which is usually observed in many developing countries and a fortiori, in CFA 
Franc Zone countries). Furthermore, such improvement in terms of trade, by increasing the 
economic growth may also reduce the need for social assistance from government and in fine, 
add to the reduction of current expenditures. Thus, an improvement in terms of trade is 
expected to be positively related to lower external and /or domestic borrowing and by the 
same token, to a low probability of excessive debt.  
Conversely, a decline in terms of trade, by lowering revenue, increasing (substantially) public 
spending and thus worsening the fiscal balance, will likely result in higher total public debt. 
As a result, the likelihood of excessive debt will rise. The positive effect of such terms of 
trade deterioration on public expenditures translated through for example, the rise of social 
assistance needs, and the high demand by public enterprises of support from the government 
because they cannot adjust their pricing policies to changes in export and import prices. 
 
The grants  
According to Cline (2003), in low-income countries (LICs), the grants elements (foreign 
grants, which represent a substantial fraction of GDP), are available to pay some part (or all) 
of the interest due on debt, and can consequently modify our previous debt sustainability. This 
is why we include in our model specification the foreign grants as a percentage of GDP. We 
thus expect the grants to alleviate the burden of indebtedness of developing countries—that is, 
to exert a negative effect on chance of entering into excessive debt. But we can also 
hypothesise that the higher the grants are for a developing country, the less it will be inclined 
to correctly manage its public finances to avoid unsustainable debt situations. In such 
instances, the grants will exert a positive effect on the total public debt. 
 
The inflation rate 
The impact of inflation on the public debt depends on how the latter is distributed among 
domestic and foreign creditors. In the case of developing countries and specifically in CFA 
Franc Zone countries, where usually a substantial part of the public debt is denominated in 
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foreign currency, the inflation impacts directly the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio and indirectly 
the ratio of external debt to GDP through the real effective exchange rate.  
A rise in inflation erodes the real value of the domestic debt hold by creditors and the 
effective debt ratio, unless all domestic debt is indexed to prices or foreign currencies (though 
according to Panizza et al., (2011), in such cases inflation can debase indexed to prices if the 
government tinkers with the price index), a government can inflate away the domestic public 
debt by money creation, with the result of this inflating away of debt depending on the share 
of debt that is indexed to inflation. Although such policy measure can be implemented in 
ECCAS, it can’t in WAEMU (see above). Panizza et al. (2011)63 also point out the 
exceptional case where inflation can lead to a rise of public debt: in the case of a country 
facing a real appreciation (that is, where inflation outweighs the currency depreciation) and 
where a large share of domestic debt is indexed to inflation, the valuation effects will create a 
positive link between inflation and domestic currency debt.  
 
6.2 Discussion on the choice of appropriate econometric technique 
Since our dependent variable is binary (a dummy), we have to choose between two kinds of 
models: a linear probability model (LPM) and a non-LPM (logit or probit model). Whereas in 
LPMs, the probability of success and failure is considered to be a linear function of the 
covariates, in logit and probit models, the expected probability is an increasing non-linear 
function of the explanatory variables. However, compared with nonlinear models, there are 
several concerns regarding LPMs.  
First, the marginal effect induced by a unit of variation of each covariate in an LPM is 
constant, whereas in nonlinear models it varies with each unit.  
Second, in contrast to non-LPMs, the predicted probabilities of success or failure in an LPM 
may lie out of the interval [0,1]. On one side, Wooldridge (2002: 455) highlights that ‘if the 
main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of the explanatory variables on the response 
probability, averaged across the distribution of these covariates, then the fact that some 
predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important. The linear probability 
model needs not provide very good estimates of partial effects at extreme values of the 
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 These authors recognize however that such situation is exceptional and argue it will likely be dominated by the 
case where inflation impacts negatively the domestic debt, in the absence of financial repression. 
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covariates’. In the same vein, Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 495) mention that ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimations of such models provide a good guide to which variables are 
statistically significant. De Ree and Nillesen (2009: 306–307) also emphasise that ‘the 
probit/logit and LPM often produce rather similar outcomes because the conditional 
distribution function tends to ‘look’ rather linear around its expected value, while at the same 
time, most draws from any conditional distribution are ‘close’ to the expected value’. On the 
other side, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) point out that OLS estimates of LPMs, where the 
predicted probabilities are outside the unit interval, may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates. They propose the sequential least squares (SLS) procedure as a way of remedying 
this problem. These iterative procedure first trims from the data those OLS estimate 
observations with predictions lying outside the unit interval. Based on these estimations, the 
data are trimmed again and the model re-estimated. The procedure is repeated until no 
predictions are outside the unit interval and the SLS estimates are thus obtained. 
Third, the problem of heteroskedasticity is likely to arise, leading to unbiased but inefficient 
coefficients (i.e., the standard errors are not valid for constructing confidence intervals and t-
statistics). Weighted least squares are said to provide efficient estimates (Mullahy, 1990), but 
hold the disadvantage of having worse finite sample properties than OLS; further, the 
inferences based on asymptotic theory can be misleading (Altonji and Segal, 1996)64. To 
overcome this difficulty, we use OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (i.e., 
White’s correction of heteroskedasticity). 
Despite the above-mentioned drawbacks, LPMs have the particular advantage of facilitating 
the interpretation of the coefficients of interaction variables, whereas such an interpretation is 
not straightforward in logit or probit models. Indeed, Ai and Norton (2003)65 show that the 
marginal effect of an interaction term in nonlinear models, as provided by standard 
econometrics packages, may hold the wrong sign and significance and, consequently, cannot 
be interpreted as such. Greene (2010) challenges the way of interpreting Ai and Norton’s 
(2003) results and notes that ‘the process of statistical testing about partial effects, and 
interaction terms in particular, produces generally uninformative and sometimes contradictory 
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 See also Wooldridge (2002: 455), who discourages the use of weighted least squares in LPM when the 
predicted probabilities lies outside the range [0,1]. 
65
 According to these authors, the interaction effect is based on cross-partial derivatives with respect to the two 
interacted variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction term different for observations. 
They thus recommend relying on these derivatives and using the Delta method to assess the statistical 
significance of the marginal effect associated to the interaction term. 
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and misleading results. The mechanical reliance on statistical measures of significance 
obscures the economic, numerical content of the estimated model’ (p. 295). He recommends 
performing the analysis not only through statistical procedures (see Greene, 2010 for details) 
but also by graphical presentations. He also emphasises the need to take into account the units 
of measurement when interpreting the partial effects of continuous variables, as the partial 
effect (per unit change) can be misleading.  
Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) also criticise Ai and Norton’s (2003) interpretation of the 
interaction term. They first contend that in Ai and Norton’s (2003) results ‘it is difficult to 
interpret the sign of interaction term coefficient because for some observations, the cross 
partial derivative of the probability of occurrence with respect to interacted covariates can 
have the sign opposite to that of the interaction term coefficient’. They argue that this is 
because of a mechanical saturation effect66, which is irrelevant for researchers primarily 
concerned with proportional marginal effects. For such researchers, small changes in 
probability are more important near the boundaries than they are near the centre. Kolasinski 
and Siegel (2010) conclude that the interaction term coefficient (provided by nonlinear logit 
or probit regressions) remains a valid measure of interaction because it is already purged of 
the saturation effect. Consequently, they suggest researchers who are not concerned with the 
saturation effect, use it as such, while others (those for whom the mechanical saturation effect 
is important) use Ai and Norton’s (2003) measure of interaction. 
In the case of only one interaction effect, researchers may use the easy fixes provided by 
standard econometric packages (e.g., the use of ‘inteff’ ado-files in Stata) or the Delta method 
to obtain the interaction term in nonlinear models. However, these fixes become unusable in 
the case of double interaction effects (‘inteff3’ ado-files are available in Stata for the 
interaction of three dummies, but not for dummy(ies) and continuous variable(s)). Moreover, 
even using the Delta method to calculate standard errors, the computation becomes 
burdensome (as in our case here) with many interactions, especially with covariates67 having 
high-order terms. 
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 Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) explain why saturation effects might not be economically relevant in certain 
contexts. They particularly show that, under general conditions, the saturation effect guarantees that the Ai and 
Norton measure of interaction will have the opposite sign from the interaction term coefficient, as one or more of 
the covariates take on extreme values. 
67
 In our case, these interaction variables include the square of this covariate, the interaction of this square with a 
dummy variable and the interaction of this covariate with another explanatory continuous variable of the model. 
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For all these reasons and given the ongoing discussion on the best way of obtaining good 
interaction terms and interpreting them in nonlinear models, we rely in this study on nonlinear 
models to perform our analysis and only use LPMs for interpreting interaction terms. In other 
words, the nonlinear model estimations allow us to interpret solely the non-interacted 
variables, while the LPM estimation allows us to interpret the coefficients of the interaction 
variables. 
However, we still have three concerns. The first concern relates to the choice of fixed or 
random effects to model unobserved heterogeneity, the second focuses on which nonlinear 
model (logit or probit) is suitable for our analysis and the third relates to the handling of 
temporal duration dependence. 
-First, we use fixed effects, which capture heterogeneity among countries as well as 
the likely importance of unobservables correlated with the error term in determining the 
probability of excessive public debt, rather than random effects for two main reasons. First, 
since our sample is composed of heterogeneous countries, state-invariant and unmeasured 
factors (e.g., political, financial institutions, the degree of creditworthiness, etc.) are likely 
to be correlated with the error term in determining the evolution of the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Second, our macro panel contains the whole population of CFA Franc Zone countries 
(i.e., WAEMU and ECCAS countries) rather than a random sample from a much larger 
universe of countries where the use of random effects may be more suitable. 
-Second, estimating standard dummy variables in a fixed-effects logit model68 using 
the unconditional Maximum Likelihood method can pose the incidental parameters 
problem, which presents significant challenges for obtaining unbiased parameter 
estimations. According to Neyman and Scott (1948), who first raised the issue of incidental 
parameters, the inconsistency of incidental parameters (fixed effects) arises because the 
number of incidental parameters N increases without bounds while the amount of 
information about each parameter is fixed. Hence, estimating a nonlinear model (especially 
an unconditional fixed-effects logit model) in large but narrow panels (with T fixed and N, 
the number of groups, growing infinitely) using the maximum likelihood method leads to 
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 Note, however, that unconditional fixed-effects probit models are biased. In addition, the conditional fixed-
effects model is not suitable in our case because only countries that display some heterogeneity in the outcome 
variable are taken into account in estimating the model. The requirement is binding in this setup given the small 
size of the cross-section dimension of our panel and the fact that for certain countries, the dependent variable 
takes either 1 or 0. 
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severe bias (inconsistency) in the fixed effects and in the coefficients of the other control 
variables. This bias in the parameters is of the order of 1/T for balanced panels (Greene, 
2007) and thus disappears as T becomes large. However, it is unclear which exact order of 
T produces unbiased estimates. Katz (2001) judges the performances of unconditional and 
conditional maximum likelihood estimators in fixed-effects logit models based on finite-
sample properties where N units have been observed for T time periods. He shows evidence 
through a series of Monte Carlo experiments that for the time periods T 16, unconditional 
and conditional maximum likelihood lead to the same results. Further, Greene (2007, p. 
621) illustrates in Monte Carlo simulations using a sample of N = 1000 with 200 
replications that the bias of parameters is only about 6.9% when T = 20, but as large as 
100% if T = 2. In this chapter, our nonlinear model is estimated by relying on the 
unconditional fixed-effects logit model and, given the above discussion, the incidental 
parameter is not a problem in our case, as the temporal dimension of our panel is T= 29 
years. 
-Third, a concern when dealing with binary time-series cross-section models is how to 
model the temporal dependence (Beck et al., 1998), since in such situations, ordinary logit 
or probit models may result in too many inferences (too high t-statistics). The empirical 
literature offers several approaches to deal with the temporal dependence issue in such 
models: temporal dummy variables for each episode or ‘spell’ or specific transformations 
of time (duration variable) as covariates in the model (for e.g., a ‘linear’ time variable). 
Beck et al. (1998) show evidence that panel logit data are identical to grouped duration data 
and suggest dealing with this problem by adding a series of dummy variables to the model. 
These dummies should capture the number of years since the previous occurrence of an 
‘event’. However, according to them, this solution has the drawback that it leads to an 
important loss of degrees of freedom (owing to the large number of dummy variables) and 
makes the hazard rate function likely to zig zag over time. Consequently, Beck et al. (1998) 
propose replacing the dummy variables with a smooth function based on ‘natural cubic 
splines’. This vector of spline-based variables, which are cubic polynomials of the time (t), 
smooth out the coefficients and the hazard function based on them. Hence, the number of 
spline variables will be lower than the number of time dummies; further, the statistical 
significance will be easier to achieve and the time dependence of the hazard function 
straightforward to test (see also the application of this technique in the recent chapter by 
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Castro and Martins, 2012). In this chapter, we model the temporal dependence by using the 
‘natural cubic splines’ as proposed by Beck et al. (1998). Moreover, we also follow another 
of Beck et al.’s (1998) suggestions by adding a variable that picks up the number of past 
events (e.g., the number of past episodes of non-excessive debt in our case). The inclusion 
of such a variable is justified by the fact that standard logit models assume ‘excessive debt’ 
states to be independent of one another, an argument which is obviously not true. 
 
7. Empirical results 
This section presents the results obtained from the statistical analysis (Table 1) and those 
obtained from the estimations of the different model specifications discussed above (Tables 2 
to 5). Note that we standardise all our continuous covariates to allow meaningful economic 
interpretations. 
 
Table 1: Fractional Polynomial Analysis 
 
Model Hypothesis to 
be tested 
df Deviance G2 P-Value 
M0: The variable ‘EVI’ is not included in the model  0 131.56482   
M1: The variable ‘EVI’ is included in the model 
(Linear Model with respect to ‘EVI’)
M0 nested in M1 1 130.85196 0.712856 0.3985 
M2: ‘EVI’ and its square are included in the model 
(Nonlinear Model with respect to ‘EVI’)
M1 nested in M2 1 123.21382 7.638146 0.0057 
Note: df = Degree f Freedom; G2 = Likelihood Ratio associated to the difference of Deviances; P-Value = 
Probability associated to G2.  
 
Before presenting these results, we first highlight one shortcoming of this study. Although it 
is possible to estimate the different specifications of the model for the panel of WAEMU 
countries, such estimations are not possible for ECCAS sub-sample of countries either by the 
use of the logit model (the results do not converge) or by the use of the trimmed sample for 
the LPM (because in trimming the data, we are left with few observations, which prohibits 
statistical inferences). This shortcoming of the cross-sectional dimension of our panel 
prevents us from performing a graphical analysis of the interaction terms (as recommended by 
Greene, 2010). Further, this is especially the case when our variables of interest (EVI and its 
square/or EVI components and their squares) are interacted with the dummyWAEMU to 
measure how the partial effect of EVI – and its square/or EVI components and their squares – 
on the probability of excessive debt varies with a switch from WAEMU to ECCAS. 
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Table 1 (above) shows the results obtained from performing a fractional polynomial 
analysis (FPA) to find out the correct parametric form for our variable of interest (the ‘EVI’ 
predictor), namely to check the linearity of that variable with the logit model (e.g., Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 1999, 2000). The FPA consists of choosing between competing models by 
performing an Analysis of Deviance69 where the deviance statistics of these models are 
compared. The difference in the deviance between the two models is the likelihood ratio, G2, 
which has a null Chi-Squared distribution (Agresti, 2002). The FPA’s results suggest that the 
minimum deviance statistic (i.e., 123.21) is observed for model M2. In other words, model 
M2 is the best fitting nonlinear transformation that contains the ‘EVI’ and ‘EVI square’ 
variables. In fact, when comparing model M2 (the nonlinear model) with the linear model 
M1, we find evidence that the likelihood ratio test statistic, G2 (i.e., the deviance for model 
M1 minus that for M2), is 7.638, with a significance level as follows: p-value 
= 0057.0)638.7)1(Pr( 2  . Since this p-value is lower than 0.01, we conclude that model 
M2 is significantly different from model M1 and therefore retains the nonlinear specification 
that contains the ‘EVI’ and ‘EVI square’ variables. The inclusion of EVI’s components in the 
analysis (see Tables 3, 5 and 6) allows us to explore whether the effects of ‘EVI’ on the 
chance of CFA Franc Zone countries entering into excessive debt are driven mainly by the 
variables ‘exposure’ and/or ‘shock’. Nevertheless, we recognise that the effects of shocks on 
the probability of the excessive debt of a given country pertaining to this Zone could depend 
on the exposure of this country to shocks. To take into account (at least partially) the 
interaction between ‘exposure’ and ‘shock’, we include in the specification the variable 
‘exposureshock’, which is the result of multiplying the ‘exposure’ and ‘shock’ variables (see 
the details in Appendix 1). 
Tables 2 to 5 have the same structures. We report in Columns [1], [2], [3] and [4] the 
results associated respectively to the unconditional fixed-effects logit model, the average 
partial effects regarding the latter, the results obtained from the LPM based on the whole 
sample and the results obtained from the LPM based on the trimmed sample (following the 
SLS procedure). Irrespective of the table considered (Tables 2 to 4), we find evidence that the 
results (sign, significance and magnitude of coefficients) of the LPM based on the whole 
sample are similar to the average partial effects of the unconditional logit specification, 
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 Note that the Analysis of Deviance is like the ANOVA used in multivariate normal regressions. 
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whereas the results of the LPM based on the SLS procedure are not70. In addition, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of the two LPMs are unexplainable differences.  
Table 2 presents the results of the model specification comprising both the variables 
‘EVI’ and its square. Following Greene (2010), we performe a simple Wald test of the zero 
interaction effect71 for the coefficient of ‘EVI’ and that of ‘EVI square’ (see the Appendix 4 
for the derivations of the logit model to obtain the interaction term, especially when applied to 
the simple case of a model specification where we have both a continuous variable and its 
square). As this test is sufficient but not necessary (Greene, 2010), it provides us with a good 
insight into the statistical significance of the ‘EVI square’ coefficient. 
The result of this test shows that the interaction term (the coefficient of ‘EVI’ square) is 
statistically significant ( 2(2) 7.76   with a p-value = 0.0206). Despite the divergence of the 
results between the LPM based on the whole sample and that based on the SLS procedure 
(Columns [3] and [4]), we obtain evidence that EVI is associated with nonlinearity with 
respect to the likelihood of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries. We can conclude 
that irrespective of the potential control variables, ‘EVI’ displays an inverted U-shaped curve 
relationship with the probability of entering into excessive debt in the CFA Franc Zone: an 
increase in one standard deviation of ‘EVI’ leads to a higher probability of excessive debt in 
this Zone; for higher levels of ‘EVI’, this probability decreases. The top point (turning point) 
of the ‘standardised EVI’ is approximately 0.50 for the LPM based on the whole sample and 
0.4749 for the LPM based on the trimmed sample. As can be observed from these results, the 
turning points are almost the same. These results can be interpreted as follows: when the 
‘EVI’ of these countries increases over time, they resort to domestic and/or external debt in 
order to cope with the rise in the "EVI" variable, thereby increasing their likelihood of 
indebtedness. However, after a certain level of ‘EVI’, it seems that these countries draw on 
their con-costly financial resources (see the details above) to cope the additional burden 
inflicted by the rise in structural vulnerability.  
                                                          
70
 However, the sign and significance of certain estimates in the LPM based on the SLS procedure are identical 
to those of the logit model.  
71
 As mentioned above, according to Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction effect is based on cross-partial 
derivatives with respect to the two interacted variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction 
term different for these observations. 
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Table 2: EVI’s Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in CFA Franc Zone Countries 
 Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables Logit Model 
(Fixed Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability Model 
on the whole sample 
Linear Probability Model 
on the trimmed sampleb 
(SLS procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Evi 17.80*** 1.038*** 1.149*** 3.702*** 
 (6.444) (0.355) (0.370) (1.231) 
Evisq -18.46*** -1.076*** -1.150*** -3.897*** 
 (6.890) (0.3794) (0.397) (1.265) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.024 0.056 0.0255 0.204 
 (0.703) (0.041) (0.0340) (0.157) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.328 -0.02 -0.0360* -0.0232 
 (0.341) (0.02) (0.0214) (0.0694) 
Inflationt-1 -0.770* -0.045* -0.0410 -0.135 
 (0.416) (0.024) (0.0265) (0.0938) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.802*** 0.105*** 0.0573 0.796*** 
 (0.564) (0.031) (0.0385) (0.276) 
REERt-1 -0.767* -0.045* -0.121*** -0.143 
 (0.447) (0.026) (0.0308) (0.0925) 
Termstrade -3.058*** -0.18*** -0.126*** -0.501*** 
 (0.742) (0.039) (0.0295) (0.167) 
Pacte -3.229*** -0.188*** -0.143*** -0.444** 
 (1.022) (0.056) (0.0479) (0.203) 
Number -2.308*** -0.135*** -0.217*** -0.488*** 
 (0.557) (0.028) (0.0402) (0.118) 
Variable -1.095*** -0.064*** -0.0657*** -0.139* 
 (0.228) (0.011) (0.0123) (0.0743) 
Spline (1) -0.00107 -0.00006 -0.000317** 0.000443 
 (0.00119) (0.00007) (0.000147) (0.00157) 
Spline (2) -0.000170 -9.91e-06 0.000234 0.0257** 
 (0.00233) (0.00014) (0.000160) (0.0113) 
Spline (3) -0.0122*** -0.00071*** -0.000282 -0.0192* 
 (0.00423) (0.00023) (0.000336) (0.0103) 
   
  
Observations  317  344 99 
Log likelihood         -61.606908    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-
Value) 
64.44 (0.0000)  157.20 (0.0000) 8.63 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.838 0.7546 
     
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
23.27 (0.0001)  8.40 (0.0000) 5.18 (0.0010) 
Fixed Effects 
Significance 
51.41 (0.0000)  141.24 (0.0000) 12.95 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. 
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This 
is the Sequential Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value 
associated concern the logit model where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and 
the P-value are associated to the linear probability models.  
 
Hypothesis 2 thus seems to be valid here. Consequently, the same reasoning will be applied in 
cases where we observe a negative effect of ‘EVI square’ and a positive effect of ‘EVI’.  
In terms of the control variables, as shown by the Joint F-test on the duration dependence 
variables (Column [1]), there is a negative duration dependence in the behaviour of CFA 
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Franc Zone countries compared with their likelihood of entering into excessive debt. In 
addition, the ‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’ has lowered the likelihood 
of these countries entering into excessive debt compared with the period where such 
budgetary discipline does not exist (1980–1998). The probability of excessive debt is also 
positively driven by a rise in the grants, a rise in inflation, a depreciation in the real exchange 
rate and a deterioration in terms of trade. Real GDP growth and the fiscal balance seem to 
exert no statistical effect on the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries. 
Table 3 contains the results of the model specification where ‘EVI’ and its square are replaced 
by EVI’s components as well as their squares. The average partial effects (Column [2]) of the 
control covariates are roughly the same as those of Table 1 (Column [2]), except that here, the 
fiscal balance variable is positively associated with the probability of excessive debt in CFA 
Franc Zone countries. In other words, an improvement in the fiscal balance leads these 
countries to enter into excessive debt. 
 
Table 3: EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in CFA Franc Zone Countries 
 Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
Linear Probability Model on the 
trimmed sampleb (SLS 
procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure -9.258 -0.4834815 -0.357 -2.849 
 (9.356) (.486234) (0.467) (1.827) 
Shock 12.79 0.6676987* 1.220*** 1.881 
 (7.775) (0.396062) (0.332) (1.466) 
Exposuresq 16.83* 0.878965* 0.837 3.900* 
 (9.780) (0.5013442) (0.518) (2.082) 
Shocksq -9.284*** -0.4848228*** -0.460*** -2.064*** 
 (3.060) (0.147198) (0.177) (0.579) 
Exposureshock -4.495 -0.2347203 -1.005*** -0.0285 
 (9.033) (0.4702039) (0.335) (1.596) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.977** 0.1032258*** 0.0437 0.635*** 
 (0.873) (0.0440164) (0.0341) (0.196) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.297 -0.0154988 -0.0342 -0.0470 
 (0.381) (0.0197703) (0.0212) (0.0806) 
Inflationt-1 -0.896* -0.0467909* -0.0404 -0.174 
 (0.480) (0.0244584) (0.0250) (0.121) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.913*** 0.0998922*** 0.0371 1.074*** 
 (0.619) (0.0301187) (0.0374) (0.275) 
REERt-1 -0.893* -0.0466562** -0.131*** -0.132 
 (0.463) (0.0232502) (0.0323) (0.0828) 
Termstrade -3.205*** -0.1673953*** -0.122*** -0.461*** 
 (0.814) (0.0377766) (0.0297) (0.154) 
Pacte -2.965*** -0.1548515 -0.162*** -0.477** 
 (1.051) (0.051094) (0.0539) (0.180) 
Number -3.180*** -0.1660735*** -0.227*** -0.847*** 
 (0.724) (0.0310941) (0.0409) (0.147) 
Variable -1.263*** -0.0659435*** -0.0652*** -0.153** 
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 (0.261) (0.0109898) (0.0121) (0.0754) 
Spline (1) -0.00161 -0.000084 -0.000336** 0.000845 
 (0.00125) (0.0000646) (0.000151) (0.00349) 
Spline (2) 0.000521 0.0000272 0.000293* 0.0320*** 
 (0.00281) (0.0001465) (0.000165) (0.0109) 
Spline (3) -0.0152*** -0.0007923*** -0.000345 -0.0245* 
 (0.00489) (0.0002358) (0.000351) (0.0130) 
 
    
Observations  317  344 83 
Log likelihood         -55.237813    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic 
(P-Value) 
58.24 (0.0010)  146.62 (0.0000) 6.75 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.840 0.784 
  
 
  
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
23.46 (0.0001)  8.63 (0.0000) 6.66 (0.0002) 
Fixed Effects Significance 38.82 (0.0001)  127.51 (0.0000) 9.38 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. 
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This 
is the Sequential Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value 
associated concern the logit model where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and 
the P-value are associated to the linear probability models.  
 
Concerning our variable of interest (‘EVI’s components and their squares), the results of the 
LPM based on the full sample are suggestive of a statistically significance (at the 1% level) of 
the variables ‘shock’, ‘shock square’ and ‘exposure*shock’. The results of the LPM based on 
the SLS procedure suggest, however, that among our variables of interest, only ‘shock square’ 
and ‘exposure square’ are statistically significant, although at the 10% significance level for 
the latter. Overall, we conclude from Table 3’s results that the nonlinearity observed for EVI 
with respect to the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries seems to be 
driven to a certain extent by both the ‘exposure’ and the ‘shock’ components of the ‘EVI’ 
variable. 
Table 4 discriminates between the impact of EVI on the probability of excessive debt 
in WAEMU versus ECCAS. Once again, the average partial effects associated with the 
control explanatory variables and shown in Column [2] display roughly the same sign, 
magnitude and significance as those in Table 2. In addition, we observe as in Table 3 that an 
improvement in the fiscal balance increases the chance of CFA Franc Zone countries entering 
into excessive debt: a one standard deviation rise in the fiscal balance (i.e., 9.25%) increases 
the probability of excessive debt by 7.4% (although the statistical significance is only 10%). 
Moreover, irrespective of the model specification considered (logistic, linear probability 
based on the full sample or on the trimmed sample), WAEMU countries have a greater chance 
of entering into excessive debt than ECCAS countries. The result in Column [2] shows that 
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holding all other covariates fixed, WAEMU countries have a 51.52% higher probability of 
entering into excessive debt compared with their ECCAS counterparts. Despite this difference 
in terms of behaviour, the inverted U-shaped relationship previously observed for EVI with 
respect to the probability of excessive indebtedness seems to be the same in terms of 
magnitude for WAEMU and ECCAS. 
 
Table 4: ‘EVI’s Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus ECCAS  
 
 Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed 
Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability Model on 
the whole sample 
Linear Probability Model 
on the trimmed sampleb 
(SLS procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Evi 1.737 0.0985157 0.289 0.574 
 (12.73) (0.7219109) (0.495) (1.888) 
Evisq -1.007 -0.0571219 -0.255 -0.516 
 (14.75) (0.8364606) (0.484) (2.091) 
dummyWAEMU 3.631*** 0.2059909*** 0.890*** 2.753*** 
 (1.202) (0.0622984) (0.162) (0.452) 
Eviwaemu 22.56 1.279856 2.279*** 3.971* 
 (14.56) (0.8120269) (0.810) (2.183) 
Evisqwaemu -24.28 -1.377162 -2.470*** -4.232* 
 (16.88) (0.9428261) (0.858) (2.437) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.307* 0.0741478* 0.0649** 0.218 
 (0.790) (0.0441364) (0.0327) (0.196) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.196 -0.0111365 -0.0386* -0.0734 
 (0.372) (0.0210011) (0.0215) (0.0732) 
Inflationt-1 -0.718* -0.0407349* -0.0374 -0.0792 
 (0.431) (0.0240257) (0.0266) (0.0821) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.735*** 0.0984442*** 0.0496 0.309* 
 (0.575) (0.030467) (0.0377) (0.162) 
REERt-1 -0.733 -0.0416072 -0.118*** -0.100 
 (0.464) (0.02585) (0.0297) (0.0980) 
Termstrade -3.089*** -.1752252*** -0.146*** -0.455*** 
 (0.781) (0.0405236) (0.0281) (0.170) 
Pacte -3.137*** -.1779594*** -0.110** -0.533** 
 (1.040) (0.0557497) (0.0488) (0.243) 
Number -2.448*** -0.1388575*** -0.259*** -0.411*** 
 (0.594) (0.028832) (0.0399) (0.112) 
Variable -1.086*** -0.0615867*** -0.0652*** -0.190*** 
 (0.228) (0.0105242) (0.0120) (0.0514) 
Spline (1) -0.00104 -0.0000593 -0.000336** -1.29e-05 
 (0.00124) (0.0000703) (0.000150) (0.000204) 
Spline (2) -0.000590 -0.0000335 0.000182 -0.000298 
 (0.00248) (0.0001404) (0.000165) (0.00100) 
Spline (3) -0.0112*** -0.0006339*** -0.000164 -0.00221* 
 (0.00432) (0.0002327) (0.000337) (0.00128) 
 
 
   
Observations  317  344 111 
Log likelihood         -60.179742    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-
Value) 64.22 (0.0001)  157.14 (0.0000) 8.82 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.843 0.749 
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
22.86 
(0.0001)  8.50 (0.0000) 3.71 (0.0079) 
Fixed Effects Significance 31.64 (0.0009)  132.71 (0.0000) 10.75 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. 
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This 
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is the Sequential Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value 
associated concern the logit model where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and 
the P-value are associated to the linear probability models.  
 
In Table 5, we use the model specification for which the results are displayed in Table 
4 but replace the ‘EVI’ variable and its square by its components and their squares in addition 
to the interaction between the components. The average partial effects obtained for the control 
covariates are roughly the same as those reported in Table 4, except for the variable 
‘dummyWAEMU’, where the average partial effect is higher than that in Table 4, and for the 
real exchange rate variable, which is here negative and significantly related to the likelihood 
of excessive indebtedness of CFA Franc Zone countries. As stipulated above, we cannot 
interpret the interaction terms associated with our variables of interest based on the average 
partial effects reported in Column [2]. Evidence is shown from Column [3] of Table 5 that 
despite the previously observed absence of a difference between WAEMU and ECCAS 
countries in terms of the nonlinearity of EVI with respect to the probability of excessive debt, 
a simultaneous rise in both ‘exposure to shocks’ and ‘shocks’ seems to exert a higher impact 
in WAEMU than in ECCAS countries. Further, the coefficient of the variable ‘shock square’ 
interacted with the variable ‘dummyWAEMU’ is negative and significant. Since the other 
interaction variables with the ‘dummyWAEMU’ are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level, the interpretation of such results would be based on the combination of the two previous 
results. Hence, from the results of the LPM based on the full sample, we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in ‘exposure’ and a one standard deviation rise in ‘shock’ will 
lead to a probability of excessive debt = (-1.184+1.59) = 0.406 = 40.6% higher in WAEMU 
than in ECCAS countries.  
 
Table 5: ‘EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus ECCAS  
 
 Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability Model on 
the whole sample 
Linear Probability Model on the 
trimmed sampleb (SLS 
procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure -17.26 -0.8111736 -1.656** -4.004 
 (18.12) (0.8479976) (0.671) (2.887) 
Shock 18.51 0.8698677 1.176*** 5.433* 
 (13.15) (0.6040299) (0.370) (3.079) 
dummyWAEMU 10.96*** 0.5151719*** 1.523*** 2.349*** 
 (2.796) (0.1117504) (0.189) (0.764) 
Exposuresq 27.86 1.309631 1.944*** 7.009** 
 (17.70) (0.8181585) (0.641) (3.240) 
Shocksq 2.916 0.1370845 -0.0337 0.851 
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 (5.787) (0.2716366) (0.160) (0.983) 
Exposureshock -27.43* -1.28945* -1.522*** -8.453** 
 (15.27) (0.6934194) (0.341) (3.767) 
Exposurewaemu -2.192 -0.1030191 0.964 0.825 
 (22.34) (1.050018) (1.114) (3.947) 
Shockwaemu -4.572 -0.2148894 0.0277 -3.176 
 (15.96) (0.7488446) (0.690) (3.933) 
Exposuresqwaemu 1.554 0.0730482 -0.892 -1.754 
 (23.00) (1.080952) (1.276) (4.270) 
Shocksqwaemu -14.99** -0.7046872** -1.184*** -3.134** 
 (6.886) (0.3102294) (0.301) (1.320) 
Exposureshockwaemu 27.45 1.290239 1.588* 8.937* 
 (18.62) (0.8557206) (0.904) (4.959) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 2.094** 0.0984357** 0.0556* 0.527* 
 (0.987) (0.0450082) (0.0320) (0.287) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.239 -0.0112262 -0.0436** -0.0309 
 (0.452) (0.0211115) (0.0178) (0.137) 
Inflationt-1 -1.034** -0.0486139** -0.0407* -0.201 
 (0.519) (0.0234128) (0.0239) (0.135) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.951*** 0.0917232*** 0.0553 0.503** 
 (0.633) (0.0272569) (0.0382) (0.212) 
REERt-1 -1.464** -0.0688191** -0.119*** -0.325* 
 (0.631) (0.0284533) (0.0284) (0.179) 
Termstrade -3.165*** -0.1487908*** -0.169*** -0.661** 
 (0.947) (0.0411214) (0.0293) (0.306) 
Pacte -2.821** -0.1326018*** -0.144*** -0.493* 
 (1.121) (0.0499856) (0.0513) (0.273) 
Number -3.316*** -0.1558461*** -0.302*** -0.713*** 
 (0.723) (0.0260734) (0.0412) (0.178) 
Variable -1.334*** -0.0626965*** -0.0648*** -0.347*** 
 (0.291) (0.0110908) (0.0117) (0.113) 
Spline (1) -0.00190 -0.0000892 -0.000279* -0.000273 
 (0.00153) (0.000071) (0.000144) (0.000248) 
Spline (2) 0.00242 0.0001136 0.000285* 0.00149** 
 (0.00423) (0.0001987) (0.000163) (0.000734) 
Spline (3) -0.0172*** -0.000807*** -0.000408 -0.00565*** 
 (0.00620) (0.0002734) (0.000334) (0.00193) 
     
Observations  317  344 80 
Log likelihood         -49.682483    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-Value) 53.34 (0.0185)  136.23 (0.0000) 5.07 (0.0001) 
R Squared   0.860 0.737 
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
21.34 
(0.0003) 
 8.92 (0.0000) 3.30 (0.0183) 
Fixed Effects Significance 23.72  45.32 (0.0000) 9.38 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. 
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This 
is the Sequential Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value 
associated concern the logit model where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and 
the P-value are associated to the linear probability models.  
 
We highlighted above the first shortcoming of our study. Another shortcoming is the 
difficulties in using a political/institutional variable. In fact, we intend to see whether the 
quality of governance in these countries alleviates or even renders statistically nil the effect of 
‘EVI’ (and its square) on the probability of excessive debt and whether once taking into 
account this variable, the effects of our variables of interest differ between WAEMU and 
ECCAS countries. 
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For this reason, we need to introduce the variable ‘quality of governance’ into the model. 
However, since the data on this variable are not available for many countries of our sample 
and given the small size of the latter, we cannot use either the logistic model or the LPM 
based on the trimmed sample to perform this analysis. Accordingly, to have an idea of such 
effect, we rely solely on the LPM based on the full sample (the data available are also not 
sufficient to apply the SLS procedure), the results of which are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: ‘EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus 
ECCAS: Taking in account institutional and political variables. 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
 Model with the variable “Quality of 
Governance” 
Model with the 
variable “civtot” 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Evi 2.035**  0.166 
 (0.888)  (1.642) 
Evisq -2.059*  0.0903 
 (1.075)  (1.873) 
Eviwaemu -1.020  3.764** 
 (1.169)  (1.834) 
Evisqwaemu 1.194  -4.233** 
 (1.382)  (2.101) 
Exposure  0.0379  
  (1.032)  
Shock  1.367*  
  (0.707)  
dummyWAEMU 0.739*** 1.728*** 2.153*** 
 (0.133) (0.274) (0.429) 
Exposuresq  0.965  
  (1.172)  
Shocksq  1.794**  
  (0.887)  
Exposureshock  -2.929***  
  (1.072)  
Exposurewaemu  -0.538  
  (1.39)  
Shockwaemu  -0.669  
  (0.853)  
Exposuresqwaemu  -0.392  
  (1.592)  
Shocksqwaemu  -2.968***  
  (0.999)  
Exposureshockwaemu  3.717***  
  (1.205)  
Qog -0.143 -0.350  
 (0.243) (0.284)  
Civtot   0.117* 
   (0.0703) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 -0.0238 -0.016 0.214 
 (0.0417) (0.037) (0.143) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.0234 -0.032 -0.0366 
 (0.0300) (0.028) (0.0696) 
Inflationt-1 -0.005 -0.0017 -0.105 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.0792) 
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Grantsgdpt-1 0.013 0.014 0.297* 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.152) 
REERt-1 -0.117*** -0.108** -0.0991 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.0976) 
Termstrade -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.440*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.135) 
Pacte -0.10* -0.189*** -0.452** 
 (0.06) (0.066) (0.220) 
Number -0.374*** -0.335*** -0.410*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.112) 
Variable -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.198*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.0477) 
Spline (1) -0.000519*** -0.00044** -0.000135 
 (0.000175) (0.00021) (0.000174) 
Spline (2) 0.00025* 0.000268 -0.000165 
 (0.00014) (0.000164) (0.000281) 
Spline (3) -0.00015 -0.0003 -0.00212*** 
 (0.00026) (0.0003) (0.000633) 
    
Observations  218 218 116 
F-statistic (Pvalue) 291.48 (0.0000) 246.25 (0.0000) 41.13 (0.0000) 
R Squared 0.921 0.931 0.746 
Joint F-test on « Duration dependence » variables 11.94 (0.0000) 14.53 (0.0000) 4.36 (0.0029) 
Fixed Effects Significance 9.72 (0.0000) 12.79 (0.0000) 7.46 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. 
Standard Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This 
is the Sequential Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value 
associated concern the logit model where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and 
the P-value are associated to the linear probability models.  
 
The idea underlying the introduction of an institutional variable in the analysis is that the 
better the quality of institutions, the lower the build-up of public debt and thus the lower the 
likelihood of entering into excessive indebtedness. In addition, there is a need for developing 
countries that are structurally vulnerable to set up adequate institutions to promote 
competitiveness, build economic resilience and promote sustainable development (Farrugia, 
2007). Thus, institutions in developing countries, particularly in CFA Franc Zone countries, 
should be as strong as possible to reflect the governance aspects inside their economic 
environments. 
By assuming that the variable ‘quality of governance’ really captures the quality of 
governance in these countries, the results in Table 6 show that although this variable appears 
with the expected sign, it is not statistically significant. Moreover, it does not affect the 
nonlinearity relationship between EVI and the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc 
Zone countries. The magnitude associated with this nonlinear relationship is the same for 
WAEMU and ECCAS countries, even if the probability of excessive debt itself is higher in 
WAEMU countries than it is in ECCAS countries. The results obtained for the EVI’s 
components and their squares, as well as their interactions with the ‘dummyWAEMU’ 
variable, are consistent with the estimates in Table 5. With regard to the other control 
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variables, the likelihood of CFA Franc Zone countries entering into excessive debt seems to 
be driven positively by a depreciation in the real exchange rate or deterioration in terms of 
trade. The ‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’ has exerted a negative impact 
on this probability, while the duration dependence remains negative and significant. The 
remaining control variables do not seem to be statistically significant. We conclude that if the 
variable ‘quality of governance’ really captures the quality of governance in CFA Franc Zone 
countries, an improvement in such quality in these countries does not affect the relationship 
observed between EVI and the probability of these countries entering into excessive 
indebtedness. 
As some of the CFA Franc Zone countries may be prone to conflict situation characterized by 
high societal violence (civil violence, ethnic violence, civil warfare and ethnic warfare), we 
find useful to include in our model specification a variable capturing such situation. We 
subsequently consider in our model specification the variable ‘civtot’ measuring the ‘total 
summed magnitudes of all societal Major Episodes of Political Violence’ (see the Appendix 1 
for more details in this variable) and expect it to substantially increase the public debt to GDP 
ratio in these countries. Note that the latter is included in replacement of the variable ‘quality 
of governance’ because of data limitation, particularly regarding the variable ‘Quality of 
Governance’. The results, based on the linear probability model using the Sequential Least 
Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006), are displayed in column [3] of Table 6.   
Apart from the variable ‘grantsgdp’ which is positive and significant (although at 10% level 
of significance), the introduction of the variable ‘civtot’ in the model doesn’t change the 
significance and sign of the coefficients of the control (economic) variables compare to the 
case where we introduce the ‘Quality of Governance’ variable. However, in contrast with the 
case of the variable ‘Quality of Governance’, we note here that the introduction the variable 
‘civtot’ in the model cancels out the significance of the variables ‘Evi’ and ‘Evisq’ – but the 
variables ‘Eviwaemu’ and ‘Eviwaemusq’ become significant. This peculiar result suggests 
that when we take into account the possible effect of political violence on the likelihood of 
excessive public indebtedness in CFA Franc zone countries, a difference appears between 
WAEMU and ECCAS in terms of the nonlinear effect of EVI on their probability of entering 
into public indebtedness. The coefficient of the variable ‘civtot’ is positive and significant 
(although at 10% level of significance), suggesting that higher all societal Major Episodes of 
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Political Violence in CFA Franc Zone countries induce higher probability of entering into 
excessive indebtedness.   
 
8. Conclusion and policy implications  
By using the ‘debt rule’ among other criteria implemented by both WAEMU and ECCAS 
countries within the CFA Franc Zone for macroeconomic stability and convergence purposes, 
this chapter assesses whether the structural vulnerability of such countries affects their 
indebtedness, and more particularly their likelihood of entering into excessive debt. To 
perform our analysis, we use the (structural) EVI jointly computed by Guillaumont et al. 
(2011) and the UN-DESA (United Nations –Department of Economic and Social Affairs) – 
indicator which is amongst others, used by the United Nations as one of the criteria for 
identification and graduation of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) -, and focus on a panel of 
14 CFA Franc Zone countries over the period 1980–2008. We also replace in the model 
specifications the ‘EVI’ variable with its components. Overall, the results are suggestive of a 
nonlinear effect of ‘EVI’ with respect to the probability of entering into excessive debt: for a 
rise in EVI, the probability of excessive debt increases in CFA Franc Zone countries; 
however, for higher EVI, this probability significantly declines. Moreover, although the 
improvement of institutions quality in these countries which are mostly least-developed 
Countries (LDCs) is highly desirable for economic growth and development purposes, it does 
not appear to influence the effect of EVI on the public indebtedness of these countries.    
Given the development challenges faced by CFA Franc Zone countries and the structural 
vulnerability of their economies, it is likely that repeated experiences of structural shocks will 
not facilitate the implementation of appropriate policy responses to these shocks. This is 
because further to one shock, the response capacity of these countries weakens, which 
subsequently increases their structural economic vulnerability. In such context, the 
international development institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) should take into account such vulnerability in their assessment of the adequate 
development policies and recommendations - especially those related to debt issues -, to these 
countries.  
Several international policy options, including a rise in international assistance (mainly in the 
form of grants) and private financing could be explored to directly address the structural 
vulnerability of these economies, while ensuring that such flows are managed in a way to 
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avoid any adverse macroeconomic implications, particularly substantial public debt. In the 
meantime, the international community should ensure that these countries reduce over the 
medium and long term their high dependence on international assistance as, sooner or later, 
aid flows will severely shrink, situation which is best illustrated by the current economic 
conditions of developed countries. The international community should also develop 
mechanisms that help these countries increase their capacity to design the appropriate policy 
responses to further shocks on their economies. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Definition and Source of variables 
 
Variable and Definition Source and Comments 
Dummyexcessivedebt 
The author ‘s computation is based on the IMF’s database on Gross Public Debt – 
The IMF’s database weblink on Gross Public debt is: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262. 
This dummy variable takes the value ‘1’ if the total Gross Public Debt-to-GDP ratio 
is higher than 70% and the value‘0’, otherwise. 
 EVI = Economic Vulnerability 
Index Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 
Exposure = Exposure Index We use the ‘exposure index’ provided by Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011) that we divide by 2, as the ‘EVI’ is the average of Exposure Index and Shock Index. 
Shock = Shock Index We use the ‘exposure index’ provided by Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011) that we divide by 2, as the ‘EVI’ is the average of Exposure Index and Shock Index. 
Fiscal_balance = Fiscal Balance 
in percentage of GDP 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Developpement International (CERDI)’s 
Public Finance Database. Fiscal balance is the overall revenue (tax and non-tax 
revenue), excluding grants minus government expenditures. 
Gdpgrowth = Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
Termstrade = Net barter terms 
of trade index (2000 = 100) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
REER = Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, Base 100 = 
2000 
CERDI’s Database: This is the Real Effective Exchange Rate, base 2005 = 100 
computed by CERDI: it is the ratio of prices in the country to prices in the main 
import partners adjusted for variations in nominal effective exchange rate. An 
increase means an appreciation. 
Grantsgdp = Grants in percent 
of GDP. 
 
Grants data are grants disbursements by all donors expressed in current millions of 
US Dollars. They are extracted from the OECD Statistical Database. The GDP used 
to calculate the ratio of Grants in percentage of GDP is extracted from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2011. 
 Inflation = Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
DummyWAEMU This an indicator variable taking the value ‘1’ if the country of CFA Franc Zone is WAEMU’s member, and ‘0’, otherwise. 
Number This variable indicates the number of prior excessive debt episodes (or spells)  
Pacte 
This is a dummy variable capturing the entry into force of the ‘Stability, Growth and 
Solidarity Pact’ within the zone franc since 1999. It takes the value ‘1’ for the years 
1999-2008, and ‘0’, otherwise. 
Quality of Governance 
The quality of governance is measured by subjective indices from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-governance index from ICRG used here 
is an 18-point scale, created by summing the following three six-point scales: 
corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. See the ICRG 
for the criteria used in coding these measures. The rationale for corruption and 
bureaucratic quality is obvious. The rule-of-law definition indicates that this 
measure reflects the government's administrative capacity in enforcing the law, as 
well as the potential for rent-seeking associated with weak legal systems and 
insecure property rights. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
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Civtot 
Civtot is the Total summed magnitudes of all societal Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (MEPV). 
 
CIVTOT (2-numeric) = CIVVIOL + CIVWAR + ETHVIOL + ETHWAR 
  
CIVVIOL (2-numeric) = the Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil violence 
involving that state in that year; Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV. 
Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes.  
 
CIVWAR (2-numeric) = Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving 
that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude 
scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes.   
 
ETHVIOL (2-numeric) = Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic violence involving 
that state in a given year.  Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; 
Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes.  
 
ETHWAR (2-numeric) = Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic warfare involving 
that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude 
scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes.  
 
Other Variables 
Evisq = The square of ‘EVI’; Exposuresq = the square of ‘Exposure’; Shocksq = the square of ‘shock’; Exposureshock 
= Exposure*Shock; Eviwaemu = Evi*DummyWAEMU; Evisqwaemu  = Evisq*DummyWAEMU; Exposuresqwaemu 
= Exposuresq*DummyWAEMU; Shocksqwaemu = Shocksq*DummyWAEMU; Exposureshockwaemu = 
Exposureshock*DummyWAEMU. 
 
  
222 
 
Appendix 2: Statistics on Periods of ‘Excessive debt’ on CFA Franc Zone countries 
 
Country Period of the data on Total Public 
Debt availability 
Period of ‘Excessive debt’ 
Benin 1980-2008 1983; 1985; 1989-1991; 1993-1995 
Burkina Faso 1980-2008 ‘No identified period of ‘excessive debt’ 
Cameroon 1980-2008 1994-2003 
Central African Rep. 1980-2008 1994-2008 
Chad 1980-2008 1994; 1999-2000 
Congo, Republic of 1980-2008 1981-2007 
Côte d’Ivoire 1980-2008 1982-2008 
Equatorial Guinea 1985-2008 1985-1996 
Gabon 1980-2008 1987-1989; 1994-2003 
Guinea-Bissau 1986-2008 1986-2008 
Mali 1980-2008 1982-2001 
Niger 1980-2008 1994-2002 
Senegal 1980-2008 1983-1988; 1994-1999; 2001 
Togo 1980-2008 1980-1989; 1991; 1993-2007 
 
Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dummyexcessivedebt 393 0.524173 0.5000519 0 1 
Evi 401 43.22752 9.917783 24.67814 72.40889 
Exposure 406 26.19997 5.148306 16.6997 40.30086 
Shock 401 17.0898 6.899618 5.937748 37.36527 
Fiscal_balance 375 4.34111 9.248568 -17.94905 38.85204 
Gdpgrowth 400 3.705248 7.968115 -28.09998 71.18799 
Inflation 400 7.950738 15.72924 -29.17266 112.8948 
Grantsgdp 401 9.980065 9.037769 0.193719 49.40295 
REER 406 126.1705 34.87212 40.2845 259.0221 
Termstrade 401 123.2465 55.78856 21.27743 357.5757 
Pacte 406 0.2413793 0.4284478 0 1 
Qog 245 0.3803713 0.1215567 0.1666667 0.6944445 
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Appendix 4: Interaction Effects 
We provide here a general derivation of interaction effects in both linear and non-linear 
models, following Ai and Norton (2003) and Ai, Norton and Wang (2004). In fact, these 
authors demonstrate on the basis of a model comprising two interacted variables that the 
interaction effect is based on cross-partial derivatives with respect to the two interacted 
variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction term different for 
observations.  
This Appendix is structured as follows:  
- Firstly, we present a general derivation of interaction effects in linear models.  
- Secondly, we focus on non-linear models, specifically logit model, where we consider 
interaction effects only for variables that do not have high order terms (that is for 
example, a continuous variable and its square): the demonstration is performed for two 
different cases: the first one deals with two interacted continuous variables and the second 
deals with two interacted variables where one is continuous and the other is a dummy. 
- Thirdly, and lastly, we consider the case of non-linear (logit) model which contains 
continuous variables with high order terms. 
   
1- Interaction effects in linear models 
 
Consider the following linear specification of the expected value of dependent variable:  
1 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] TE y x x x x x x x x                                    (1) 
where 1 , 2  and 12 are parameters and   is a vector of parameters, all of them are unknown. 
Tx  is a vector of variables that excludes 1x and 2x  (that is, Tx is supposed to be independent 
of 1x and 2x ). 
Assuming that 1x and 2x  are continuous variables. The marginal effects of 1x  on the expected 
value 1 2[ / , , ]E E y x x x  depends on 2x  if 12 0  : 1 12 2
1
E
x
x
             (2)   
The interaction effect given by the impact of a marginal change in 2x  on the marginal effect 
of 1x , is thus obtained from taking the derivative of (2) with respect to 2x :  
2
12
2 1
E
x x
      (3). 
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As a consequence, in linear specifications, the interaction effect 
2
2 1
E
x x
   equals the marginal 
effect 12
2 1( )
E E
x x w
    where w represents the interaction term. However, in non-linear 
models such as logit and probit, this inequality does not hold. In the next section, we provide 
a general derivation of interaction effects in logit model where the interaction variables are 
continuous and where ther is no high order terms in the model.  
 
2- Interaction effects in non-linear models: the case of logit model without high order 
terms 
Consider now the following expected value of dependent variable y:  
1 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x x x F u                    (4) 
Where F(u) is a nonlinear function of its argument 1 1 2 2 12 1 2 Tu x x x x x       .  
For example, in the logit model, F(u) is equals the cumulative distribution function defined as 
exp( )( )
1 exp( )
uF u
u
   where exp denotes the exponentiel function. For probit model, F(u) would 
be the cumulative normal distribution function ( )u . Since in this chapter, we have used the 
logit model to perform our analysis, we will focus on this function for the derivation of the 
formulae of interaction effects if  
 
(i) 1x and 2x  are both continuous variables ; 
(ii) 1x is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy variable. 
 
(i) If F(u) is a twice differentiable function, with the first and second derivatives denoted 
by '( )F u and ''( )F u being respectively the marginal effect with respect to 1x , we obtain the 
interaction effects formulae as following : 
  
2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
( )( ) ( ) [ '( ) ] [ ( ) ]E E F u u uF u f u
x x x x x x x x x x
                             (5) 
 
The transformation of (5) leads to:   
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'
1 12 2 12 1 12 2 2 12 1
2
[ ( ).( )] ( ). ( )( ) ( )f u x f u x x f u
x
                            (6) 
For logit model where exp( )( )
1 exp( )
uF u
u
  , evidence is shown that '( ) [ ( )][1 ( )]F u F u F u   and 
'' '( ) [ ( )][1 2 ( )] [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]F u F u F u F u F u F u     .  
 
As a result,  
2
2 1
E
x x
   12 1 12 2 2 12 1.[ ( )][1 ( )] ( )( )[ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]F u F u x x F u F u F u             (7) 
 
This suggests that the interaction effect 
12
2
xx
E  generally differs from the marginal effect 
)( 12
2
xx
E   of the interaction term 12 xxw  . 
 
(ii) Assume now that 1x  is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy variable. 
 
Consider the expected value function (4) where 1x  is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy 
variable. 
The mixed interaction effect  )(
12 x
E
x   can be computed as follows: 
0)(1)())(()( 2
1
2
11212
 xxuFxxuFxuFxxEx    (8) 
  
The transformation of (8) leads to the following expression:  
  
)()()( 11'1112211'
12
 TT xxFxxxF
x
E
x
   (9) 
Note however that )()(
2112 x
E
xx
E
x  . 
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3- Interaction effects in non-linear models: the case of logit model with one high order 
terms (order 2) 
 
(i) Consider the case of logit model with one high order terms (order 2) – this the case 
for our model with the variable ‘EVI’ and ‘EVIsquare’ 
 
Instead of expectation (4), we now depart from the following expected value:  
2
1 2 1 1 1 1[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x F u                         (10) 
where 21 1 1 1
Tu x x x     .   
 
The formula of the interaction effect is:  
2
'
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )( ) ( ) [ '( ) ] [( 2 ). ( )]E E F u uF u x F u
x x x x x x x x x
                      
Hence, 
2
' ''
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 ( ) ( 2 ).[ ( )].E uF u x F u
x x x
         and finally,  
2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 [ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x F u F u F u
x x
                 (11) 
 
(ii) Consider the case of logit model with two high order terms (order 2) – this the case 
for our model which contains the components of the variable ‘EVI’ and their squares. 
 
Instead of expectation (10), we now depart from the following expected value:  
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x x x x x F u                (12) 
where 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2
Tu x x x x x x x           .   
 
The interaction term of the variable 21x is obtained through the following expression: 
2
' ' 2 ''
1 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1 1 1 1
[ '( ) ] [( 2 ). ( )] 2 . ( ) ( 2 ) ( )E uF u x x F u F u x x F u
x x x x x
                    
 
Therefore, 
2
2
1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1
2 .[ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x x F u F u F u
x x
               (13) 
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 Similarly, the interaction term of the variable 22x is given by:  
 
2
2
2 2 2 2 12 1
2 2
2 .[ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x x F u F u F u
x x
                (14). 
 
Overall, we conclude that for linear functions where uuF )(  and where 1)(' uF , the 
interaction effect is given by 12 , for the nonlinear function such as logit, it is always different 
from 12 , even if the model contains variables with high order terms.      
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Financing development is a major issue for developing countries, and particularly the poorest 
ones, which are exposed to external and internal shocks.  
This thesis investigates two subjects: ‘the relationship between ODA, migrants’ remittances 
and fiscal episodes’ and ‘the structural economic vulnerability effect on public indebtedness 
of developing countries’. Each of these issues has been respectively decomposed in the 
following two questions, the subjects of the chapters of this thesis: 
1) ‘How do fiscal episodes in developed countries affect their aid supply?’ and ‘How do 
development aid unpredictability and migrants’ remittances influence the fiscal consolidation 
decision of developing countries?’ 
2) ‘What is the effect of the structural economic vulnerability of developing countries on the 
public debt of these countries?’ and ‘How does the structural economic vulnerability in CFA 
Franc CFA zone countries affect their excessive public debt?’  
 
To answer these questions, we make use of both economic literature and econometric tools.  
 
Main Results 
 The evaluation of the consequences of fiscal episodes in main OECD Donors on their 
aid supply leads to the following results:  
- First, on the full sample of OECD DAC countries, we observe that fiscal consolidation 
episodes reduce aid effort, whatever aid variable considered, with these negative 
effects sometimes diminishing over time. However, fiscal stimuli episodes exert 
significant and positive effects only on aid the Net Aid Transfers variable of Roodman 
(2008, 2012), the other aid variables do not significantly respond to fiscal stimuli 
periods. 
- Second, European Union countries exhibit the same behaviour in terms of aid effort as 
those of the full sample of countries. In contrast, aid exports of Non-European 
Countries (Non EU) do not seem to be affected during episodes of large fiscal 
retrenchment, whereas these countries reduce severely their aid supply during large 
episodes of loose discretionary fiscal policy with no decreasing of this negative effect 
over time.  
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Turning to the consequences of migrants’ remittances and development aid unpredictability 
on fiscal consolidation measures in developing countries, the analysis distinguishes between 
two types of measures:  gradual fiscal adjustment and rapid fiscal adjustment. The results 
obtained suggest that: 
-  Workers’ remittances increase the likelihood of fiscal consolidation, be the latter 
gradual or rapid. This result remains valid for the two different sub-samples analysed 
in this chapter, except for low-income countries, for which we observe no effect of 
remittances on the decision to consolidate the budget gradually. This positive effect of 
remittances (irrespective of the sample considered) seems to have sometimes 
translated through fiscal policy variables. 
- The unpredictability of aid inflows does not affect the adoption of fiscal consolidation 
measures in developing countries. The explanation can be rooted in either the 
utilization of such aid by the recipient countries that makes unaffected the 
government’s budget, or because we control for the quality of governance variable.  
 
The assessment of the impact of structural economic vulnerability in developing countries on 
their overall public debt also generates interesting results:  
- With regard to the full sample of developing countries, as well as the sub-samples of 
LMICs and UMICs, EVI affects positively the build-up of public debt, but this 
positive effect appears after a threshold of the EVI. In other words, we observe the 
existence of a non-linear relationship (in the form of a U curve) between the EVI and 
public indebtedness in developing countries. The same findings apply when we use 
EVI’s components rather than EVI itself. This result of EVI is confirmed when the 
analysis is performed over decades.  
- By contrast, for LICs, the U curve relationship between EVI and the total public debt 
is observed only over decades. 
- These results show the extent to which structural vulnerability in developing countries 
affects their public debt, especially in LICs.    
We further focus on CFA Franc zone countries, and examine the way their structural 
vulnerability influence their likelihood of entry into excessive public debt. To do so, we rely 
on the debt rule adopted by these countries: the ratio of the total public debt to GDP should 
not exceed 70%. Overall, the results are suggestive of a nonlinear effect of ‘EVI’ with respect 
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to the probability of entering into excessive debt: a rise in EVI, the probability of excessive 
debt increases in CFA Franc Zone countries; however, for higher EVI, this probability 
significantly declines. Moreover, this result does not depend on the institutions quality of 
these countries - which are mostly least-developed Countries – which are supposed to mitigate 
their structural vulnerability. 
 
Policy Implications of these Results 
Several policy implications emerge from the results obtained regarding the effects of fiscal 
episodes in OECD Countries on their aid supply:   We could infer that the fiscal adjustment measures being currently adopted by many 
developed countries, especially the European Union ones will negatively affect their 
aid expenditures, with these negative effects being likely higher than expected, given 
the severity of the crises. The recent OECD statistics in terms of ODA supply confirm 
these results especially with respect to the current public finances crises faced by 
Developed Countries. These curtailments will affect severely the investment spending 
of developing countries, especially Africans, with deleterious effects on economic 
growth and poverty reduction. As a result, the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) is likely to be severely jeopardized in these countries.  Despite the current crucial role of aid inflows for many aid recipients (especially Low-
Income Countries), these countries should reduce their aid dependency in the long 
term. In this respect, the International Community for example has a key role to play, 
including in helping these countries strengthen their mobilization of tax revenue by 
removing the main obstacles to the improvement of such mobilization. Emphasis 
should also be put on innovative financing mechanisms (as decided during the 
Monterrey Summit in 2002) through for instance the international financial tax 
transactions and the reduction of remittances costs at the international level. In 
addition, the deepening of domestic financial markets in these countries should be 
very helpful in allowing them to simultaneously rely less on foreign capital flows 
(whose borrowing could be very costly compared to domestic financing) and channel 
the saving towards investments for sustainable development purposes. 
What about the relationship observed between transfers (that is, migrants’ remittances and aid 
flows) and the likelihood of fiscal consolidation in developing countries?  
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Despite the well-known positive macroeconomic effects of remittances, the rise of the latter 
appears to lead governments’ recipients in developing countries to adopt fiscal profligacy 
measures and to consolidate their budgets further. Better management of the revenues derived 
from these private transfers during their booms could help avoid such situations and allow 
greater room for manoeuvre for governments’ recipients to implement countercyclical 
measures during bad times. Furthermore, the fact that the unpredictability of ODA flows does 
not appear to exert an impact on this probability does not rule out the possible of effect of 
unexpected aid shortfalls or rises on other macroeconomic variables (for e.g., on inflation and 
real exchange rate) and consequently of threatening the macroeconomic stability of the 
recipient country. As a result, a predictability of aid flows is strongly desirable. 
Let us now turn to the relationship between structural economic vulnerability and public 
indebtedness in developing countries. The results suggest that, as for economic growth and 
other macroeconomic indicators, structural vulnerability also matters seriously for 
indebtedness in developing countries, particularly in LICs. We also obtain that this structural 
economic vulnerability affects the likelihood of CFA Franc Zone countries to engage in 
excessive public indebtedness. Hence, given the development challenges faced by developing 
countries and particularly LICs/CFA Franc Zone countries, it is likely that repeated 
experiences of structural shocks will not facilitate the implementation of appropriate policy 
responses to these shocks. This is because further to one shock, the response capacity of these 
countries weakens, which subsequently increases their structural economic vulnerability. In 
such context, the international development institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) should take into account such vulnerability in their 
assessment of the adequate development policies and recommendations - especially those 
related to debt issues -, to these countries.  
Several international policy options, including a rise in international assistance (mainly in the 
form of grants) and private financing could be explored to directly address the structural 
vulnerability of these economies, while ensuring that such flows are managed in a way to 
avoid any adverse macroeconomic implications, particularly substantial public debt. In the 
meantime, the international community should ensure that these countries reduce over the 
medium and long term their high dependence on international assistance as, sooner or later, 
aid flows will severely shrink, situation which is best illustrated by the current economic 
conditions of developed countries. The international community should also develop 
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mechanisms that help these countries increase their capacity to design the appropriate policy 
responses to further shocks on their economies. 
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CONCLUSION GENERALE 
L’examen des conséquences des épisodes budgétaires dans les principaux pays donateurs de 
l’OCDE sur l’offre d’APD (Chapitre I) nous conduit aux conclusions suivantes :  
- Premièrement, sur l’échantillon total des pays principaux donateurs de l’OCDE, les 
épisodes de consolidation budgétaire réduisent l’aide aux PED bénéficiaires, cette baisse 
diminuant cependant avec le temps. Cependant, les effets des épisodes d’expansion 
budgétaire dépendent du type de variable d’aide considéré avec un effet positif observé 
sur la variable « Aide Nette » de Roodman (2008, 2012) et un effet statistiquement nul 
obtenu pour les autres variables d’aide.    
- Deuxièmement, les pays de l’Union Européenne (UE) affichent le même comportement 
en matière d’offre d’aide que ceux de l’échantillon total. En revanche, le sous-échantillon 
des pays n’appartenant pas à l’UE se comporte différemment avec une absence d’effet 
des sévères épisodes d’austérité budgétaire sur leur offre d’APD et un effet négatif sur 
l’APD des périodes d’expansion budgétaire.       
L’analyse des conséquences des transferts des migrants et de l’imprévisibilité de l’APD sur 
les choix de consolidation budgétaire a été conduite en distinguant deux types de mesures 
d’austérité budgétaire : les mesures d’austérité budgétaire rapide et les mesures budgétaires 
d’austérité graduelles. Les résultats se présentent comme suit :  
- Les transferts des migrants accroissent la probabilité de consolidation budgétaire 
(graduelle ou rapide). Ce résultat demeure valide lorsqu’on considère les sous-
échantillons des économies fortement dépendantes des transferts des migrants et des 
PFR, à l’exception que pour ces derniers, il n’y a pas d’effet des transferts des 
migrants sur la décision d’adopter des mesures de consolidation graduelles. Cet effet 
obtenu des transferts des migrants semble parfois transiter par les recettes et/ou les 
dépenses de l’Etat.     
- L’imprévisibilité les flux d’APD n’affecte pas la propension des gouvernements des 
PED à adopter des mesures d’austérité budgétaire. Les résultats demeurent vrais 
lorsqu’on focalise sur les deux sous-échantillons précités. Une utilisation usage de 
cette aide qui n’affecte pas directement le budget pourrait expliquer de tels résultats. 
De même, ces résultats pourraient tenir au fait qu’une meilleure gouvernance 
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annihilerait l’effet statistiquement significatif de l’imprévisibilité de l’APD sur la 
probabilité d’adopter des mesures d’austérité budgétaire dans les PED.         
 
L’examen des effets de la vulnérabilité structurelle des PED sur leur endettement met en 
évidence des résultats tout aussi intéressants : 
- On observe une relation non-linéaire en forme de « U » entre la vulnérabilité 
structurelle (ou ses composantes) et la dette publique des PED. Cette relation demeure 
valide lorsque l’on s’intéresse à l’échantillon des PRII et PRIS et suggère que l’effet 
positif de la vulnérabilité sur l’endettement n’apparaît qu’au-delà d’un seuil de  
vulnérabilité des PED. Les résultats demeurent aussi valides lorsque l’analyse est 
réalisée sur des périodes décennales. 
- En revanche, pour les PFR, cette relation en forme de « U » n’est observée que sur des 
périodes décennales.   
- Ces résultats montrent combien la vulnérabilité structurelle est déterminante dans 
l’endettement public des PED et en l’occurrence celui des PFR.  
En focalisant sur les pays de la Zone Franc CFA, nous nous intéressons à la façon dont leur 
vulnérabilité structurelle les contraint à adopter des mesures d’endettement excessif. Cette 
étude est donc réalisée en nous appuyant sur la règle d’endettement adoptée par les pays de 
cette zone : le ratio de la dette publique totale (dette domestique et dette extérieure) du pays à 
son PIB ne devra pas excéder 70%. 
Les résultats des analyses suggèrent un effet non-linéaire de la vulnérabilité structurelle sur la 
probabilité d’endettement excessif des pays de la zone Franc CFA. En effet, on observe que 
plus ces pays sont vulnérables, plus leur probabilité d’endettement excessif s’accroit, mais 
pour des niveaux de vulnérabilité très élevés, cette probabilité décline significativement. De 
même, ce résultat reste indépendant d’une amélioration de la qualité des institutions de ces 
pays (qui sont d’ailleurs pour la plupart des PMA) qui est sensée atténuer leur vulnérabilité 
structurelle.  
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Implications en termes de politiques économiques 
Plusieurs implications en termes de politique économique émergent de ces résultats relatifs 
aux effets des épisodes budgétaires dans les pays de l’OCDE sur leur offre d’aide :    Nous pouvons déduire des résultats obtenus que les mesures d'ajustement budgétaire 
actuellement en cours dans plusieurs pays développés donateurs, spécialement l'Union 
européenne auront des répercussions négatives sur l'APD, répercussions qui pourraient 
être bien plus fortes que nous l'espérions. Les statistiques récentes de l’OCDE en 
matière d’offre d’APD par les principaux donateurs semblent confirmer les résultats 
obtenus et ce, au regard de la crise que traversent actuellement les finances publiques 
des pays développés. Ces coupes dans l'APD affecteraient sensiblement les dépenses 
d'investissement des PED, notamment en Afrique avec des effets notoirement négatifs 
et significatifs sur la croissance économique et la réduction de la pauvreté. En 
conséquence, l'atteinte des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) 
sera compromise dans ces pays.  En dépit du rôle crucial que jouent aujourd'hui les flux d'APD dans les pays 
récipiendaires (plus particulièrement les PFR), ces derniers devront réduire leur 
dépendance à l'aide à long terme. Á cet égard, la Communauté Internationale a un rôle 
important à y jouer, notamment en aidant ces pays à une meilleure mobilisation des 
recettes fiscales. Un accent important devra être aussi mis sur les mécanismes de 
financement innovants (tels que décidés lors du Sommet de Monterrey en 2002) à 
travers par exemple la taxe sur les transactions financières internationales et la 
réduction des coûts des transferts des migrants au niveau international. Par ailleurs, 
l'approfondissement des marchés financiers domestiques dans ces pays pourrait les 
aider à moins dépendre des flux de capitaux étrangers (dont l'emprunt pourrait coûter 
plus cher que le financement domestique) et orienter leur épargne vers des 
investissements qui contribueraient à un développement durable.    
Qu'en est-il de la relation entre les transferts (les transferts des migrants et l'APD) et la 
probabilité de consolidation budgétaire dans les PED?  
En dépit des effets macro-économiques positifs bien connus des transferts des migrants, une 
hausse de ces transferts conduit les gouvernements récipiendaires des PED à adopter des 
mesures budgétaires laxistes qui vont conduire par la suite à une consolidation de leurs 
finances publiques. Une meilleure gestion des recettes issues de ces transferts durant les 
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périodes de boom économique pourrait aider à éviter de telles situations et offrir une marge de 
manœuvre plus importante à ces gouvernements pour la mise en œuvre de politiques contra-
cycliques pendant les périodes de basse conjoncture. En outre, l'absence d'effet de 
l'imprévisibilité de l'APD sur cette probabilité de consolidation budgétaire des PED n'enlève 
en rien la possibilité pour cette imprévisibilité de l'APD d'influer sur les autres variables 
macro-économiques (telles que l'inflation, et le taux de change réel). En conséquence, une 
forte prévisibilité de l'APD est souhaitable.       
Considérons à présent la relation entre la vulnérabilité économique structurelle et 
l'endettement public des pays en développement. Les résultats suggèrent que, autant que la 
croissance économique et d'autres indicateurs macro-économiques, cette vulnérabilité influe 
sérieusement sur l'endettement des PED et en l'occurrence celui des Pays à Faible Revenu 
(PFR). Nous avons également observé que cette vulnérabilité structurelle affecte la probabilité 
pour les pays Africains de la Zone Franc de s'engager dans un endettement excessif.  
Ainsi, au regard des défis des PED et particulièrement des PFR/Pays Africains de la Zone 
Franc, il est probable que les expériences répétées de chocs structurels ne faciliteront pas la 
mise en œuvre de réponse de politique appropriées à ces chocs. Cela tient au fait qu'à la suite 
d'un choc, la capacité de réponse de ces pays s'affaiblit, ce qui accroît leur vulnérabilité 
économique structurelle. Dans un tel contexte, les Institutions Internationales telles que la 
Banque Mondiale et le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) devront prendre en compte cette 
vulnérabilité dans l'évaluation des politiques de développement ainsi que leurs 
recommandations – en particulier sur les questions liées à l'endettement – pour ces pays.   
Plusieurs options de politiques économiques pourraient être explorées: une hausse de l'aide 
internationale (notamment sous forme de dons) et le financement privé, en s'assurant que de 
tels flux soient gérés de façon à éviter les conséquences macro-économiques fâcheuses, 
notamment en termes d'endettement. Dans le même temps, la Communauté Internationale 
devra s'assurer qu'à moyen ou long terme, ces pays réduisent leur dépendance à l'aide 
internationale puisque tôt ou tard, les flux d'aide s'amenuiseront, telles que le montrent 
actuellement les conditions économiques des pays développés. Il incombe également à la 
Communauté internationale de développer des mécanismes susceptibles d'aider ces pays à 
accroître leur capacité à répondre de façon adéquate aux chocs économiques qui affecteraient 
leurs économies.    
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